A Green-Water Testbed: Vietnam’s New Multi-Role Frigate

On 10 August 2026, Sông Thu Corporation, a military-owned shipyard, initiated the construction of a new multi-role anti-submarine frigate of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes in Da Nang for the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN). It is not known how many more of these ships will be built. When built, the new frigate will be the largest and most technologically sophisticated warship ever built domestically. It is a new class of warship and represents a pivotal moment in Vietnamese naval strategy.

The new warship also represents a transition away from Russia as a traditional supplier due to problems in that country’s defence industry. It operationalises Vietnam’s “maritime-oriented continental” grand strategy: while Hanoi’s long-standing continental mindset continues to dominate maritime strategy, there is a growing recognition of the importance of the sea. The development of the frigates also aligns with the 2030 naval force modernisation guidelines and serves as an operational testbed for indigenous military technologies. By bridging pragmatic Russian design with homegrown weapon suites, Vietnam is demonstrating that its strategy of defence-industrial self-reliance is a functional capability.

Since the early 2000s, Hanoi has shifted its strategic focus eastward, recognising the maritime domain as vital to its economic prosperity and national security. To counter high-intensity naval threats, primarily from China, without compromising its readiness with all of its three continental neighbours, the 2019 White Defence Paper prioritised the immediate modernisation of the Navy within strict budget limits. Breaking a decade-long procurement hiatus in major surface combatants, the new multi-role warship operationalises the maritime posture and establishes an indigenously driven mechanism for sustainable fleet expansion.

Official defence directives clarify that Vietnam’s naval posture precludes the need for a blue-water oceanic fleet. Instead, naval modernisation focuses on reinforcing naval regions while creating a mobile, modern offshore task group to secure contested waters. The new frigate fits squarely within this force structure. By pairing an indigenously produced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar with a twelve-cell vertical launch system (VLS), likely for air-defence missiles, the ship expands its protective reach beyond self-defence to cover an entire group of accompanying vessels. To conduct anti-submarine warfare, which is the main task of the new frigate, it integrates dual RBU-6000 rocket launchers, twin 533mm torpedo tubes, hull sonar (and possibly towed-array sonar), and a helideck for a Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopter. This setup allows the crew to detect, track and engage underwater targets across multiple ranges. An eight-cell launch array for domestic VCM-family anti-ship cruise missiles (Vietnam Cruise Missile made by Viettel – possibly the 300 km VCM-02 variant) gives the vessel the long-range firepower needed to strike enemy surface ships from a safe distance.

The warship does not mark an abrupt technological leap. Rather, it is the product of systematic, decade-long investments in domestic defence-industrial infrastructure dating back to the 2010s.

The warship does not mark an abrupt technological leap. Rather, it is the product of systematic, decade-long investments in domestic defence-industrial infrastructure dating back to the 2010s. The success of the current programme builds on years of incremental fleet building. First, light surface combatants evolved through design experience gained from fast-attack craft programmes, such as the BPS-500 baseline and TT-400TP series. Second, specialised fleet support matured through the domestic construction of complex auxiliary platforms, including landing craft, transport ships, and the submarine rescue ship Yết Kiêu 927. Third, Vietnam adopted pragmatic engineering partnerships based on a purchased hull. As with the TT-400TP project, Vietnam leveraged Russian naval architecture for hydrodynamic reliability while retaining control over shipyard construction at Sông Thu Corporation and internal system integration.

Beyond its immediate combat roles, the vessel serves as the primary operational testbed for the VPN. Technologically, the platform integrates a range of locally manufactured sensors and shooters. It serves as a proving ground for sensor-to-shooter automation by linking fixed-panel AESA radar and Combat Management Systems developed by Viettel (a major state-owned technology conglomerate). This automates threat tracking and target assignment for vertical-launch air defence and AK-630 close-in weapon systems. It also validates the sea-going performance of locally produced VCM anti-ship cruise missiles and indigenous vertical-launch controls under real-world maritime conditions. Furthermore, it establishes a standardised hardware configuration comprising domestic AK-176 artillery, RBU-6000 launchers, and radar suites that can be standardised across future domestic warship production runs.

By introducing this vessel into the fleet, the Navy can refine its operational concepts. It enables the testing of real-time tactical data links between offshore task groups, coastal missile brigades, island garrisons, and airborne assets. It could serve as a command-and-control flagship for mobile task forces, giving commanders operational experience in coordinating joint air defence, surface strike, and anti-submarine sweeps in green-water sectors.

However, as the vessel assumes these demanding roles, its primary mission of anti-submarine warfare reveals key technical bottlenecks. In discussions with the author, Chinese and Vietnamese defence enthusiasts have quickly pointed out several potential shortcomings of the new project. Developing and manufacturing sonar arrays with consistent, high-grade underwater acoustic performance remains exceptionally difficult, meaning early hulls will almost certainly rely on imported sonar suites (possibly from the French company Thales). Furthermore, critical dependencies persist in propulsion and high-end metallurgy, where foreign engines and specialised steel remain necessary, demonstrating that full domestic independence across every system remains an incremental, long-term challenge.

Beyond Vietnam, this platform exemplifies a regional shift across Southeast Asian navies toward larger, heavily armed multi-role surface combatants, such as Indonesia’s Merah Putih (Arrowhead 140) frigates, the Philippines’ Miguel Malvar-class frigates, and Malaysia’s Maharaja Lela-class programme. Despite the rise of asymmetric sea-denial capabilities such as uncrewed surface vessels and precision coastal strike capabilities, regional powers recognise that resilient multi-role combatants remain essential for command and control, long-range endurance, and multi-domain operations. By integrating domestic systems, most notably AESA radar and VCM missile systems, onto a Russian-origin design, Vietnam demonstrates a meaningful, if partial, form of strategic autonomy: the capacity to operationalise domestic defence technology at scale.

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