A ‘Reverse Nixon’ Attempt by Trump? A Chinese View

During the early months of Trump’s second presidency, Washington made a drastic U-turn in its policy towards Europe, Russia, and Ukraine: Trump expressed sympathy with Russia on its conditions for a peace deal and engaged in high-level talks with Moscow, signaling an intent to possibly engineer a US-Russian rapprochement, even at the cost of straining transatlantic ties. Some observers suggested that Trump was pursuing a “Reverse Nixon” approach – seeking to reconcile with Russia in order to redirect the US strategic focus towards countering China. Although Trump’s recent outburst of frustration with Russian President Putin might have put paid to this notion, it may not have completely assuaged European concerns. This article assesses the likelihood and sustainability of a Reverse Nixon.

The greatest problem with a Reverse Nixon attempt is that Trump cannot possibly meet the conditions that Russia would demand for a ceasefire, including de facto occupation of Ukrainian territories and permanent denial of Ukraine’s NATO membership. Regardless of Trump’s personal views, deep-rooted anti-Russia sentiments remain strong across the US political establishment and civil society. Bipartisan coalitions in the Senate continue to press for additional sanctions against Russia. Any attempt by Trump to stall this effort in order to placate Putin would almost certainly trigger a strong domestic backlash.

Moreover, the geopolitical price of swaying Russia would be exorbitant. Putin has repeatedly signalled to Western leaders that any sustainable European security architecture must recognise Russia’s “historical rights” over Eastern Europe. Acquiescing to this demand would, in effect, place parts of Eastern Europe back under Russian influence. Such a concession would no doubt signal the death of NATO and, along with it, the transatlantic alliance – a cornerstone of the US global hegemony since the end of the Second World War.

On the flipside, it is also very unlikely that Moscow would fully embrace Trump’s goodwill gestures. Trump’s greatest problem is that he is seen as untrustworthy and an unconventional and iconoclastic national leader. Russian decision-makers would be concerned that a future US president could change course under internal anti-Russia pressure. As problems between the United States and Russia are deep and structural, mutual trust is almost non-existent, and neither side is capable of pursuing, or willing to pursue, a genuine rapprochement. As such, a Reverse Nixon is more illusion than strategy. And Russia would see little reason to commit the nation to such a reckless strategy only to bring instability upon its entire eastern flank, while also irreparably damaging a trustworthy partnership with China, reaffirmed by dozens of joint statements, leaders’ visits, and high-level meetings.

For Europe, its position in the US-Russia-China trilateral dynamic is becoming increasingly difficult. With Russia posing a direct security threat and Trump waging a “cultural war” against European political values, the continent is experiencing intense anxiety and insecurity not seen since the end of the Second World War.

As problems between the United States and Russia are deep and structural, mutual trust is almost non-existent, and neither side is capable of pursuing, or willing to pursue, a genuine rapprochement.

This pressure has pushed Europe to fundamentally rethink its defence strategy and focus on pragmatic diplomacy, notably with regard to China. Subtle shifts in tone are already observable: recent statements by high-ranking European officials, including European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, Netherlands Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp, and France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, show a more positive attitude towards Beijing. Furthermore, negotiations over some trade issues are making progress, such as exploring a floor price for electric vehicles from China. These developments suggest Europe’s growing interest in expanding cooperation with China – reminiscent of its outreach during Trump’s first term – as a hedge against mounting transatlantic volatility.

We may see some improvements in Europe-China trade relations, along with joint efforts to build consensus on the need to preserve multilateralism and global governance. But such a trend will not in any way reduce the complexity of EU-China relations. The European Union insists on casting China as a systemic rival and remains deeply concerned about Europe’s high-tech sectors coming under increasing competitive pressure from China. Meanwhile, Europe remains frustrated with the inability to expand common ground with China over the conflict in Ukraine. These concerns will not go away overnight just because Trump has pushed an extortionist agenda with the European Union.

Thus, it would be premature to expect a fundamental shift in Europe’s strategic posture towards China in the coming years. For sure, the profound sense of betrayal from an increasingly “un-transatlantic” US government and fears that Trumpism would have an enduring influence in American society will drive Europe to push for more strategic autonomy in the long run. But Europe’s options remain constrained. The continent remains divided, and the political will to collectively “wake up” is uneven at best. While the strategic impulse to chart a more independent path is growing, it is far from consolidated.

Even if decisive actions were taken today, a leading European defence think tank estimates that it would take at least 10 years for Europe to develop a full-fledged, independent self-defence capability. In the meantime, European nations will have little choice but to continue relying on American defence guarantees, hence continuing their strategic dependence on the United States.

In conclusion, Trump’s second presidency has undoubtedly unsettled the dynamics of US-Europe-Russia relations, but the fundamental structure of these relationships remains unaltered. Trump’s attempts to drive a wedge between Russia and China are unlikely to have a lasting impact. Neither will Europe fundamentally reassess its posture towards China even amid rising doubts about the reliability of the US alliance. Trump’s latest outburst against Putin and his decision to supply more weapons to Ukraine suggest that a Reverse Nixon strategy is unlikely in current circumstances, or at most unsustainable.

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