A Tale of Two (or More) Prime Ministers

Despite coming to power with substantial parliamentary backing, Srettha Thavisin still faces scepticism about his authority as prime minister. The issue extends beyond questions of legitimacy, which remains shaky given that his appointment was secured through a controversial alliance between Pheu Thai and military-backed elements. This arrangement, which excluded the Move Forward Party, the winner of the May general elections, has been widely criticised as a betrayal of Thai voters’ mandate. Rather, the prevailing concern is about Srettha’s autonomy or the apparent lack thereof, with Thaksin Shinawatra and his youngest daughter Paetongtarn still in the picture.

Srettha’s perceived lack of de facto power as prime minister came under scrutiny in October following the screening of the movie “Sap Pa Rer (The Undertaker),” attended by cabinet ministers and Paetongtarn. When a reporter referred to Srettha as “Prime Minister,” he jokingly replied, “Which prime minister? Thailand has two prime ministers.” His standing was further questioned after a Pheu Thai Party meeting two days later, when Srettha congratulated Paetongtarn on becoming the party’s leader with a hand kiss and a bow. Despite Srettha’s subsequent attempt to retract the comment after being questioned by veteran journalist Suthichai Yoon, his initial remark inadvertently underscored the ambiguity surrounding the real locus of power in the government.

This ambiguity allows for a far-fetched yet plausible interpretation — that Srettha may be acting as a puppet for Thaksin, who secretly wields influence from a private room on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital, and through his daughter, Paetongtarn. Paetongtarn not only formally leads Pheu Thai but also remains one of the party’s prime ministerial candidates. Paetongtarn maintains that the “Shinawatra family does not own Pheu Thai; Pheu Thai belongs to everyone”. But only Paetongtarn commands the party’s endorsement to potentially become Thailand’s next prime minister.

Theoretically, Paetongtarn may replace Srettha as the prime minister. This might happen after the junta-appointed Senate’s term ends in May 2024 and the prime minister is selected solely by Members of the House of Representatives. In the meantime, Srettha will continue to play his part as a “salesman prime minister” to court foreign investments to Thailand. Domestically, he will pave the way for Paetongtarn, such as by allowing her to “shadow” him during his trips to the provinces (thus giving new meaning to the word) and appointing her as the deputy chairwoman of the National Soft Power Strategy Committee, a role that comes with real budgetary power but limited accountability. At the same time, Srettha will also turn a blind eye to any signs of possible special treatment to ensure Thaksin’s comfortable life outside prison.

“If it is indeed the case that Srettha operates within narrow confines, this raises significant concerns about governance in Thailand. This situation implies that crucial policy decisions and government actions may reflect the interests and preferences of Thaksin rather than the needs of the people.”

Ultimately, this interpretation is captivating not so much due to concrete evidence of Thaksin’s meddling in government affairs, but rather because of Srettha’s perceived lack of political clout with Thaksin lurking in the background like a shadow puppeteer. Similar doubts have plagued previous prime ministers in Srettha’s position. This includes Samak Sundaravej, and has even extended to members of Thaksin’s own family, such as Somchai Wongsawat, who is married to Thaksin’s sister Yaowapha, and Yingluck Shinawatra, who did not shy away from campaigning under the slogan “Thaksin Thinks, Pheu Thai Acts” in 2011.

Srettha’s situation bears similarities to Samak’s in that he is an outsider to the Shinawatra family. However, Srettha does not hold any formal leadership position in Pheu Thai and has no direct influence over any Pheu Thai MPs. Worse, it is an open secret that Srettha’s ascent to the role of prime minister owed much to Thaksin and little to his personal popularity. Throughout the government formation period earlier this year, it was Thaksin whom Pheu Thai leaders and other party leaders turned to for advice. Thaksin’s return on 22 August to Thailand just hours before the vote for Srettha’s appointment as prime minister further reinforced the perception that he played a pivotal role in Srettha’s selection. It is, therefore, unsurprising that both the cabinet and even his own official team of advisors are replete with individuals closely associated with Thaksin. After all, Srettha was chosen; he did not choose.

If it is indeed the case that Srettha operates within narrow confines, this raises significant concerns about governance in Thailand. This situation implies that crucial policy decisions and government actions may reflect the interests and preferences of Thaksin rather than the needs of the people. At stake are issues of democratic accountability, as well as critical matters such as the pace and nature of constitutional reforms, and the fate of those awaiting an amnesty bill for lese majeste charges. It remains open to question whether Srettha will be willing to tackle these issues head-on, given the potential risk of antagonising the conservative establishment, which appears to be the sole guarantor of Thaksin’s security and legal immunity.

Whatever path Srettha chooses, he must tread carefully. Failure to achieve significant accomplishments, such as the implementation of the ambitious digital wallet scheme, could jeopardise his position as prime minister. Yet, if he exceeds expectations, particularly on the domestic front, he may also face the risk of being replaced, as his successful performance could overshadow Paetongtarn and delay her rise to the premiership. Furthermore, if Srettha aligns himself too closely with Thaksin, he could face significant public backlash, much like Yingluck. Her government’s attempt to pass a controversial amnesty bill, which would have allowed Thaksin to return home without facing charges, resulted in widespread protests and, eventually, the 2014 coup d’état.

On the other hand, if Srettha treads too carefully and does little to please the Shinawatras, he may find himself left in the cold, similar to Samak whose bid to return to power in 2008 after being dislodged by the Constitutional Court was thwarted by his party’s decision to nominate Somchai Wongsawat as his replacement. Ultimately, Srettha’s lifeline, setting him apart from all previous Thaksinite parties’ prime ministers, may be his status as a political outsider and a classic Thai elite background that places him closer to the traditional centres of power in Thai society — a status that not even Thaksin can lay claim to. The rest depends on his political acumen to leverage this trait, which, as of now, he has demonstrated only indirectly.

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