All Roads Lead to Bhumjaithai?

Widely known as the party founded by Buriram-based politician-turned-sports-mogul Newin Chidchob, the Bhumjaithai Party is emerging as a major political force after candidates affiliated with the party dominated the Thai Senate election in June. Despite being the third-largest party in the House and adhering to a traditional political blueprint centred on patronage and dynastic politics, Bhumjaithai has demonstrated the potential to become an unexpected yet credible champion of the conservative status quo, countering the push for further pro-democracy reforms.

Bhumjaithai was forged in the wake of a mass defection by Newin and his faction from Pheu Thai (PT)’s predecessor, Palang Prachachon, after its dissolution in 2008. Its inception marked Newin’s break with Thaksin Shinawatra, who was Palang Prachachon’s de facto leader when he was in exile. Since then, it has made surprising inroads into traditionally Democrat strongholds in the South, and proved to be highly adaptable to challenges such as redesigned constituencies, changing electoral systems, and evolving national political currents (Table 1 and Figure 1).

Unlike parties such as PT and the Move Forward Party (MFP), which focus on building party brands through policy offerings and ideological stances, Bhumjaithai has prioritised consolidating power locally. In the previous administration, Bhumjaithai built strong local networks through infrastructure projects overseen by the Ministry of Transportation and village health volunteers organised by the Ministry of Public Health, of which Bhumjaithai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul was the minister. The party is now in an even stronger position to influence and mobilise electoral support through local authorities after Anutin turned to head the Ministry of Interior.

Furthermore, Bhumjaithai has actively participated in the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) elections, which are held to elect the chief executives and members of the Provincial Councils that oversee local governance in each province. This has enabled Bhumjaithai to entrench and expand its influence beyond its traditional strongholds, typically anchored by political families with ties to Newin. The upcoming PAO elections will be critical for Bhumjaithai as it seeks to transform into a full-fledged political machine with large reserves of vote canvassers, access to patronage resources, and support from local authorities.

Yet, what sets Bhumjaithai apart is not these tactics alone but its strategic positioning in a political landscape where, in Newin’s words, “there are no permanent friends or enemies.” The party has cemented its status as the quintessential power broker. This stems from its lack of ideological commitments (except being more pro-monarchy in recent years), aggressive tactic in poaching MPs from other parties, and Teflon-like pragmatism in forming and switching alliances (which gave rise to the Prayut Chan-o-cha government in 2019 and the current PT-led government). This status enabled the party to secure lucrative ministerial portfolios and policy concessions, including the decriminalisation of cannabis and hemp in 2022, despite not being the ruling party.

Gaining Ground

Table 1: Election results for the Bhumjaithai Party in general elections from 2011 to 2023

Election Years	Voting Systems	Election Results
2011 Election	Parallel Voting	34 / 500
2019 Election	Mixed Member Apportionment (MMA)	51 / 500
2023 Election	Parallel Voting	70 / 500

Figure 1: Districts won by the Bhumjaithai Party in general elections from 2011 to 2023

However, recent developments have shown that Bhumjaithai’s modus operandi may no longer be limited to brokering coalitions and staying under the radar for the sake of doing business with politics. During the selection process for prime minister in July 2023, Bhumjaithai’s Chada Thaised fiercely justified the party’s decision not to support MFP’s candidate for prime minister, Pita Limajaroenrat. He argued that MFP had violated a sacred, unspoken rule in Thailand by campaigning to amend the lese majeste law, and suggested that a new law should be introduced to allow shooting people who insult the monarchy without resulting in imprisonment — a statement that even some die-hard royalists would find extreme.

The question of whether Bhumjaithai truly has what it takes to defend the conservative status quo in Thailand was largely settled when the party’s Blue-line senator candidates won 123 of the 200 seats (61.50%), becoming the most influential faction.

These displays of unusually fervent monarchist stances did not go unnoticed. In June, Bhumjaithai’s leader and sole prime ministerial candidate, Anutin Charnvirakul, was awarded the Chulachomklao Order, Second Class, and the Rattanaporn Medal, Third Class — the only civilian politician in a list mostly populated by members of the Privy Council and high-ranking generals, including General Prayut Chan-o-cha. In a country where symbols hold immense significance, it is not a stretch to interpret this as the anointing of a new conservative successor. In response, Anutin ordered Bhumjaithai MPs to wear yellow, a colour symbolising loyalty to the monarchy, during the latest parliamentary meetings deliberating the budget bill.

The question of whether Bhumjaithai truly has what it takes to defend the conservative status quo in Thailand was largely settled when the party’s Blue-line senator candidates won 123 of the 200 seats (61.50%), becoming the most influential faction (Figure 2).

These pro-Bhumjaithai senators are widely perceived to be part of Newin Chidchob’s clientelistic networks — this includes a former chauffeur of Newin’s father, former House Speaker Chai Chidchob — as well as former MP candidates and close associates of the Bhumjaithai party leader, Anutin Charnvirakul. Though the methods Bhumjaithai used to engineer a block vote that resulted in such a staggering outcome remain a mystery, the implications of a Bhumjaithai-dominated Senate are clearer than they initially appear.

Senate Turns Blue

Figure 2: Senate election results divided by political lines

Given Bhumjaithai’s numbers in the Senate, the party is now in a strong position to bargain with and represent conservatives whose preferred parties in the 2023 general elections did not win enough seats to matter. The Senate, while no longer having the power to participate in the selection of prime ministers alongside the House, retains the authority to endorse appointments of members to independent organisations that have, for decades, been the linchpin of judicial interventions against pro-democracy forces in Thailand. Just this year alone, the Senate will oversee new appointments for six positions in the Office of the Auditor General, one Ombudsman, three members of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and two judges in the Constitutional Court.

In addition, according to the military-drafted 2017 Constitution, amending the Constitution requires the approval of at least one-third, or 67 of the 200 Senators. It is entirely plausible, therefore, that Bhumjaithai would leverage its influence over appointments to independent bodies and block any constitutional amendments that might undermine the prerogatives of established institutions in Thailand, in exchange for more power or to extricate itself from an ongoing party dissolution case.

In this landscape, any stable government needs Bhumjaithai, while any significant political manoeuvring or institutional changes must go through the party, even if it does not appear to set the legislative and reform agendas. In short, all roads now lead to Bhumjaithai.

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