Anwar is Weak, But the Opposition is Weaker Still

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. The previous year saw a slew of cheery economic data and foreign policy coups for Malaysia. That said, the country’s prime minister has seen more than his fair share of political predicaments.

Malaysia’s 2025 GDP growth beat all estimates, and its economy is now the second fastest-growing economy in the region. In recent months, the ringgit’s performance was the best in the region. The currency has staged its best rebound in seven years, strengthening from MYR4.70 to MYR3.90 against the greenback. This reflected robust fundamentals and the fact that investors are betting on winners of the trade war. One of its crowning achievements was that foreign direct investments continued to hit record highs, with Johor leading the pack. 2025 was also the most significant foreign policy year under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Malaysia elevated its global standing, improved regional collaboration, and preserved ties with the US and China.

These uncontested achievements contrast with the predicaments that Anwar is currently facing. The recent troubles — the relocation of pig farms, temple demolition and the controversy over the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) — came in rapid succession and have put Anwar in a vulnerable position.

Anwar’s foundational strengths lie in the country’s non-Malay voter base and his anti-corruption image. The former is where his mandate originates; the latter is his moral claim as the leader hardened by a quarter-century of personal sacrifice.

In the past two general elections, Anwar’s coalition enjoyed high levels of support from non-Malay constituencies, with more than 90 per cent from Chinese voters and about 81 per cent from their Indian counterparts. These votes came primarily from West Malaysia and enabled Anwar’s coalition to triumph in three-cornered contests against a myriad of Malay parties that split the vote. The Reformasi movement that arose from Anwar’s sacking in 1998 centred on democratic reforms and ending corruption and cronyism. His fiery campaign speeches, until today, are about going after corrupt politicians and businessmen who extracted copious rent from the state (‘sakau’ in Malay). Indeed, good governance and anti-corruption are at the centre of his Madani administration.

This year Anwar’s core strengths have been challenged in successive weeks with probable ramifications, for the next general election.

… Anwar’s political woes would be a political goldmine for the opposition, but they have not capitalised on them, given that the grouping is facing deep divisions.

It started with the pig farm issue. Initially, the Selangor state government planned to relocate a large-scale pig farm. The move was greeted with enormous objections on environmental and community grounds, and was long delayed. Anwar intervened and called for the relocation of the pig farm to be halted. Subsequently, the Sultan of Selangor decreed that all pig farms should be phased out in all districts in the state, which has the country’s third-largest pig farm industry. The federal Cabinet agreed and Selangor state has stopped issuing licenses and moved to close the 114 pig farms. This resulted in potential bankruptcies and financial losses to these farmers, who are predominantly Chinese.

Despite Anwar’s efforts to find a middle ground, a total ban on such farms would likely produce a backlash from the Chinese community. To compound Anwar’s woes, this comes shortly after the remarkable Chinese swing in Sabah’s state election in November last year, which saw the Democratic Action Party (DAP) wiped out. Fearing a backlash, ministers from DAP, who mainly represent ethnic Chinese in the governing coalition, had to repeatedly reassure the Chinese community of pork supply for the Lunar New Year in mid-February.

Then came the Hindu temple demolition and relocation saga, an issue which has a history of sparking intense racial clashes, including violence. While the ‘Anti-illegal Houses of Worship Movement’ rally, involving 141 conservative NGOs protesting against the Hindu temple, was blocked by the government, Anwar vowed to ‘clean up’ these unauthorised temples. A group of men, acting on their interpretation of Anwar’s statement, took it upon themselves to demolish a Hindu temple in Rawang. Another group protested against the legal construction of a Hindu temple claiming that its location was in an area with a high percentage of Malay-Muslims.  Many in the Indian community criticised Anwar and asked him to withdraw his ‘unprecedented’ directive that had ‘serious consequences’.

Lastly, the Bloomberg exposés on MACC chief Azam Baki’s public shareholdings have triggered public backlash, leading to a 1,000-person demonstration. Bloomberg reported that Azam’s shareholdings likely exceeded the allowed threshold for civil servants (MYR100,000 per company or 5 per cent of its paid-up capital). It also reported that the commission had helped a ‘corporate mafia’ seize control of some Malaysian companies or oust their founders. This was not an isolated case regarding the MACC chief. In fact, Anwar led his coalition to protest against Azam’s shareholdings in another company in 2022. This time round, Anwar’s government’s proposal to hold a committee probe was criticised by government backbenchers as a toothless tiger with potential conflict of interest, as the scope for investigation is limited.

Ordinarily, Anwar’s political woes would be a political goldmine for the opposition, but they have not capitalised on them, given that the grouping is facing deep divisions. Its coalition chairperson post has remained vacant for nearly two months until recently, and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) has just sacked its coalition deputy chairman and leader of the opposition, Hamzah Zainudin. A few days before the sacking, 16 Bersatu parliamentarians called for the resignation of Bersatu chairperson Muhyiddin Yassin. This triggered a fresh bout of internal unrest.  

The opposition’s weakness may mean that it cannot convert the government’s troubles into political gains. However, this does not negate the possibility of a weakening government as these issues directly affect Anwar’s core mandate and moral legitimacy. At present, both Anwar and Azam seem defiant and unfazed by the criticism, and it seems likely that Azam will stay on until his contract expires in May 2026. The longer this drags on, however, the weaker the government becomes as pressure builds from within and without. Its coalition partner, DAP, is threatening to leave government positions if it does not see reforms by July 2026. In any event, a weak government and a weak opposition is a sure recipe for voter disillusionment.

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