Countering Misinformation: Where ASEAN Can Make a Difference

Southeast Asia faces a range of challenges involving misinformation and online manipulation. These include electoral falsehoods, AI-enabled extremist content, geopolitical manipulation and AI-generated deception. Some of these problems are rooted in domestic politics, while others involve actors and networks operating across national borders. For policymakers, the concern goes beyond false claims circulating online. Such claims can mislead voters about candidates or portray territorial disputes as armed confrontations. AI-generated content could also be used to amplify extremist narratives.

Electoral misinformation is a significant concern in Southeast Asia, as it can capitalise on existing political loyalties, mislead voters about what candidates said or did, and complicate informed electoral choices. During Indonesia’s 2024 election, for example, fabricated speeches attributed to political figures circulated online. Research on that election found that voters’ existing political loyalties influenced which deepfakes they believed, suggesting that AI-generated misinformation can reinforce existing political divisions.

Beyond elections, misinformation has also circulated about territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea. In separate incidents in 2024 and 2025, misleading videos falsely claimed that the Philippines had attacked and destroyed Chinese vessels. One repurposed footage from a military exercise, while the other used fabricated news reports. Such claims can whip up nationalist sentiment and make already contentious disputes harder for the public to assess.

Another growing concern is the potential misuse of AI by extremists. For instance, AI-generated TikTok videos have portrayed deceased militants involved in terrorist attacks, illustrating how the technology can be exploited to make extremist-related narratives more sensational and easier to circulate.

But the fact that several ASEAN countries face similar misinformation challenges does not necessarily mean they require a regional response. For instance, local journalists and fact-checkers familiar with the country’s politics are better placed to spot fabricated speeches targeting candidates in Indonesia’s election.

Even foreign interference does not always merit ASEAN intervention. Case in point: an October 2025 Reuters investigation uncovered a Chinese-funded operation that used a Manila-based marketing firm to spread messages supporting Beijing’s interests and discrediting the US in the Philippines. The operation relied on fake Filipino social media identities, making the messages appear to come from local users rather than an external sponsor. But while the operation involved a foreign sponsor, the investigation did not establish that the same campaign extended to other ASEAN countries. Understanding this distinction matters: foreign involvement alone, therefore, does not necessarily make it a regional problem requiring an ASEAN-level response.

A potentially stronger case for regional cooperation, however, arises when related deceptive campaigns concern more than one ASEAN country. In July 2026, a CNA investigation uncovered more than 550 TikTok videos from 30 accounts spreading misleading claims about Singapore and Malaysia, including claims that China’s Hainan Free Trade Port would undermine Singapore’s position as a major shipping hub and that policies sidelining ethnic Chinese had held back Malaysia’s development. The accounts reused scripts and synthetic presenters, suggesting a coordinated production network. But the investigation could not ascertain who operated the accounts or whether a foreign government was involved.

The regional question, then, is whether investigators in different countries could compare their findings on the accounts, narratives and distribution patterns involved in such campaigns. This is where ASEAN cooperation could add value by helping ASEAN member states (AMS) identify cross-border links and determine whether those isolated incidents are part of a broader regional operation.

AMS have already reached agreement on some basic principles. A 2018 framework called for cooperation on fact-checking and media literacy, while the 2023 guideline distinguishes misinformation, or false information spread unintentionally, from disinformation deliberately spread to deceive. But coordinated influence operations present a different challenge. They may involve fake accounts or concealed sponsorship even when some messages are factually accurate. ASEAN could therefore help AMS investigate who is behind such campaigns and how they are orchestrated without requiring them to agree on whether disputed domestic political claims are true or false.

ASEAN’s efforts have also gone beyond issuing guidelines. The ASEAN Foundation’s Digital Literacy Programme reported reaching nearly 194,000 people through workshops by November 2023. In 2025, ASEAN information ministers also acknowledged the work of the ASEAN Task Force on Fake News and information-sector working groups. These are concrete activities, but participation figures do not establish whether people became better at identifying misinformation. Nor do these accounts establish whether ASEAN has tested joint investigations of deceptive networks operating across borders.

The European External Action Service offers one example. Its investigations into foreign information manipulation examine the networks, intermediaries and infrastructure used to carry out coordinated campaigns. The FIMI Explorer helps investigators trace connections between these operations. Meanwhile, the EU’s Digital Services Act Transparency Database publishes platforms’ reasons for removing or restricting content, making those decisions open to public scrutiny.

ASEAN, however, lacks the EU’s legal teeth to compel such disclosures from Big Tech. But it could still adapt the investigative methods and explore a regional incident-reporting network. Some of the relevant measures in ASEAN’s 2026–2035 Work Plan for Information and Media are scheduled for 2029 or later. Singapore could therefore use its 2027 ASEAN Chairmanship to propose early trials of selected measures.

One starting point is to make cross-border deceptive campaigns easier to investigate. Under Action 5.8 of ASEAN’s work plan, AMS are encouraged to cooperate against cross-border threats involving the misuse of digital technologies. Through ASEAN’s information-sector officials, the bloc, under Singapore’s chairmanship, could test the proposed incident-reporting network against a handful of suspected cross-border campaigns. AMS, social media platforms and researchers could compare where content first appeared, which accounts or scripts were reused, and what remains unknown about the operators. By comparing their findings, investigators could see whether the same accounts or networks were behind campaigns targeting different countries, without each country having to investigate the same accounts separately.

Another issue is what social media platforms reveal about deceptive campaigns. Under Action 5.11 of ASEAN’s work plan, ASEAN envisages reports on takedowns of misinformation. But knowing how many posts were removed tells investigators little about who is behind deceptive campaigns, how the accounts are connected or whether the same networks operate across different countries. TikTok already publishes reports on covert influence operations, which provide a useful starting point for investigating such networks. But these reports alone may not establish whether the same operators are behind deceptive campaigns targeting different ASEAN countries.

Earlier ASEAN initiatives have already laid the groundwork for cooperation on misinformation, particularly through common guidelines, digital literacy programmes and information-sharing efforts. What has yet to be established is whether such cooperation can help investigators uncover connections between campaigns targeting different countries. Building on this work, Singapore could start by bringing together interested AMS and independent researchers to square these reports against findings from existing investigations. Where information is missing, they should ask platforms for clarification. Even if the platforms decline, the exercise could still establish what investigators know and what remains unclear. Nor would it require governments to disclose their own takedown requests.

But better reporting is only part of the response. Investigators also need the skills to check the material behind suspected deceptive campaigns. Under Action 2.12 of ASEAN’s work plan, ASEAN proposes training hubs covering fact-checking and the use of AI tools in newsrooms.  Singapore could build on these earlier efforts by giving the proposed training a practical focus by using AI-assisted translation to compare claims across languages and checking whether audio or video has been manipulated. Independent fact-checkers, journalists and researchers could practise these checks together. Participants could be tested on sample material before and after training, without compromising their editorial independence.

Ultimately, the onus is not on ASEAN to intervene every time misinformation surfaces in one of its member states. But when deceptive campaigns involve actors and networks operating across borders, individual countries may struggle to establish the full picture. Singapore’s 2027 Chairmanship could help determine whether ASEAN cooperation can close that gap.

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Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely and critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre. The ASEAN@60 Special Edition series marks the organisation’s 60th anniversary in 2027 and highlights the key issues that will shape ASEAN and Southeast Asia as the organisation enters its seventh decade.