Liquified natural gas (LNG)-fired Nhon Trach 3 and 4 power plants in Dai Phuoc, Vietnam. (Photo by PV Power via GE Vernova)

Coal Now, Clean Later? Vietnam’s Energy Security Dilemma

Published

Vietnam is facing a hard trade-off between energy security and its 2050 net-zero pledge. With cleaner alternatives lagging, coal is a necessary bridge, but Hanoi must keep its reliance on coal brief and reassess honestly its climate timeline.

On 12 November 2026, Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade signed a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract for the long-delayed 1,200 megawatts (MW) Nam Dinh I Thermal Power Plant with a South Korean investor, TKG Taekwang. The coal-fired plant, located in the northern province of Ninh Binh, is expected to come into operation in 2030. The investor has pledged to reduce the plant’s emissions to roughly that of an liquified natural gas (LNG)-fired facility’s level, at the investor’s expense. Even so, the signing appears difficult to reconcile with Vietnam’s net-zero pledge for 2050.

This development also raises a critical question: How can Vietnam reconcile its immediate need for reliable power with its long-term commitment to a clean energy transition?

Since making its pledge at COP26 in 2021, Vietnam has framed the green transition as a pillar of economic growth, rather than simply a climate obligation. Politburo Resolution 70 of August 2025 on national energy security targets renewables at 25–30 per cent of primary energy supply by 2030, alongside a sharp reduction in coal’s share. The revised Power Development Plan VIII caps coal-fired capacity at 31,055 MW through 2030, with no new coal-fired projects thereafter.

However, energy security has increasingly become the government’s overriding concern. In 2023, extreme heat and drought triggered rolling blackouts across northern Vietnam, home to many export-oriented factories. The World Bank estimated the cost at USD1.4 billion, about 0.3 per cent of GDP. This episode damaged Vietnam’s reputation as a reliable manufacturing alternative to China. This year’s events have brought other shocks: the Iran war and closure of the Strait of Hormuz pushed fuel prices sharply higher, while inflation rose to 5.6 per cent in May, its highest since 2020.

With double-digit growth an official objective, the government has instructed Vietnam Electricity to increase power generation by more than 15 per cent in 2026. However, clean-energy alternatives cannot yet meet demand on that scale. Vietnam’s wind and solar capacity surged from almost nothing in 2016 to 21.84 gigawatts (GW) in 2023, among the fastest proportional expansions anywhere, but growth then slowed sharply after feed-in tariff schemes, where investors are paid high guaranteed prices for 20 years, expired without replacement. A prolonged dispute over retroactive tariff cuts affecting 173 projects has made lenders and investors more cautious. Curtailment has also increased in central Vietnam, where energy generation has outpaced grid development. Transmission infrastructure alone requires around USD18.1 billion in investment between 2026 and 2030. More importantly, without sufficient baseload generation, flexible capacity and storage, intermittent wind and solar power cannot guarantee uninterrupted electricity for factories and other major users.

Nam Dinh I captures Vietnam’s dilemma: growth requires power today, while decarbonisation demands decades-long commitments.

Hydropower offers additional but limited scope. Most of Vietnam’s large-scale potential has already been exploited, while its share of installed capacity fell to around 28 per cent in 2025. Nuclear power is a credible long-term option, but not a quick one. In March 2026, Vietnam and Russia signed an agreement for two VVER-1200 reactors at Ninh Thuan 1, backed by a USD8 billion Russian export credit covering up to 85 per cent of construction costs. However, construction has not begun and Vietnam has not identified a foreign partner for the Ninh Thuan 2 project, casting doubt on whether its first nuclear power plants can come online by 2035.

LNG has fared even worse. Vietnam targets 22.5 GW of LNG-fired capacity by 2030, but only one of 18 government-monitored projects, Hiep Phuoc (4.4 GW over three phases), appears to be on schedule. The rest are held up by stalled negotiations over power purchase agreements, financing gaps and volatile LNG import prices.

Coal therefore remains the cheapest and most immediately feasible option. It supplied 57.2 per cent of Vietnam’s electricity in early 2025. For a government pursuing double-digit growth and high-tech investment, which both require abundant, reliable electricity, retaining coal in the near term is understandable.

However, coal must remain temporary. Nam Dinh I’s BOT term runs for 25 years from commercial operations, taking it to around 2055 — beyond Vietnam’s net-zero deadline. That risks either a stranded asset or its expensive early retirement. Investor preferences are also changing: around 80 per cent of foreign-invested firms prefer industrial parks with green energy infrastructure, as multinationals’ RE100 commitments push supply chains towards cleaner power. Vietnam has strong domestic reasons to support decarbonisation. Serious air pollution in major cities aside, the World Bank estimates that, if left unaddressed, climate change could cost the country 12 to 14.5 per cent of GDP annually by 2050.

Looking Ahead

If the Vietnamese government can act fast to address the above challenges to accelerate the energy transition, the 2050 target for net-zero emission may still be achievable.

Vietnam faces a particularly demanding transition compared with some regional peers. Among the seven Southeast Asian countries that have adopted a 2050 net-zero target, Vietnam has the largest electricity system and one of the fastest-growing power demands, making implementation especially challenging. Indonesia and Thailand have set later targets of 2060 and 2065 respectively, giving themselves more time to manage their transition.

Persisting with an overly ambitious timeline could weaken Vietnam’s competitiveness and create unintended consequences for its energy security and growth prospects. If the government ultimately concludes that the 2050 target is no longer realistic or appropriate, it should revise it and pair any adjustment with firm interim commitments, such as a peak year for coal-fired generation, a clear retirement schedule for older plants and a credible carbon pricing roadmap. Revising the target could carry reputational costs with international partners and climate-conscious investors, but allowing the target to slip quietly would be more damaging.

Nam Dinh I captures Vietnam’s dilemma: growth requires power today, while decarbonisation demands decades-long commitments. Coal can help keep the lights on through the 2030s, but only if it serves as a bridge that buys Vietnam time to build the cleaner energy system to replace coal. Whether Hanoi uses that time effectively will determine if coal remains a temporary bridge or hardens into a long-term dependency.

2026/311

Le Hong Hiep is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.