Expanding the Diplomatic Toolbox: Southeast Asia at the New Delhi BRICS Summit

Among the important features of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi was Southeast Asia’s turn toward BRICS without a collective ASEAN decision to join. Five ASEAN countries were present, each of their own volition but in different capacities. Indonesia is a full member; Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are partner countries; the Philippines participated as the 2026 ASEAN Chair. Therefore, ASEAN has not sought a consensual position on BRICS. Instead, individual ASEAN countries are using the expanding BRICS platform to advance their national interests while continuing to affirm ASEAN centrality.

ASEAN has never been comfortable with exclusive blocs or being forced to choose between competing powers. Its members prefer to widen their room for manoeuvre. BRICS is increasingly becoming another platform through which they can pursue such autonomy.

Indonesia is the clearest example. In 2025, it became the first ASEAN country to become a full BRICS member. Through President Prabowo’s participation as a member, Indonesia provides for BRICS a direct Southeast Asian anchor, while BRICS presents to Jakarta another forum to pursue its priorities of strategic autonomy and global governance reform. Prabowo championed three key messages at the 2026 BRICS Summit: national self-reliance, Global South unity and stronger cooperation within BRICS.

For Indonesia, BRICS is not a substitute for ASEAN, the G20 or other partnerships. It is an additional instrument. Jakarta has traditionally resisted aligning with any major power bloc. Its participation shows that BRICS can accommodate countries that maintain extensive relationships with both the West and the emerging Global South.

Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam represent different forms of engagement. All three are BRICS partner countries, a category created to give countries a structured relationship with BRICS without requiring full membership. Their participation showed how the expansion has created a new layer of engagement between the organisation and regional powers. All three may aspire to full membership in the next expansion.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim utilised the summit to advance Malaysia’s economic interests. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Le Minh Hung’s highlighted similar issues surrounding innovation, digital transformation, clean energy and sustainable development. Indeed, the BRICS agenda intersects with ASEAN’s priorities across a range of issues: resilient supply chains, technology, infrastructure, the energy transition and greater economic diversification.

Thailand has directly participated at the foreign ministerial level, with Deputy Prime Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who is also foreign minister, representing the country at the BRICS summit. As a BRICS partner, Bangkok gains another channel for engagement with major emerging economies without abandoning its traditional relationships. Collectively, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand demonstrate that the BRICS partner mechanism is becoming a useful instrument for Southeast Asian countries seeking wider economic options.

But the most politically interesting participant was the Philippines. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr attended the New Delhi summit as head of state and the 2026 ASEAN Chair. The ASEAN Chair’s acceptance of India’s invitation enabled India, this year’s BRICS Chair, to broaden the bloc’s engagement with regional organisations from the Global South.

The Philippines therefore performed a useful bridging role. Being neither a BRICS member nor partner, the Philippines’ presence brought the ASEAN perspective to a BRICS gathering without necessarily implying ASEAN’s collective adherence to BRICS agendas. It showed that ASEAN could engage with BRICS without joining it.

ASEAN’s experience is based on managing relationships among competing major powers rather than choosing between them. Its priorities fit comfortably with the New Delhi Declaration.

This also exposes an important reality about ASEAN’s relationship with BRICS. ASEAN has no consensus on BRICS membership but maintains the operating philosophy of preserving strategic autonomy, avoiding binary choices and allowing individual members room to pursue their own interests.

India amplified BRICS’ Global South orientation, and ASEAN countries are actively supporting that transition. They demonstrated a clear understanding of multipolarity. ASEAN’s experience is based on managing relationships among competing major powers rather than choosing between them. Its priorities fit comfortably with the New Delhi Declaration agenda adopted by BRICS leaders on 12 September 2026.

The New Delhi Declaration offers Southeast Asia several openings. Most saliently, the call for reform of global governance strengthens the case for a greater voice for developing countries. The Declaration’s focus on development finance and South-South cooperation could offer alternatives beyond traditional Western financial institutions, notably the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), BRICS Pay initiative, and promotion of local currency trade and credit facilities. BRICS’ policy emphasis on resilient and diversified supply chains is particularly relevant as Southeast Asia seeks to benefit from the restructuring of global manufacturing.

For India, this is especially significant. This author has consistently argued in The Durian Flavour that the Act East policy, ASEAN centrality, Indo-Pacific engagement and Global South diplomacy are complementary rather than competing. The New Delhi summit to a significant extent demonstrated the proposition of the Durian Flavour in practice.

The emerging picture is therefore more nuanced than an ASEAN move towards BRICS. ASEAN itself has not engaged BRICS. Several member states embrace the ASEAN Plus policy, which gives them more leeway and autonomy to pursue their own interests.

The most important message from the New Delhi summit is that Southeast Asia is adding another platform to its diplomatic toolbox. This is perhaps exactly how ASEAN wants multipolarity to work: not choosing sides, but having more sides to choose from.

2026/290