The Diplomatic Limits of Cambodia’s Engagement with Myanmar

Cambodia hosted Min Aung Hlaing last week for a high-profile visit. Cambodia was the fourth ASEAN member state to receive the Myanmar leader in three months and the eighth country to do so since a military-dominated Parliament installed him as president in April.

Phnom Penh accorded him the honour of a state-level visit, with a welcome from acting head of state Hun Sen and meetings with Prime Minister Hun Manet. Whatever Phnom Penh said about the bilateral character of the visit, this is the kind of reception a government extends to a counterpart deemed to be a full and equal member of ASEAN. However, Cambodia is hardly alone. Laos, Thailand and Vietnam had already received Min Aung Hlaing. These visits reveal a widening gap between ASEAN’s collective restrictions on Myanmar and the bilateral engagement pursued by some of its members.

Cambodian officials have framed the trip as strengthening friendship. Critics of the regime in Naypyidaw, including the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, argue that governments hosting Min Aung Hlaing lend cover to a military that continues to conduct armed operations against civilians.

Naypyidaw’s objectives for the trip are easy enough to discern. Myanmar is using bilateral diplomacy to establish a semblance of normality with ASEAN member states, even as the bloc’s collective restrictions remain formally in place. Even if Phnom Penh insists that the visit is bilateral, it will still be read regionally as part of Myanmar’s wider attempt to normalise relations one ASEAN capital at a time.

Since the 2021 coup, non-political officials rather than political leaders have represented Myanmar at summits and foreign ministers’ meetings. The bloc has stressed that any reconsideration of this would have to depend on Myanmar making progress on the Five-Point Consensus (ASEAN’s peace plan includes a call for the immediate cessation of violence and constructive dialogue among all parties in Myanmar’s civil conflict). Philippine Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro, the ASEAN Chair’s special envoy, said in July that readmission remains far off. But Min Aung Hlaing has spent the past year chipping away at ASEAN’s position. In effect, he has sought to show that warmer bilateral relations with some ASEAN states, accumulated at the rate of one ASEAN capital at a time, weaken ASEAN’s position. In June, his government dismissed the need for a special envoy beyond Lazaro’s term, and he described the Five-Point Consensus as discriminatory.

As more ASEAN members pursue high-level bilateral engagement with Naypyidaw, ASEAN will need to maintain a clear distinction between bilateral relations and its collective position on Myanmar.

For Naypyidaw, however, the substantive bilateral agenda may have been secondary to the political optics of the visit. Memoranda on trade, tourism, labour, policing, and parliamentary exchanges cost little to sign and serve the larger agenda of providing further evidence that Myanmar is normalising its relations with other ASEAN states. Naypyidaw can use this to its advantage, particularly at a time when economic difficulty remains a severe and destabilising problem at home.

The more vexing question is why Cambodia had received Min Aung Hlaing. One motivation is Phnom Penh’s longstanding preference for engagement over isolation. In January 2022, Hun Sen travelled to Naypyidaw as ASEAN Chair and offered Cambodia’s experience of reconciliation. He received considerable criticism for the trip. Today, Cambodia is portraying itself as a potential bridge between Naypyidaw and ASEAN.

However, Cambodia’s reconciliation experience has limited relevance to Myanmar, where there is no comparable convergence of external pressure, great-power alignment or conditions for a negotiated settlement.

There were also more immediate considerations. Cambodia faced less diplomatic exposure in hosting Min Aung Hlaing after Laos, Thailand and Vietnam had already done so. The visit also offered tangible bilateral returns. The four agreements signed at the Peace Palace, including eliminating double taxation, reciprocal investment promotion and protection, cultural cooperation, and media and information, give Cambodia and Myanmar a framework for exchanges. Min Aung Hlaing also publicly supported Cambodia’s efforts to resolve its border dispute with Thailand peacefully and in accordance with international law.

These considerations help explain Phnom Penh’s decision, but they do not give Cambodia much leverage over Myanmar’s internal trajectory. Nor should bilateral gains be confused with progress on ASEAN’s Myanmar agenda. The four agreements do not address the core issues that ASEAN has tied to Myanmar’s political representation. They may serve both countries’ bilateral interests, but they also give Naypyidaw evidence of increasingly normal relations with another ASEAN member without changing conditions on the ground.

Any indication suggesting that Myanmar’s post-election arrangements have settled the question of legitimacy, or that Myanmar is ready to resume full participation in ASEAN summits, will be exploited in Naypyidaw’s messaging. But fundamentally, Myanmar’s “reintegration” at the leaders’ level is an ASEAN-wide matter that depends on progress Myanmar has yet to demonstrate.

Policy Implications

If Cambodia is serious about avoiding the charge that it is lending legitimacy to Naypyidaw, it should define the visit in practical and limited terms. Cambodia should distinguish clearly between its bilateral engagement with Myanmar and ASEAN’s collective decision on Myanmar’s political representation. Phnom Penh can pursue cooperation with Myanmar where it serves Cambodian interests. The larger challenge, however, goes beyond Cambodia. As more ASEAN members pursue high-level bilateral engagement with Naypyidaw, ASEAN will need to maintain a clear distinction between bilateral relations and its collective position on Myanmar. State visits, agreements and warmer bilateral ties do not by themselves constitute progress on the Five-Point Consensus, nor should they predetermine Myanmar’s return to full political representation at ASEAN meetings.

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