From Mosques to Motorbikes: Kedah’s Ride Dakwah Anak Muda and Muslim Youth Engagement

On 19 September 2026, thousands of motorcycles converged on the roads of Alor Setar, Kedah, for Ride Dakwah Anak Muda (Islamic Outreach Ride for Youth, RDAM). The dakwah (Islamic outreach) event was organised by independent preacher Ustaz Wadi Annuar and ESR Motor, a motorcycle performance business with an established network of motorcycle enthusiasts. Bringing together male Muslim youth motorcyclists from across Malaysia, attendees participated in a programme of religious talks, prayer and a friendly round of football.

RDAM’s significance lies not in its use of motorcycles, but in the strength of its grassroots networks as emerging sites for Muslim youth mobilisation. Originally planned to be held at Wadi Annuar’s school, Akademi Darul Ilmi in Sungai Petani, RDAM was moved to Stadium Sultan Abdul Halim to accommodate the larger-than-anticipated crowd of 40,000 attendees. The participation of youth across Malaysia underscores the growing ability of alternative dakwah networks like motorcycle communities to mobilise young Muslims for religious engagement. Here, religious engagement refers to how young Muslims participate in religious life, as well as how religious actors reach out to them, and the social spaces in which these engagements occur.

Malaysia’s religious authorities and political parties have conducted motorcycle-based dakwah for more than a decade. In May 2015, the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM), together with the Terengganu state government and the All Bikers Club Malaysia (ABCM), organised a three-day Kembara Dakwah Bermotosikal dan Khidmat Masyarakat (Motorcycle-based Dakwah and Community Service Expedition) programme which involved 120 volunteers travelling through Kuala Lumpur, Pahang and Terengganu on their superbikes. JAKIM has organised similar events over the years.

Three days before RDAM, the Federal Territories Islamic Religious Department (JAWI) organised Ride Santai dan Kembara Dakwah Merdeka Madani (Madani’s Independence Relaxed Ride and Dakwah Expedition) to “strengthen bonds between mosque authorities and local communities while fostering…religious outreach during independence month”.

By bringing dakwah into a lifestyle and network already familiar to people, these programmes offer new avenues for engagement beyond conventional mosque-centric settings.

Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) has held similar programmes. Their Alternative Riding Club (ARC), formed in 2007 by the party’s youth wing, combines motorcycle convoys with community engagement and Islamic outreach. The recurrence of such programmes indicates that the use of motorcycling as a medium for dakwah has been part of Malaysia’s Islamic outreach repertoire for some time. By bringing dakwah into a lifestyle and network already familiar to people, these programmes offer new avenues for engagement beyond conventional mosque-centric settings.

Unlike the above events, RDAM brings together digital networks, popular figures and youth subculture — important features of contemporary Muslim youth engagement. Ustaz Ahmad Yusof, the preacher who approached Wadi Annuar about organising RDAM, said he wanted the event to be specifically for “mat motor, mat rempit” (motorcycle riders and enthusiasts), referring to the youth-based motorcycle subculture built around shared interests, group identity, social networks and motorcycle-based activities.

Motorcycling is more than just a mode of transportation; its established social networks provide a shared identity around which other forms of engagement can be organised, thus making it a convenient vehicle for dakwah. Rather than expecting young Muslims to enter traditional religious settings, RDAM brings religious activity into a social space they already identify with.

Furthermore, to centre the event around Wadi Annuar — who has 1.3 million followers on Instagram and 3.4 million on TikTok (comparable to youth-oriented preacher Azhar Idrus’ 1.8 million and 3.1 million followers respectively) — gives the event a recognisable online personality around which young participants can rally. Adib ESR (from ESR Motor), a well-known figure in Malaysian motorcycle circles, was also involved as a speaker, which would conceivably attract more young riders to the event.

This pattern is not unique to Malaysia. In Indonesia, youth-oriented movements like Pemuda Hijrah, founded in 2015 by preacher Hanan Attaki, have sought to mobilise young Muslims alienated from traditional religious spaces and offer them an inclusive community. Like RDAM, it appeals to youth through established alternative spaces and identities, rather than formal religious institutions.

Similar forms of religious mobilisation have also occurred in Singapore, albeit not centred around a particular lifestyle or community. Singapore’s case illustrates the same broader mechanism of religious mobilisation through charismatic figures and digital networks. In December 2023, Malaysian celebrity Alif Satar launched the Geng Subuh Macam Jumaat campaign, encouraging Malaysian Muslims to attend congregational dawn prayers at the mosque, just as they would congregational Friday prayers. The campaign found its way to Singapore, with popular figures such as Donjany and Taufik Batisah taking the lead. Their participation boosted the campaign’s appeal, with nearly 4,000 worshippers filling up Masjid Yusof Ishak on 6 January 2024.

These examples point to a shift in the modes of religious engagement. Muslim youth are encountering religion through online movements that emphasise a sense of belonging and participation in social networks they already identify with, rather than formal religious instruction. The case of Geng Subuh Macam Jumaat further illustrates how religious mobilisation and online exposure can easily cross national borders and digital divides, translating into offline movements without formal religious institutions.

As Muslim youths’ religious lives are increasingly shaped by alternative pathways, traditional institutions no longer hold the monopoly on religious engagement that they once did. This shift does not necessarily imply that formal religious institutions have become redundant. Rather, Muslim youth in Southeast Asia are steadily influenced by religious ideas and movements through social networks, subcultures and digital platforms.

Understanding shifts in Muslim youth engagement requires attention not only to traditional religious spaces and methods, but also to the capacity of alternative, online movements to translate into offline participation. These networks may introduce unpredictability for religious institutions, but recognition of where and how Muslim youth engagement begins could offer them critical lessons on how to stay relevant to young Muslims in the region.

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