A vessel identified by the Philippine Coast Guard as “Chinese maritime militia” (back R) and a China Coast Guard vessel (front R) sailing near the Philippine military chartered Unaizah May 4 (L) during its supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea in 2024 (Photo: JAM STA ROSA / AFP)

US-China Stabilisation Changes Southeast Asia’s Risks

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Steadier US-China ties may ease the risk of great-power confrontation, but they bring new risks for Southeast Asia, from bargains struck over the region’s head to an eroding tariff advantage.

Even as Washington and Beijing seek greater stability in their relationship, tensions involving China and US allies and partners in Southeast Asia can persist. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington, another incident unfolded around Second Thomas Shoal on 24 September, with Manila and Beijing offering different accounts. This captures a broader regional reality: US-China stabilisation may lower some risks but raise others and leave longstanding disputes unrelieved.

The effort to stabilise relations with China is part of a broader US turn towards selective accommodation with major adversaries, mainly through leader-level bargaining. On 16 October, US President Donald Trump waived most of the new Russia sanctions under a law he had signed a month earlier. In August, he scaled back joint exercises with South Korea, citing his relationship with Kim Jong Un. Trump has also repeatedly said he is open to meeting Kim again. These moves do not amount to comprehensive settlements or a consistent policy across Washington’s relationships with Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Rather, they suggest Trump’s willingness to ease pressure on these countries in pursuit of direct engagement with their leaders, and to adjust security arrangements with US allies in the process.

For Southeast Asia, such accommodation may reduce the risk of great power confrontation, but raises uncertainty about whether the region’s interests will be adequately factored into bargains struck by Washington and Beijing.

Two variables will shape what this means for Southeast Asia: how durable US-China stabilisation will be, and how robust Washington’s commitment to the region remains. For now, the likeliest combination is a steadier US-China relationship alongside an America that remains engaged but increasingly stretched and less predictable.

On the first variable, there are grounds for expecting continued stability in US-China relations. During Trump’s visit to Beijing in May, Xi described a new vision of “constructive strategic stability” intended to guide US-China relations. Xi’s September visit to Washington extended the trade truce to 10 January 2027, recommended favourable tariff treatment for US$30 billion of goods in each direction, and confirmed plans for two further leader-level meetings before the end of the year.

For Southeast Asia, that stabilisation has three implications.

First, more sustained dialogue between Washington and Beijing can reduce the danger of military confrontation and disruptive economic escalation, both longstanding regional concerns.

Second, US-China bilateral bargaining carries a risk of exclusion: Washington and Beijing may reach understandings that affect Southeast Asian interests while leaving regional states with little influence over the outcome. So far, the most consequential forms of such bargaining have not materialised. Washington has not formally changed its Taiwan policy nor struck the sweeping US-China trade deal that Southeast Asian exporters feared would leave them at a disadvantage. But the reciprocal tariff cuts recommended after Xi’s September visit would, once implemented, narrow Southeast Asia’s tariff advantage over China in the sectors covered.

Third, US-China stabilisation does not resolve disputes between China and Southeast Asian states. As the 24 September incident at Second Thomas Shoal illustrates, a more stable US-China relationship can coexist with continuing tensions in the South China Sea (SCS).

The second variable is the scope and reliability of American commitment to the region. Here, America’s declared priorities and available resources do not always align. In August, US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Elbridge Colby said the Pentagon remained focused on the first island chain, including the Philippines. Yet, at the time, the redeployment of the USS George Washington to the Middle East left no US carrier strike group west of San Diego. Although the ship’s return had been expected by early November, it was still operating in the Arabian Sea in mid-November. Washington may prioritise the first island chain in its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy while still having to divert finite military resources to competing theatres.

US-China stabilisation is preferable to confrontation, but stability between the great powers does not automatically produce security for Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian countries will view these developments through different lenses, depending on their vulnerabilities. This year’s State of Southeast Asia survey by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, conducted in January-February 2026, captures these underlying concerns. The SCS topped Philippine respondents’ geopolitical concerns, with 55 per cent expecting their country’s relations with China to worsen. Meanwhile, Singaporean, Thai and Cambodian respondents identified economic tensions between major powers as their top concern. US-China stabilisation resolves neither. For Manila, tensions with China have not receded. For economically exposed states, avoiding a US-China trade war is welcome, but less so if tariff relief for China narrows their own tariff advantage and attractiveness as alternative investment destinations. What matters is less stabilisation itself than the terms on which it occurs – and how Washington and Beijing behave under it.

Policy Implications

Southeast Asian states are not simply passive recipients of US-China stabilisation outcomes: their response has been to widen their room for manoeuvre by diversifying relationships. This preference is broadly shared: 55.2 per cent of respondents to the ISEAS survey favoured strengthening ASEAN resilience and unity in navigating great-power rivalry, while only 6.3 per cent thought the region must choose a side. Indonesia, for example, has concluded trade negotiations with the EU and signed a trade agreement with the US, while conducting military exercises with China, Russia and the US.

Room for manoeuvre means securing useful commitments from different partners without exclusive alignment, but it matters only if it translates into influence over decisions that affect the region. This requires that Southeast Asian states retain their rights and meaningful participation in arrangements affecting their interests. They can do so bilaterally, by making their voices heard in dealings with major powers, and collectively through ASEAN, where the combined voice of 11 member states should carry greater weight. Yet bilateral partnerships that broaden their options can also make ASEAN cohesion harder to sustain. The South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations, which have reached provisional agreement on about 80 per cent of the draft but will carry over into 2027, raise precisely this question: Can ASEAN negotiate meaningful regional rules with China despite its members’ increasingly differentiated relationships with Beijing, Washington and other external powers?

US-China stabilisation is preferable to confrontation, but stability between the great powers does not automatically produce security for Southeast Asia. Much depends on the terms of their accommodation, how Washington and Beijing behave towards the region and whether Southeast Asian states retain meaningful influence over decisions that affect them.

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Sophie Wushuang Yi PhD is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, and a Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University.