ASEAN and the UN: Strengthening Security Through Multilateralism

The highest-level meeting between ASEAN and the United Nations (UN) will take place on 11 October 2024 in Vientiane, Laos. Unlike previous gatherings, this summit comes at a time when UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and ASEAN leaders must confront the urgent need to reinvigorate the multilateral system which is increasingly threatened by geopolitical fragmentation and eroding trust among states.

This meeting will follow the UN Summit of the Future, held on 22-23 September 2024 at the UN Headquarters in New York, where world leaders sought to forge a new consensus to safeguard the future amid growing distrust. The Pact for the Future, with 56 action lines adopted at the summit, aims to address not only sustainable development and international peace and security but also the roles of youth, future generations and the need to transform global governance.

The Pact’s ambitious agenda seeks to renew trust in global institutions by making them more effective in delivering on their commitments. According to Guterres, the plan includes “the strongest language on Security Council reform in a generation and the most concrete step towards the Council enlargement since 1963”. The reform proposals focus on increasing representation for developing countries and small and medium-sized states, and limiting the scope and use of the veto. Additionally, the pact emphasises the importance of enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations like ASEAN to address new and emerging challenges.

However, the UN’s struggle to address ongoing conflicts such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza underscores systemic limitations of the organisation. The use of veto power in the UN Security Council (UNSC) has paralysed decision-making, such as in the case of Russia’s veto against its own aggression in Ukraine in 2022. The UN has failed to mediate in highly polarised situations or protect civilians. In Myanmar, for example, the political crisis has continued despite the appointment of a UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy. This speaks of the lack of enforcement mechanisms within the multilateral system.

ASEAN faces similar challenges. The organisation’s consensus-based approach, which is typically compounded by internal divisions, has significantly hindered decision-making and its ability to enforce the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar. This has exacerbated the ongoing instability and further loss of life. Even before the military coup, ASEAN was criticised for its weak response to the Rohingya crisis, one of the world’s largest refugee crises. ASEAN has also failed to form a united stance on the South China Sea, due to varying national interests and relations with China. This has delayed the conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China, further undermining its credibility.

These cases demonstrate that while multilateralism has been effective in various functional domains, such as development, education, health and socio-economic cooperation, its effectiveness in the realm of security is often found wanting. National interests and geopolitical rivalries frequently obstruct collective actions. Unlike NATO, a collective defence entity which benefits from a shared defence interest (read: the former Soviet Union and now Russia), more diverse organisations like the UN and ASEAN face significant challenges in advancing effective multilateral security cooperation due to divergent threat perceptions and alliances.

…while multilateralism has been effective in various functional domains, such as development, education, health and socio-economic cooperation, its effectiveness in the realm of security is often found wanting.

Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) have successfully promoted cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges — such as countering terrorism, cyber threats, trafficking and piracy — ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing hard security issues remains in question.  The proliferation of minilateral security groupings, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, highlights the limitations of ASEAN-led mechanisms in addressing more pressing security concerns.

Despite these challenges, strengthening multilateralism in security remains critical for enhancing trust among states and tackling the increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges of today. ASEAN and the UN are well-positioned to enhance multilateralism, given their complementary strengths in regional diplomacy and global governance.

First, both sides can strengthen preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding by leveraging ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ARF. The UN can increase its technical assistance and mediation expertise, particularly in conflicts involving ethnic groups or internal political crises, as seen in Myanmar. Additionally, while ASEAN does not have a standing peacekeeping force, all its member states have supported UN Secretary-General Guterres’ Action for Peacekeeping initiative. Strengthening ASEAN’s ability to contribute systematically to UN peacekeeping would further enhance ASEAN-UN cooperation and boost multilateralism.

Second, ASEAN and the UN can improve coordination between the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), particularly in response to the growing number of natural disasters exacerbated by climate change. A joint humanitarian task force between AHA and OCHA, in coordination with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), could also provide a framework to jointly address the Myanmar crisis and prevent duplication of efforts.

Third, ASEAN’s cybersecurity cooperation strategy can be upgraded into a regional cybersecurity governance framework by collaborating with the UN, drawing on its leadership in developing international norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. This could help ASEAN address emerging cyber threats and strengthen its digital infrastructure.

Lastly, ASEAN can play a more active role in UNSC debates, especially on issues affecting Southeast Asia. During their respective terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, Vietnam (2020-2021) and Indonesia (2019-2020) pushed for  ASEAN’s position by fostering closer cooperation between ASEAN and the UN. This included facilitating remarks by the ASEAN Secretary-General at the UNSC and consistently advocating for ASEAN centrality, particularly in relation to regional security issues like the South China Sea. ASEAN should also advocate for UNSC reform that includes greater representation from the Global South. Supporting ASEAN member states’ candidacies in UN bodies, including non-permanent seats on the UNSC would allow the region to influence security decisions affecting ASEAN such as those pertaining to the South China Sea and the situation in Myanmar, ensuring that its interests are represented on the world stage.

Multilateralism is the cornerstone of ASEAN’s diplomacy and it is particularly vital for smaller countries like Singapore. Without it, ASEAN’s principles of a rules-based approach, inclusivity and openness cannot be upheld. To prevent the paralysis of ASEAN or the UN, their member states need to move beyond functional cooperation and focus on improving institutions and processes to ensure that they are fit for purpose in an increasingly volatile world.  

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