ASEAN in 2026: Great Expectations, Limited Effectiveness

2025 was a pivotal year for ASEAN. The bloc expanded to 11 members with Timor-Leste’s entry and set an ambitious long-term direction through the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. Despite headwinds posed by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, ASEAN advanced key economic initiatives, including upgrading its free trade agreement with China and reaching a substantial conclusion in negotiations for the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). Yet political and security tensions continue to cast a shadow, with the Myanmar crisis unresolved and renewed clashes along the Cambodia-Thailand border.

This mixed picture of ASEAN’s developments is reflected in the latest edition of The State of Southeast Asia Survey Report (SSEA) by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, which captures how Southeast Asia’s policy and opinion leaders perceive evolving geopolitical dynamics. The findings point to a more complex and demanding environment for ASEAN. While the organisation remains central to regional diplomacy, its effectiveness continues to be constrained by structural limitations and intensifying geopolitical pressures. This reveals a widening gap between rising expectations and its capacity to deliver. 

ASEAN’s relevance is most evident in its continued normative appeal. The largest proportion of respondents (25.5 per cent) regard it as the leader in championing global free trade, slightly higher than in 2025 (23.8 per cent). Support is particularly strong in Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam (Chart 1).

For the first time since the survey was conducted in 2019, the bloc also emerged as the most trusted actor to uphold the rules-based order (23.4 per cent), edging ahead of the US (22.3 per cent) (Chart 2). This shift signals growing confidence in ASEAN’s role as a convenor and stabilising force, particularly among larger member states such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

Chart 1. Leader on Championing Trade

Chart 2. Supporting The Regional Order

However, this normative strength is not matched by perceptions of economic or political-strategic influence. Only 13.2 per cent of respondents consider ASEAN the most influential economic power in the region, down from 14.8 per cent the previous year (Chart 3). Similarly, ASEAN ranks only third in terms of political and strategic influence, behind China and the US, with 15.3 per cent respondent share (Chart 4).

Despite its lower standing in terms of economic and political-strategic influence, ASEAN stands out in one key aspect: it is perceived as a benign power that is welcomed by the majority of the region. Regional respondents who welcome ASEAN’s growing economic influence continue to exceed those who welcome the corresponding influence of China and the US (Chart 3). Support remains strongest among smaller economies such as Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos. The slight decline in this positive sentiment, from 68.5 per cent in 2025 to 62.5 per cent this year, shows that the bloc can take more concrete actions to bring back confidence.  

This positive view also extends to ASEAN’s growing political and strategic influence. A substantial share of respondents at 68.1 per cent welcome its growing influence (Chart 4), especially in Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore.

Chart 3. ASEAN’s Growing Economic Influence

Chart 4. Positive on ASEAN’s Strategic Influence

Taken together, this suggests that ASEAN is valued less for its agenda-setting ability and more for its role as a buffer and stabilising anchor amid growing major-power competition. It also points to a growing disconnect between ASEAN’s perceived role and its material capabilities. The organisation continues to be trusted to uphold the principles of free trade and a rules-based order, but is seen less as a decisive actor shaping regional outcomes. A persistent constraint of ASEAN’s influence and power lies in the bloc’s responsiveness to regional and global issues. This divergence is unfolding against a backdrop of rising global protectionism, particularly the return of tariff-driven policies by the US. For Southeast Asian economies deeply embedded in global supply chains, ASEAN’s value lies less in economic weight than in its ability to provide a collective platform to mitigate external shocks and sustain openness.

A majority of respondents (34.7 per cent) view the organisation as being slow and ineffective, while 32.2 per cent fear that it risks becoming an arena for major power rivalry. These perceptions reflect deeper concerns about ASEAN’s ability to maintain cohesion and centrality in an increasingly contested regional order. Geopolitical uncertainties also complicate ASEAN’s operating environment. Concerns over US leadership have emerged as the region’s top geopolitical issue, reflecting unease about policy unpredictability. At the same time, tensions in the South China Sea and broader strategic competition continue to test ASEAN’s ability to navigate external pressures while preserving its autonomy.

… the SSEA 2026 underscores a central paradox: ASEAN remains indispensable, but increasingly insufficient. Its legitimacy as a convenor and normative anchor endures, yet its ability to act decisively lags behind expectations.

Internal divisions further underscore these constraints. On Myanmar, while engagement with all stakeholders remains the most widely supported approach, differing views among member states highlight the difficulty of forging a unified response. This reflects a broader tension within ASEAN between its long-standing principle of non-interference and rising expectations for more decisive collective action.

Despite these perceived shortcomings, ASEAN has sought to match its statements with more concrete actions. In 2025, the ASEAN Geoeconomics Task Force (AGTF) was established to better coordinate regional responses to the US’ unilateral tariffs and to navigate emerging geoeconomic challenges in general.

While ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar crisis has yet to make a significant impact, its diplomatic role remains relevant. Its efforts in mediating the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute is recognised, with a majority of survey respondents agreeing that ASEAN has taken active steps to mediate the crisis (38.9 per cent), including through the Extraordinary General Border Committee (GBC) Meetings and the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord. However, such contributions are often seen as incremental, constrained by institutional limitations, consensus-based decision-making, and reliance on the rotating chairmanship.

Ultimately, the SSEA 2026 underscores a central paradox: ASEAN remains indispensable, but increasingly insufficient. Its legitimacy as a convenor and normative anchor endures, yet its ability to act decisively lags behind expectations. Bridging this gap to enhance ASEAN’s influence will require not only reaffirming ASEAN’s centrality, but also strengthening its institutional responsiveness, internal cohesion, and strategic clarity in an increasingly fragmented regional and global order. Efforts such as the AGTF and the mediation of the Cambodia-Thailand conflict are a positive start but must be followed by concrete actions beyond the meetings.

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