A New Deal for the Mekong

Imagine the Mighty Mekong Basin not as a source of friction among riparian countries but as a platform of joint management and development across ASEAN. To make this happen, a new deal is needed that involves multiple countries across different sectors.

Rising on the Tibetan Plateau and running some 4,800 kilometres through six countries, Southeast Asia’s largest river makes Thailand and Vietnam two of the world’s top rice exporters, powers Laos as the “battery of ASEAN” and sustains Cambodia as the largest inland fishery producer on earth. As a cultural artery, the Mekong ties together fabled cities from China’s Xishuangbanna and Thailand’s Chiang Rai to Luang Prabang in Laos, and onward to the industrialising hubs of Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Can Tho in Vietnam. For most non-riparian ASEAN states, Mekong rice is likely on many dinner tables and for Malaysia and Singapore, Mekong-generated electricity has started to flow into their grids. Every year, millions of Southeast Asians travel to experience the river’s landscapes. In short, the Mekong is a strategic asset for all ASEAN countries, not only for those along its banks.

However, these benefits have been under immense pressures. Rapid hydropower and infrastructure development is reshaping river flows, sediment and fish migration. Meanwhile, climate change is intensifying droughts and floods, impacting energy production, rice cultivation, fisheries, livelihoods, and the ecosystems that support tourism. Geopolitical competition has created multiple Mekong cooperation frameworks – from Mekong River Commission (MRC) to Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and Mekong-US Partnership – which collectively contribute to, but sometimes fragment, the governance of the basin.

While cooperation under the MRC has yielded positive achievements, there is a growing sense that the great river is being overworked but under-governed. Various actors from riparian states and partners to NGOs and academics have called for more investment in solar and wind systems instead of in dams, scrutiny of projects such as Cambodia’s Funan Techo canal, the strengthening of Mekong governance, and the bringing together of ASEAN to engage more on Mekong issues.

Approaches that focus on a single issue (such as managing floods) or sector (such as mitigating dam impacts) or bilateral matters (such as between only Cambodia and Vietnam) will only see partial results, however. More importantly, they will not transform the Mekong.

What is needed are proposals that show a strategic vision for what the Mekong could be, with bold leadership. Such a vision could support good development in all Mekong countries, meet the needs of non-Mekong countries, and determine what trade-offs are acceptable to increase connectivity and interdependence among concerned parties.

For inspiration, we can go back to the past. In the 1970s, the UN-backed Mekong Committee prepared an Indicative Basin Plan that tabled a suite of multi-purpose Mekong projects designed to benefit all four riparian countries through hydropower (primarily for Laos and Cambodia), flood control (primarily for Vietnam), irrigation (primarily for Thailand), and navigation (for all four states). Those plans were never realised due to conflicts, but they showed that the basin can be thought of as a single system rather than a chain of separate national projects. Today, a new deal could help to revive that basin-wide, multi-country, and multi-sector vision. The riparian states in ASEAN at present may lean on more technical knowledge, environmentally friendly technologies, and financial resources (including from non-Mekong countries).

Several concrete strategies can be pursued. First, the coordinated operation of Lancang-Mekong dams is critical. Today, many Chinese and Lao reservoirs release and withhold water according to energy demands and in response to extreme weather events. This practice often exacerbates floods (when dams must release additional water when typhoons hit their reservoirs) and droughts (when dams must store whatever water they can in a ‘dry’ wet season to have enough for generating energy in the dry season). A rules-based coordination regime, supported by real-time data and advanced modelling and forecasting, could systematically increase total energy output, help mitigate downstream floods and droughts, and support dry-season irrigation. Crucially, if timed correctly, this can ensure the ‘reverse flow’ or expansion of the Tonle Sap (which sustains fisheries) during the wet season, while providing fresh water to Vietnam’s delta (to counter salinity intrusion in the dry season).

Second, any new major project on the Mekong should be a genuine joint endeavour between two or more governments. The region has examples of cross-border energy investment and trade, but most dams are still financed as national projects, though with foreign investment. Taking inspiration from the Itaipu binational project between Brazil and Paraguay, Laos and Thailand could, for example, develop mainstream projects as shared assets with joint ownership, cost-sharing, and allocation of shares (not just compensation) to local communities. Future schemes involving Myanmar, Laos and China could follow the same template. All such projects could engage MRC technical guidance early, adhere to MRC procedures, undergo independent technical review, and incorporate social standards and joint environmental monitoring.

Third, better coordination of existing dams, along with the development of joint projects, would provide incentives to forego any national projects with high transboundary environmental costs. It would allow a greater focus on expanding wind and solar energy schemes, which Laos has started to do with two 600-megawatt (MW) wind complexes (Monsoon and Truong Son), a 1,000-MW solar project (Oudomxay), and additional 240–300 MW floating solar plants planned on reservoirs. All this increase in capacity will benefit the region. The export of Mekong energy from Laos to Singapore forms part of the broader ASEAN Power Grid (APG) concept and could be further advanced with subsea cables from Cambodia and/or Vietnam to Singapore. Thailand and Malaysia would need to show ASEAN solidarity by treating electricity generated in the Mekong not as bilateral imports but as part of a shared regional resource, with arrangements that spread costs and benefits. Non-riparian ASEAN members like Singapore could take a leadership role in realising the APG, as they already import significant amounts of Mekong rice and have begun importing Mekong-sourced renewable energy.

Fourth, with coordinated storage operations and joint development, the Mekong could potentially serve as a continuous waterway from China down to Cambodia and Vietnam. Compared to road and rail, river navigation can offer greater benefits, as demonstrated by Europe’s Rhine and the Danube, including lower carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, reduce energy usage, and lower air pollution, noise and accidents. A fully navigable Mekong could enhance the economic viability of Cambodia’s proposed Funan Techo Canal, provided it is developed through a cooperative approach involving upstream Laos and downstream Vietnam via the MRC. This would likely require bypass solutions around the Khone Falls (an unrealised French colonial-era dream of unimpeded upriver travel). If coordinated upstream operations also benefit Vietnam’s delta, Hanoi would have an incentive to support navigation improvements for Laos and Cambodia. Landlocked Laos, which already has northern access to the Chinese market via the Laos-China Railway, would likely be interested in southern access to the sea through Mekong navigation as part of its ‘land-link’ strategy.

Fifth, a new deal featuring a better managed river flow, the development of beneficial joint projects, the cancellation of harmful ones, and enhanced energy connectivity will enable the conservation of the Mekong’s critical ecosystems and biodiversity, while supporting tourism and sustainable finance. Forests, waterfalls, and towns along the Mekong – including “twin cities” straddling borders – can be promoted from source to sea. Protected forests, parks, floodplains and wetlands can generate nature-based carbon credits for markets in Singapore and beyond.

The proposed new deal can only materialise with bold leadership and coordinated action across institutions and countries. The MRC, LMC Water Centre, Mekong Institute, and ASEAN should work together on the technical design of such a package, carefully study relevant aspects, and present proposals at ministerial meetings and leaders’ summits. Development partners and multilateral banks could contribute with finance and negotiation support. Unlike in the past when the Mekong often divided East from West, upstream from downstream, and mainland from maritime Southeast Asia, the “Mother of Rivers” has the potential to unite ASEAN and its partners in a new era of shared prosperity. This can happen only if the region moves from developing individual projects to forging a collective bargain that reflects the river’s scale and significance.

Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.