China’s Retaliation Against Japan and the Implications for Southeast Asia

China-Japan relations remain in the doldrums months after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks that China’s use of force against Taiwan could pose a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Compared with the earlier measures imposed on South Korea for deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system, Beijing’s actions against Japan this time are markedly different in both scope and intensity. Beyond Japan, China is likely to press other countries, Southeast Asia included, to adopt stronger language opposing Taiwan independence and supporting China’s reunification agenda.

When Seoul announced the deployment of THAAD missile systems in July 2016, Beijing imposed a slew of measures against South Korea to show its displeasure. It started with official statements expressing strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition, to specific retaliatory actions such as banning group tours to Korea and blocking Korean celebrities, dramas and music from appearing on Chinese media platforms.

Bearing the full brunt, Lotte Group, which provided the land for THAAD’s deployment, had to close 87 out of 99 hypermarkets (almost 88 percent of its outlets) in China due to onerous administrative measures like safety inspections, tax audits, supply chain disruptions, non-renewal of licenses and even Chinese consumer boycotts. It eventually shuttered all its retail outlets in China and shifted to focusing only on duty free operations directed at Chinese tourists visiting Korea and Chinese resellers of Korean products.

There are some similarities in China’s current measures against Japan, especially the socio-economic ones, with the past actions it took against South Korea. These include discouraging Chinese tourists from visiting Japan, cautioning Chinese students from studying in Japan, withdrawing Japanese films from being screened and cancelling performances by Japanese artists in China. It further banned all seafood imports from Japan, reinstating the 2023 ban which was partially lifted in 2025.

However, Beijing’s retaliation against Japan broke new ground in several areas. For one, the response is more coordinated and systematic, involving concurrent actions by Chinese ministries/agencies across multiple sectors. The scope of retaliation varies, extending beyond socio-economic and political-diplomatic measures. Even within specific sectors, the measures implemented ranged from responses. For instance, on the economic front, apart from seafood, China has halted talks on the resumption of Japanese beef exports to China. After Takaichi’s election victory in the Lower House, Beijing tightened control of dual-use items including rare earths to Japanese companies, building on earlier measures in January 2026.

In a direct challenge to Japan’s sovereignty, Beijing sent a coast guard formation into disputed waters near the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) on 16 November 2025, marking the first such intrusion following Takaichi’s remarks. Overall, the Chinese coast guard reportedly logged 357 days of patrols around the Diaoyu Islands in 2025 alone, maintaining an almost daily presence. Chinese fighter jets have also locked their radar on Japanese aircraft southeast of Okinawa’s main island. China has also conducted joint air patrols with Russia around Japan.

Chinese state media further questioned Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands (that includes Okinawa which hosts a US military base). Changanjie Zhishi, a social media platform of Beijing Daily, claimed that Japan has never “truly possessed sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands in a historical or legal sense. CGTN, China’s global television network, even argued that the status of Ryukyu Islands remained undetermined as the people living there had tributary ties with the Ming dynasty since 1372 that saw Chinese influence extending into Ryukyu, long before Japan annexed the Ryukyu islands in 1879. Although Chinese state media has questioned Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu’s previously in 2013 when Japan’s nationalised the Senkaku Islands (which is administratively part of the Ryukyu Islands), the key difference between then and now is the more coordinated action taken by a few media outlets on this issue.

Beijing even attempted to mobilise international opinion against Japan’s wartime atrocities and what it sees as a revival of Japanese militarism. Its United Nations (UN) representative has asserted that Japan is not qualified to be a UN permanent member — given the latter’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council — as Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan raise serious doubts about Japan’s commitment to the post-war international order, the basic norms of international behaviour and peaceful development. However, the above view of Japan does not appear to be widely shared by other countries. In the 2025 Survey of the State of Southeast Asia, Japan remains the most trusted major power in the region with an ASEAN-10 overall trust level of 66.8 per cent, up from 58.9 per cent in 2024.

To get US to restrain Japan on the Taiwan issue, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed to US President Donald Trump in a phone call late last year that Taiwan’s return to China is an important part of the post-war international order, and that the two countries have a joint responsibility to uphold such an order. Trump subsequently rang Takaichi and reportedly asked her to avoid escalating matters with China on the Taiwan issue.

Most recently, China has secured the strong support of Uruguay — a country in the western hemisphere — on the Taiwan issue. In the joint statement on Uruguayan President Yamandu Orsi’s visit to China in February 2026, Uruguay checked all the right boxes by affirming its adherence to the “One China” principle, recognising China as the sole legal government representing all of China, acknowledging Taiwan as an inseparable part of Chinese territory, opposing any form of Taiwan independence, and supporting the efforts of the Chinese government to achieve national reunification (the last phrase can be read as including support for Beijing’s use of force to reunify Taiwan).

Although its retaliation has inadvertently propelled Takaichi to a resounding victory in the Lower House, Beijing shows no sign of letting up the pressure on Japan. To China, the Taiwan issue is at the core of its key interests, a higher order than THAAD’s deployment which was directed at North Korea although the system’s radar extended into Chinese territory.

ASEAN does not have a collective position on the Taiwan issue beyond the fact that all ASEAN member states (AMS) adhere to a “One China” policy. On its part, China is against ASEAN’s involvement in the Taiwan issue as it regards this as an internal matter. Nevertheless, Beijing is likely to step up efforts to get AMS to adopt stronger language to oppose Taiwan independence and support reunification.

Among AMS, Cambodia appears to have set a precedence on the Taiwan issue. In 2023, Phnom Penh expressed its “resolute adherence” to the “One China” Policy, opposed any attempt to interfere in China’s internal affairs, and stated its “resolute support” for China’s every effort at national reunification. Going forward, Beijing is likely to want AMS to adopt some or all of the above references to Taiwan. Beijing can also be expected to step up pressure on AMS to reduce interactions with Taiwan.

It appears that the space to manoeuvre on the Taiwan issue has become much more restrictive. However, AMS or ASEAN as a whole do have an interest, especially amid tense cross-strait relations, to remind relevant parties — be it China, Taiwan or the US — to exercise caution, refrain from provocative actions and resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue in the overall interest of peace, security and development.

Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.