Does ASEAN Still Matter to the Labour Government in the United Kingdom?

After 14 years under Conservative rule, the United Kingdom (UK) is anticipating domestic and foreign policy shifts following the Labour Party’s landslide victory in the recent general election. While foreign policy took a back seat during the election campaign amidst pressing domestic reform agendas, the new Labour Government now faces the imperative of defining the UK’s global role to uphold its vision of a “Global Britain” or a “Reconnected Britain”.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a pivotal player in international forums like the G7, G20, NATO, and the Commonwealth, the UK’s foreign policy stature remains pivotal on the global stage, and closely watched by ASEAN and the international community. The critical question now is whether ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region would be prioritised under the new government, with little details disclosed so far about Labour’s plans for the region.

David Lammy, swiftly appointed as Foreign Secretary in Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s cabinet, brings extensive government experiences under prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. However, his previous focus has predominantly been on domestic issues such as education, social justice, and equality rather than on foreign policy. Nonetheless, his tenure as Shadow Foreign Secretary since 2021 signals a readiness to navigate a complex geopolitical landscape marked by challenges such as the Ukraine conflict and US-China tensions to situations in the Middle East.

Labour’s foreign policy under Lammy is expected to champion a “progressive realism” — using realist means to pursue progressive ends — to deliver Labour’s goal of a “Britain Reconnected”. The end goal is often not about accumulating more hard power but achieving soft power or progressive goals such as climate action, democracy promotion, and economic development.

At the forefront of Lammy’s priorities is forging an European security pact through enhanced structured dialogues with Europe to rebuild trust, an area the Labour Party has criticised the Conservative Government for neglecting. This focus acknowledges that the most pressing threats to Britain emanate from Europe and would potentially buffer against diminished US support under a future Donald Trump administration, should he be elected. His primary focus, therefore lies in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security amidst Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and building ties with Trump’s Republican Party, as Labour has traditionally enjoyed better ties with the Democrats.

Other immediate priorities include advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza and pursuing long-term peace and security in the Middle East. As a center-leftist, Mr Lammy is prepared to enhance engagement with Middle Eastern governments, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. In response to deteriorating relations with China under the Conservative Government, the Labour Government has also committed to conducting a “full audit” on China within the next 100 days.

With numerous pressing foreign policy agendas, the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN appear to be lower priorities for Lammy, despite the government’s pledge to finalise a UK-India Free Trade Agreement. Labour has previously criticised the Conservative focus on the Indo-Pacific as a distraction from local issues. The sustainability of the Indo-Pacific “tilt” will be challenged in the face of limited resources, especially as Labour plans to raise defence budget from 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent of the GDP, adding to fiscal constraints.

Nevertheless, Lammy is unlikely to withdraw the UK’s involvement from the Indo-Pacific. He views the Indo-Pacific as having some significance where AUKUS (trilateral security partnership in the Indo-Pacific between Australia, the UK and the US) should continue to operate. Existing security commitments in the Indo-Pacific, such as the deployment of the Royal Navy Littoral Response Group to the region and other joint military exercises as part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, are likely to continue. The UK civil service will ensure ongoing commitments and cooperation with ASEAN, such as those detailed in the ASEAN-UK Plan of Action. Given historical partnerships, the UK’s defence presence in Singapore and Brunei will likely remain stable. However, the new government will unlikely take on additional commitments beyond those already established.

As the UK embarks on its “reset” of foreign policies, it should avoid a narrowly focused approach to maintain its global status. The credibility of the UK as an international player hinges on its responsiveness to global developments, particularly as critical flashpoints intensify in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.

The deepening relations between Russia, China, and North Korea underscores how developments in the Asia-Pacific region can impact Europe’s security. This highlights why the Indo-Pacific has become not only a priority for the Conservatives but also an external relations imperative for NATO and the EU.

The Conservative Government’s proactive pursuit of closer ties with ASEAN (an organisation that is at the heart of the Indo-Pacific) also reflects its recognition of Southeast Asia’s potential as a future economic powerhouse. The UK’s securing of a dialogue partnership with ASEAN in 2021 underscores its commitment to fostering security, economic and normative interests that are integral to its global strategies.

The UK’s commitment to the region has garnered significant strategic recognition, as highlighted in the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report. The UK ranks sixth among eleven dialogue partners in terms of strategic relevance to ASEAN, surpassing countries such as Australia, Russia, India, Canada, and New Zealand.

Strengthening ties with ASEAN presents an important opportunity for the Labour Government to enhance its influence in a strategic region marked by major power rivalries. At a time when the US’ commitment to the region is uncertain, the UK can play a crucial role in bridging potential gaps, particularly in scenarios such as a potential return of Donald Trump to office. This can be achieved by strengthening cooperation and values championed by the Labour Party, including climate action, good governance, promotion of international law and support for multilateralism. Additionally, deepening economic relations, including exploring a region wide ASEAN-UK free trade agreement with enhanced market access, will be instrumental. The UK has bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam rolled over from its previous EU membership. Additionally, it signed the Protocol of Accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in July last year, paving the way for expanded trade opportunities with Malaysia and Brunei as well.

Beyond bilateral engagement, the UK’s participation in ASEAN-led mechanisms like the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which the UK is keen to join, will present the UK with valuable opportunities to exercise its leadership on key multilateral platforms among major powers.

Ultimately, the UK’s foreign policy recalibration under Labour hinges on balancing global commitments with European regional priorities. As the UK embarks on this new phase, its engagement with ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific remains important for projecting influence, advancing economic interests, and shaping norms in an increasingly interconnected world. The upcoming ASEAN-UK Ministerial Meeting on 26 July 2024 in Vientiane, Laos will shed light on how this “reset” with the Global South will unfold.

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Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.