Navigating Our Future Together? The Philippine Chairmanship in a Year of Strategic Tension

When the Philippines assumed the ASEAN chairmanship on 1 January 2026 under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together”, expectations were high within ASEAN that Manila would steer ASEAN through a year marked by strategic uncertainty and accumulated regional pressures. The organisation continues to face political crises in Myanmar, persistent tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) and a broader environment in which the second Trump administration and geoeconomic competition continue to test ASEAN unity. Two months into the chairmanship, early meetings and diplomatic engagements offer initial signals of how Manila is positioning itself within these structural constraints.

The Philippine chair has focused on continuity. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Cebu in late January was an early test on forging unity on sensitive issues, with Myanmar at the centre of discussions. There, Manila reiterated established ASEAN positions, including continued reference to the Five-Point Consensus and the restriction of high-level representation by the Myanmar military authorities. In her capacity as Special Envoy of the ASEAN chair, Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa P. Lazaro’s visit to Myanmar on 6 January 2026 made clear after her visit that ASEAN would not recognise the recent electoral process as yet, reinforcing the grouping’s position that political developments in Myanmar must move towards inclusive dialogue and cessation of violence. While engagement with the military leadership prompted criticism from regional observers, the visit reflected ASEAN’s long-standing approach of dialogue without endorsement.

This dual-track posture reflects Manila’s effort to bridge differing views within ASEAN on the balance between political pressure and continued engagement with Naypyidaw. Lazaro’s visit was not intended to produce a political breakthrough. Rather, Manila appears to be signalling that its chairmanship will prioritise managing escalation risks and preserving ASEAN’s collective position rather than forcing an expedited political outcome.

This balancing act extends to the SCS issue, where the Philippines faces a particularly delicate balancing act. As one of the claimant states, Manila has been among the most vocal in asserting its maritime rights under international law. As ASEAN chair, however, it must frame the issue in a manner that sustains regional cohesion while keeping negotiations with China on the Code of Conduct (CoC) moving. In interviews following the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, Foreign Secretary Lazaro reiterated that any CoC must be consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), signalling Manila’s continued emphasis on a rules-based approach as it steers ASEAN discussions. Yet expectations among some ASEAN policymakers and observers of a legally binding conclusion within the year remain tempered by political reality. Divergent strategic calculations among ASEAN member states, together with the pace and substance of negotiations with China, make a rapid breakthrough unlikely.

While the Philippines has emphasised progress towards concluding the CoC in 2026 and has scheduled more negotiations, the more consequential test lies in ensuring that any outcome is substantive and credible. If Manila can sustain negotiation momentum, help contain the risk of maritime escalation among claimant states and China, and avoid visible fractures within ASEAN’s collective position, that would constitute meaningful progress in a more polarised environment.

On another front, the Cambodia–Thailand border tensions further underscore the limits of ASEAN’s crisis management architecture. While the Philippines has not introduced new mechanisms beyond those already established, it has continued to support the work of the ASEAN Observer Team and sustain discussions within ASEAN on ceasefire verification and de-escalation. Here too, the chair’s role has been facilitative rather than interventionist. The priority appears to be preventing bilateral frictions from spilling over into broader regional fragmentation.

Beyond the immediate political and security pressures, the Philippine chairmanship has continued work on ASEAN’s longer-term integration agenda. Sectoral and ministerial meetings in economic cooperation, tourism, energy cooperation and socio-cultural engagement have proceeded as scheduled, reinforcing continuity across ASEAN’s core workstreams. Manila has linked these efforts to the early implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, framing its leadership around peace and security anchors, prosperity corridors and people-centred empowerment. In periods when consensus on strategic questions proves elusive, it is often through functional cooperation that ASEAN sustains its relevance and momentum. While unlikely to generate headlines, steady advances in these domains can help sustain confidence in ASEAN’s practical relevance at a time when unity on more contentious political questions remains fragile.

Two months in, the Philippine chairmanship has projected steadiness and alignment with ASEAN’s established diplomatic practice. The question going forward is less about rhetorical ambition and more about sustained capacity. The more consequential answer may lie not in the regional arena, but at home. Chairing ASEAN requires more than foreign policy signalling. It demands bureaucratic discipline, coherent messaging and the alignment of domestic agencies behind agreed regional priorities. As the year unfolds, Manila’s ability to sustain focus, coherence and diplomatic bandwidth will be shaped in part by domestic political dynamics, inter-agency coordination across the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and defence, trade, energy and economic agencies responsible for advancing ASEAN sectoral commitments.

What more, President Marcos Jr.’s political standing has significantly changed since 2022. With two years left in office, his approval and trust ratings are in decline. The break-up of his alliance with the Dutertes and the lack of credible progress in the ongoing flood control corruption scandal probe have considerably diminished his political capital. Apart from these, the looming impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte and the ongoing trial of former president Rodrigo Duterte in the International Criminal Court are likely to occur this year, further adding to the list of domestic political distractions and constraining the government’s capacity to project sustained leadership abroad.

The recent declaration of Sara Duterte that she will run in the 2028 presidential elections has caught the Marcos Jr. government on the defensive. Vowing to change the policies of the current administration, she has become a formidable opposition figure. It is possible that the government’s actions and foreign policy goals related to the ASEAN chairmanship might be interpreted as protecting Philippine interests against Sara Duterte’s revisionist plans, which possibly includes adopting a more pro-China policy that downplays the country’s maritime interests in the SCS as implemented by her father’s presidency.

This is clearly seen in managing Philippines-China relations. A “word war” has ensued between Chinese Embassy officials in Manila and several Filipino officials and senators when a coast guard official used an unflattering caricature of Xi Jinping in a public lecture. Mindful of its ASEAN chairmanship role, the government has allowed the DFA to de-escalate the tensions since stormy relations with China will not bode well for its capacity as host to world leaders this year. However, an analyst warned that the Marcos Jr. administration must ensure that this will not be interpreted as changing its current policy of fervently promoting the country’s maritime interests in the SCS.

This exposes the internal political vulnerabilities of the Marcos Jr. administration as it assumed the ASEAN chairmanship. The Philippines must ensure that it projects a modicum of domestic political stability, bureaucratic coherence and policy consistency if it wishes to inspire confidence among its counterparts in the region and beyond. President Marcos Jr. must rally the entire government apparatus as well as the nation, to convince them that this chairmanship presents a vital opportunity to show responsibility and leadership. While the Philippines has historically shown that it can play the role of an international host well, the country cannot rest on its old laurels.

The first quarter of the Philippine chairmanship reflects a broader reality confronting ASEAN in 2026: the challenge lies less in setting ambitious priorities than in preserving cohesion amid mounting challenges. Manila’s approach thus far has been measured and calibrated. Whether that steadiness proves sufficient in a year of overlapping crises will be the more consequential test for the Philippines and for all of ASEAN.

Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.