Beyond Non‑Recognition: Myanmar’s Elections Leave ASEAN In a Bind

Derided by most international observers and the Myanmar diaspora as a sham, the recently concluded three-phase elections in Myanmar have entrenched military rule under a new constitutional government. For ASEAN, the outcome throws into sharp relief an increasingly uncomfortable question: does it persist with marginalising the intransigent junta until the latter cooperates with ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) or find a way back to engagement that does not betray ASEAN’s norms?

After the ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat in late January, Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro, who is concurrently the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, clarified that the ministers had not reached consensus “as of now”. Maintaining that “any meaningful political progress can only take place in an environment of peace, security and inclusivity, supported by the cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue”, the chair’s statement masks strategic divergences within the bloc, because exactly how to achieve “meaningful political progress” remains the key question that is unanswered.

One camp within ASEAN is prepared to give some weight to the election outcome, however flawed, believing it is the start of a political transition, now framed as a generic transition rather than a ‘transition to democracy’ (ASEAN’s lingo for Myanmar back in the 1990s). For those of this view, Myanmar could be welcomed back once there is some semblance of a stable government, regardless of how unrepresentative it is. This approach allows a return to ‘business-as-usual’ with Myanmar political leaders coming back to ASEAN meetings and summits.

A second camp worries that such unconditional acceptance would give the junta the wrong signals: that state-led atrocities committed against civilians can be swept under the carpet if the right institutional façade is in place. This position is grounded in concerns about human rights, accountability and legitimacy.

A third ‘middle ground’ group supports ASEAN’s collective non‑recognition of the military junta while maintaining low‑key bilateral engagement, allowing room for ambiguity and quiet diplomacy with Naypyidaw. Diplomatic accreditation that was halted post-2021 has resumed, with countries like Brunei appointing a new ambassador and Cambodia celebrating the 70th anniversary of its establishment of diplomatic relations with Myanmar, for instance. Expressing diplomatic support for ASEAN’s 5PC has not stopped Vietnam from pursuing further cooperation with the junta. Vietnam and Cambodia were the two ASEAN members who sent election observers from their capitals, while other ASEAN diplomatic missions monitored from the ground.

These internal fault lines explain why consensus on how to move the Myanmar issue forward remains elusive, even as some ASEAN states have visibly re‑engaged the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) through diplomacy, trade, energy and even military cooperation.

The real test ahead is whether ASEAN can translate its principled non‑recognition into a more politically astute strategy of conditional engagement …

ASEAN member states will show collective support with the Philippines Chair’s line of maintaining non‑recognition while leaving the door open to future adjustment. Foreign Secretary Lazaro hinted in a public lecture that the group was considering “certain permutations”, including proposals to solve the problem of providing humanitarian aid. When asked what might change ASEAN’s position, she said that the cessation of violence will be “the most basic thing that ASEAN will look at”. Conditions for a sudden convergence of views, either towards a more permissive stance on engagement or, conceivably, towards a harder line, are dynamic and dependent partly on the junta’s willingness to cooperate with ASEAN but also on how creatively ASEAN decides to engage with other stakeholders.

Given the current situation, ASEAN needs to revisit how it uses its 5PC. Rather than discard the 5PC as obsolete, ASEAN can sharpen it into a transactional offer: an end to violence against civilians and engage in political dialogue with non-military stakeholders in exchange for a gradual return to the ASEAN table.

Such an approach would treat the Myanmar military as part of the problem but also part of the solution, recognising its role in any realistic settlement. It acknowledges an uncomfortable reality: while ASEAN may loathe the junta’s actions, the costs of prolonged non‑engagement are borne disproportionately by the people of Myanmar who remain inside the country.

Singapore’s language on the Myanmar issue post-2021 shows what constitutes a workable minimum standard. It has consistently argued that “meaningful political progress in Myanmar requires a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue, and participation by all stakeholders”, indicating that the recent elections did not meet these conditions. By emphasising where the elections fell short (on fair conduct and inclusivity), ASEAN can sidestep technical debates on legal recognition that might constrain its future responses to other elections in the region.

The Myanmar impasse feeds into a broader critique of ASEAN’s consensus‑based decision‑making. The bloc’s inability to respond “quickly, firmly and decisively” to fast‑moving crises is increasingly seen as a structural weakness in a volatile external environment. Yet, moving away from consensus would be politically fraught and could damage ASEAN unity. A more realistic near‑term adjustment would be to use informal coalitions, flexible geometry, and clearer thresholds under the 5PC for when Myanmar’s representation at ASEAN meetings can be upgraded or downgraded.

New Delhi’s reactions are what one expert analysis says “an exercise in managed legitimacy”. India’s strategic interests in Myanmar are in border stability and preserving infrastructure connectivity projects linking northeastern India through Myanmar to Southeast Asia. While the elections may be distasteful, New Delhi will neither condemn nor endorse the results.

This contrasts with Beijing’s endorsement of a “steady and orderly” election that reflects “the choice of the people”, which is viewed by some as a diplomatic setback for ASEAN’s position of non-recognition. China’s public messaging on Myanmar leans on its Five Principles of Peaceful Co‑Existence – the reality remains that China may pay lip service to ASEAN centrality, but this does not prevent China’s pursuit of its national interests, including maintaining border security, protecting commercial interests and preserving strategic access to the Indian Ocean. Far from making Beijing look bad, this divergence on recognition has reinforced regional perceptions of China’s considerable leverage over Myanmar.

By maintaining a position of non‑recognition for now, ASEAN has chosen adherence to its commitment to democracy, rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which are enshrined ASEAN Charter norms, even if practical tools to defend these norms remain limited. The real test ahead is whether ASEAN can translate its principled non‑recognition into a more politically astute strategy of conditional engagement that alleviates civilian suffering without rewarding the Myanmar junta’s impunity. To do this requires sustained political will.

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