Beyond the SQUAD: Ideas for the Philippines to Work with a Northeast Asian Minilateral Arrangement

The Philippines has borne the brunt of China’s hard power in the West Philippine Sea and its insidious use of ‘sharp’ power’ in domestic politics. This combination of China’s unique tools of statecraft is part of an overall operational design to assert sea control over the East and South China Seas (SCS), and to exert influence over the region’s political elites. (Editor’s note: The West Philippine Sea refers to waters in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, or EEZ.)

The Philippines is aware that it does not have the diplomatic or military gravitas to counter Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions alone. The SCS arbitration case that the Philippines won at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on 12 July 2016 was an asymmetric solution, which has a profound impact on the legal and diplomatic front. However, this has not curbed China’s ability to escalate tensions at sea. 

During the Shangri-La Dialogue last month, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. articulated in his speech the primacy of his country’s national interest, his foreign policy and national security agenda, and the importance of contesting China’s use of hard and sharp power to support its excessive maritime claims. He also paid homage to ASEAN centrality and its importance in maintaining order and stability in the Indo-Pacific. However, if the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey could be used as a barometer of the region’s sentiment, Marcos’ nuanced appeal for ASEAN support may likely fall on deaf ears. The survey indicated that despite the region’s fear of China’s abuse of its military and economic power, most of ASEAN favoured Beijing over Washington. These results may reflect how adroitly China has positioned itself in the region and the efficacy of its geoeconomic strategy. The Philippines has yet to receive an explicit show of support from ASEAN for its current approach to dealing with China on the SCS.

Perhaps Manila will have to cast its gaze towards the northeast by building on the emerging minilateral engagements involving the US and other like-minded strategic partners. The Marcos administration will have to find the sweet spot that allows Marcos Jr. to explore the opportunities being presented by these engagements to improve the country’s security and economic situation, while maintaining its traditional ties within ASEAN.

Will Manila be bold enough to undertake a new geopolitical project, such as the coming together of like-minded states to form a ‘Northeast Asia Minilateral Arrangement’? Such a potential project can build on the momentum of two recent developments. The first is the trilateral summit between Japan, the Philippines and the US, held at Washington DC on 11 April 2024. A few weeks later, the defence ministers of the three countries, together with their counterparts in Australia, met at the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii. Thus, the SQUAD was born. 

Should it stop with the SQUAD? Perhaps, moving forward, the Philippines could also engage South Korea and Canada, with which the country has strong bilateral interactions. Canada recently stepped up assistance for overcoming the Philippines’ critical gaps in maritime domain awareness by providing near real-time satellite data on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUUF)-related activities within the latter’s EEZ. Moreover, President Marcos Jr. will be officially visiting Canada in a few months, and this could be a harbinger for stronger partnerships in defence and security matters.

South Korea is a major security partner in defence logistics, as it has provided aircraft and naval ships, including offshore patrol vessels in the immediate pipeline. More importantly, South Korea is already part of an earlier trilateral pact signed on 18 August 2023 – the Camp David Principles (JAROKUS), which includes the US and Japan.  

The Marcos administration will have to find the sweet spot that allows Marcos Jr. to explore the opportunities presented by these engagements to improve the country’s security and economic situation, while maintaining its traditional ties within ASEAN.

In this author’s view, a new minilateral in Northeast Asia composed of Canada, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and the US should be predicated on two objectives: first, setting up a mechanism for collective maritime security in the region, and second, promoting economic resilience. The following could be potential projects: 

• Expanded and Sustained Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA), which veers away from periodic patrols towards a 24/7 operational rhythm performed by either navies or coast guards of member states;

• Combined Naval Logistics Facility, which can be set up at Subic (Philippines) to support the maintenance and logistics requirements of participating navies and coast guards that will be patrolling the SCS;

• Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Northeast, which can be established as a biennial event alternating with the RIMPAC exercise hosted in Hawaii. For the Philippines, EX SAMA-SAMA, a multilateral naval exercise, can be repurposed for this activity;

• Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness, which can study the assembly and deployment of a space-based maritime surveillance capability to track adversary naval, commercial, and IUUF traffic in the region; 

• Defence Industry Zone, which optimises the existing Agila Subic Shipyard in Zambales (Philippines) to support shipbuilding programmes of the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, and the projected Defense Industrial Estate in Bataan (Philippines), to cater to the logistical needs of members’ uniformed services; and 

• Integrated Air Defence and Sea Denial System, which builds on the  recent acquisition of the Brahmos anti-ship missile system by the Philippine Marine Corps and the lessons learned from this year’s BALIKATAN multinational exercise. (In these cases, the systems used in these exercises offer solutions to plug the gaps in the country’s archipelagic and air defence posture.)

In summary, President Marcos Jr. has reset the government’s foreign policy and national security posture to be resilient against China’s excessive maritime claims, economic coercion, and coercive tactics at sea and in the information battlespace. However, for these approaches to gain traction, Manila is compelled to collaborate with other countries that share not only its fears but also its values.

2024/197