Border Crackdown on Organised Crime Puts Vulnerable Myanmar Population in Thailand at Risk

The Thai-Myanmar border is both a crucial refuge and a hotspot for transnational organised crime and modern slavery. Increased securitisation by Thailand, China, and other actors may reduce crime on the Myanmar side. However, these broad measures risk threatening the vulnerable Myanmar population currently in Thailand or seeking refuge there.

In recent years, the Thai-Myanmar border region, especially the Shwe Kokko enclave, located within Myanmar’s Karen State and controlled by the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), has emerged as a shelter for a sophisticated network of global online scams. While Shwe Kokko is notorious, it is only one of many such centres along this stretch of the border.

To staff their scam centres, these telecommunications fraud operations target multinational victims, especially Mandarin and English speakers, and increasingly rely on advancements in artificial intelligence to expand their reach. Many recruited scam victims are lured, abducted and trafficked from various countries. Once employed, many are forced into exploitative conditions resembling modern slavery.

Media and research reports typically focus on the financial impact of money scams, not only in Myanmar but also in Cambodia and Laos. For example, a 2024 United States Institute of Peace study estimates that some 305,000 scammers in these three Southeast Asian countries were responsible for stealing US$39 billion annually (out of a global total of US$64 billion). However, the human impact of these operations on scammers and their victims is equally important. A significant number of scammers appear to be victims themselves, as highlighted by a 2023 UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) paper and various news reports.

The case of Chinese actor Wang Xing, who was abducted and trafficked to the Myanmar border through Mae Sot and later saved through the same border, went viral in early January 2025. In mid-January, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on Southeast Asian states to intensify their efforts against organised crime. Thailand now actively collaborates with China, as evidenced by the recent visit to the border by Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi. However, it is important to note that a diverse group of stakeholders has been involved in and has benefited from transnational telecommunications fraud. At times, even Thai officials have been linked to scam centres operating within the kingdom.

For decades, the Thai-Myanmar border has been a crucial crossing point for trade and goods, and a gateway for migration for work or refuge. Vulnerabilities along the border are not new but they have been intensified since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup.

This intersection of vulnerability and refuge is most evident in the nine camps on the Thai side, which combined house a refugee population of at least 86,000. Additionally, tens of thousands of asylum seekers crossed the border after the February 2021 coup.

Vulnerabilities along the border are not new but they have been intensified since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup.

In Tak province, particularly in Mae Sot, the Myanmar population outside of the refugee camps can be categorised into three groups: migrant workers, long-term and newly arrived; registered asylum seekers, who are individuals fleeing post-coup repression and violence, and are registered with UNHCR and awaiting resettlement; and non-resettlement asylum seekers, who do not seek third-country resettlement and are instead holding onto hope of returning to Myanmar when political conditions improve.

These groups overlap. Frustration with long asylum waits of years has pushed many registered asylum seekers into the non-resettlement group, voluntarily or otherwise. By early 2025, distinguishing between the two groups is increasingly difficult. The number of asylum seekers has continued to rise, driven by young men fleeing Myanmar’s mandatory military conscription introduced in February 2024. Many seek refuge while also pursuing work, blending into the migrant worker group.

Except for documented migrant workers, most asylum seekers — registered or not — remain undocumented or partially documented. They face restricted movement in Mae Sot and Tak province, often paying 300 baht (US$8.84) monthly for so-called police cards, as well as larger bribes or extortions at checkpoints and during arrests or detentions.

Fears of deportation due to increased border securitisation have significantly increased, particularly among Myanmar dissidents who are almost certain to face arrest, as well as younger individuals at risk of immediate conscription upon returning to Myanmar. This growing fear among the Myanmar population in Tak province is expected to drive further inland migration to Chiang Mai, Bangkok and cities in southern Thailand. 

For Thailand, China and other regional actors, the Myanmar border is often associated with organised crime, trafficking, and modern slavery. However, for the people of Myanmar, both within the country and those seeking refuge in Thailand, the border remains a lifeline. While state-led efforts to combat crime are necessary, they risk worsening the situation for those seeking safety and survival.

As Thailand, Myanmar, and other regional actors tighten border security, it is crucial to consider the human impact of these policies. It is essential that governments address organised crime and human trafficking, but these measures should not come at the cost of the rights and safety of vulnerable populations.

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