Cambodia’s Outreach to the West Does Not Change China’s Centrality
Published
The view that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet is recharting foreign policy — by reaching out to Western countries and relying less on China — is overblown. China remains Cambodia’s closest friend due to its inside track to the Cambodian elite and its pervasive influence in Cambodia’s economy.
There is a view that Hun Manet is moving away from the pro-China tilt of his father Hun Sen, towards a more diversified foreign policy since becoming Cambodia’s prime minister in August 2023, as evidenced by his interactions with American and European business and political leaders at the World Economic Forum and his meeting with the French president during a visit in January 2024. However, Cambodia’s efforts to make new friends, especially the West, does not necessarily mean that Phnom Penh is rethinking its enduring relationship with China.
Cambodia-China relations are currently on a strong footing. China is Cambodia’s largest investor, trading partner, and aid donor. Numerous Chinese infrastructure projects such as roads, expressways, bridges, buildings, ports, dams and airports, and most recently, a controversial 180 km-long Funan Techo Canal, dot the country’s landscape despite concerns of corruption, adverse environmental impacts, debt burden, and vice and criminal activities.
Why have Chinese projects remained so pervasive?
Chinese companies enjoy direct access to the Cambodian political elite, according to a Cambodian source interviewed by this author. Companies from other countries usually approach the relevant ministries/agencies to pitch a project idea. This by-the-book, bottom-up mode takes time as the project invariably gets mired in the bureaucratic process and may not even be approved at the end. In contrast, Chinese companies bypass this cumbersome process by going straight to the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) political elites, who can immediately green-light proposed projects and then instruct the relevant ministries/agencies to implement them. The Cambodian elites and officials involved are rewarded for their support by receiving a cut from the investment project. In this way, the Chinese projects help to reinforce the existing entrenched political system and shore up the legitimacy of the CPP. Moreover, Chinese investments do not come with strings attached, making them much more attractive than investments from other countries.
Another reason for the enduring nature of China-Cambodia relations is the strong political ties between the two countries — often described as iron-clad, a term reserved for China’s closest friends. Hun Manet chose China to be the first foreign country to visit in September 2023, soon after he was appointed prime minister. He visited China again in October 2023 to attend the 3rd Belt and Road Forum hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Hun Manet’s two consecutive trips to China within a short span of time underscored the importance that Phnom Penh accords to the relationship with China. And even though Hun Sen is no longer prime minister, China has maintained “strategic communication” with him, a recognition of his influence in Cambodia. Beijing invited Hun Sen to attend the annual Boao Forum in March 2024 where he met China’s third-ranked Political Bureau Standing Committee Member and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji. When Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Cambodia in April 2024, he called on Hun Sen, apart from meeting Hun Manet and Cambodian King Sihamoni. During his visit, Wang Yi affirmed that China will always be Cambodia’s most trustworthy partner and strongest supporter. From China’s perspective, Hun Sen, his son Hun Manet and King Sihamoni (who travels frequently to China for vacation and medical treatment) will ensure that their country sustains the special relationship with China.
Hun Sen’s 2021 refrain “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?” remains relevant today under Prime Minister Hun Manet. Given the entrenched political system in Cambodia, its lack of Western friends, and Cambodia’s wariness of its immediate neighbours, Phnom Penh looks set to continue to rely heavily on China for its development and security.
There is a limit to how much attention the Cambodian leadership can devote to foreign policy, much less engineer a shift away from China, as Hun Manet’s foremost priority is to consolidate power. There are currently 11 deputy prime ministers (one more than when Hun Sen was prime minister), reflecting a delicate balancing act among different political groupings with ties to Hun Sen and the ruling CPP. Apart from managing younger deputy prime ministers like Sar Sakho (aged 43), Tea Seiha (44), Keut Rith (45) and Say Sam AI (44), Hun Manet (47) has to win over the trust of more senior individuals like Aun Pornmoniroth (59), Vongsey Vissoth (59), Hangchuon Naron (62), Sok Chenda Sophea (68), Neth Savoeun (68) and Sun Chanthol (68), some of whom are loyal to Hun Sen.
To protect Hun Manet and afford him time to consolidate power, Hun Sen assumed the position of senate president in February 2024, which affords him an official platform to influence the course of domestic politics in favour of his son. Moreover, as senate president, Hun Sen will assume the ceremonial role of acting president when the king is overseas. Furthermore, Hun Many, Hun Sen’s youngest son, was also appointed the 11th deputy prime minister in February 2024, further buttressing the Hun Sen family’s presence in Cambodian politics.
China is the country that Cambodia turns to when it encounters problems in its relations with its immediate neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Historically, Cambodia has had a difficult relationship with these two bigger and stronger neighbours. Today, it still views Thailand and more so Vietnam with a certain degree of wariness. From Cambodia’s perspective, ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in addressing the Preah Vihear dispute between Cambodia and Thailand from 2008-2011 convinced Phnom Penh that it needed China to check the ambitions of its immediate neighbours. More recently, Vietnam has expressed concerns over China’s presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base as well as Cambodia’s resolve to build the Funan Techo Canal, which some speculate could bring Chinese military presence closer to Vietnam’s southern border. A Cambodian source said that because of these concerns, Hanoi may deliberately make things difficult for Cambodia going forward. Hence, it is even more important for Cambodia to fall back on China for support.
Hun Sen’s 2021 refrain “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?” remains relevant today under Prime Minister Hun Manet. Given the entrenched political system in Cambodia, its lack of Western friends, and Cambodia’s wariness of its immediate neighbours, Phnom Penh looks set to continue to rely heavily on China for its development and security. The centrality of China in Cambodia’s foreign policy will therefore remain more of the same.
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Lye Liang Fook is an Associate Senior Fellow at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow and Assistant Director at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore.









