China’s Drive for Food Self-Sufficiency: What It Means for ASEAN Countries

China plays an important role in the global food system because it is the world’s largest food importer. Its determination to reduce imports and increase its food self-sufficiency is emerging as one of the most important developments shaping regional food security and global trade. While China is unlikely to become a major food exporter by 2030, its changing import demand will have significant implications for ASEAN economies that depend heavily on the Chinese market.

Beijing is seeking to strengthen domestic food production, reduce import dependence and build greater resilience against geopolitical, climatic and supply-chain shocks through its No. 1 Document, and Agricultural Plan embedded in the 5th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). These plans were released in early 2026. Together, these Chinese goals constitute one of the most important developments shaping regional food security and global trade.

To China, the challenge is structural. China feeds almost one-fifth of the world’s population with less than one-tenth of its arable land. Rather than expanding farmland, it is raising productivity through biotechnology, improved genetics, precision agriculture and digital farming, alternative proteins and more efficient livestock production. This technology-driven strategy mirrors the industrial policies that made China globally competitive in sectors such as solar power, batteries and electric vehicles — a parallel that the rest of the world should watch closely.

As China’s domestic production increases and the competitiveness of certain commodities improves, Chinese imports of such commodities are likely to decline. Rice, poultry, eggs and pork are already close to self-sufficiency, while the production of wheat and maize is expected to increase substantially over the coming decade (see Table 1). In contrast, soybeans, beef, dairy products and vegetable oils will remain heavily import-dependent because of China’s limited land and water resources.

For ASEAN countries, the consequences will be mixed. Reduced Chinese demand for some commodities could soften global prices and affect export earnings, particularly for countries with high exposure to the Chinese market. Exporters should also expect increasingly stringent Chinese requirements on food safety, traceability and sustainability. Greater Chinese production of poultry, aquaculture products and alternative proteins could also intensify competition in both regional and global markets. Conversely, China’s advances in biotechnology, digital agriculture and food processing could serve as valuable sources of technology transfer that strengthen ASEAN food security.

Mixed Bag for ASEAN Countries

Table 1: Current import volumes, expected outlook for major agricultural commodities and the likely implications for ASEAN.

Agricultural commodity	Current Imports, Million Metric Tons, MMT/20251	Expected situation by 20302	Expected impact on ASEAN
Soybeans	111.8 MMT	Remains major importer	Continued strong demand by China
Vegetable oils	6.8 MMT	Remains import dependent	Continued demand for non-palm oil edible oils
Seafood	4.9 MMT	More domestic aquaculture	Reduced import of low-value fish
Wheat	3.9 MMT	Higher domestic production	Reduced import growth
Rice	3.1 MMT	Almost self-sufficient	Limited change
Beef	2.8 MMT	Significant imports to continue	Limited change
Maize	2.7 MMT	Increased self-sufficiency	Lower feed grain demand by China
Pork	0.98 MMT	Stable domestic production	Lower import dependency by China
Poultry	0.27 MMT (meat only)	Net exporter	Growth competition for ASEAN

China has become the largest agricultural export market for several ASEAN economies. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam are particularly exposed through exports of tropical fruit, cassava, rice, seafood and poultry (Table 2). A slowdown or shift in Chinese demand would require these countries to diversify their export destinations and compete more aggressively in alternative markets (such as the European Union, various Gulf states and Japan). Nevertheless, China will remain one of the world’s largest food importers through 2030, particularly for soybeans, beef, premium dairy products and high-quality foods.

Dependence on China

Table 2: Varying levels of ASEAN exposure to the Chinese market.

ASEAN Member State	Main Agrifood Exports to China	Approx. Share of Country’s Agrifood Exports Going to China	Exposure if China Reduces Imports
Thailand	Durians, mangosteens, longans, cassavas, poultry, rubber	30–40%	High
Vietnam	Durians, dragonfruits, coffee, seafood, pepper, rice	25–35%	Moderate–High
Malaysia	Palm oil, cocoa, bird’s nests, processed foods	15–20%	Low
Indonesia	Palm oil, coffee, cocoa, fisheries	10–15%	Low
Philippines	Bananas, coconut products, pineapple	10–15%	Low–Moderate
Myanmar	Rice, maize, pulses, fruits	30–40%	High
Cambodia	Rice, cassavas, bananas, mangoes	35–45%	High
Lao PDR	Rubber, bananas, cassava, maize	60–80%	Very High
Brunei	Negligible agricultural exports	<5%	Minimal
Singapore	Food re-exports, processed foods	<5%	Minimal
Timor-Leste	Coffee	Small export base	Low

An equally important question is whether China could become a significant food exporter. The authors’ assessment is that China seems mainly concerned about raising its self-sufficiency to reduce dependency on imports and does not appear to have any aspirations to dominate global food trade. However, the country is already emerging as a major exporter of agricultural technology, improved seeds, digital farming systems, irrigation equipment and food-processing machinery. These technologies offer opportunities for deeper ASEAN-China cooperation in productivity improvement, climate resilience and sustainable agriculture.

The larger issue for ASEAN is therefore not whether China exports more food, but how its changing import demand reshapes global markets. Countries heavily dependent on China as a single export destination face increasing commercial risk as Chinese production expands and imports become more selective.

ASEAN governments can respond in four ways.

First, they should gradually diversify export markets beyond China. South Asian states like India as well as Africa are expected to generate much of the future growth in food demand. Japan, South Korea and the European Union offer opportunities for premium products.

Second, they should move up the value chain by supporting investment in processed foods, premium rice, speciality coffee and cocoa, halal-certified products and sustainably certified seafood. Improved logistics, cold chains, food safety systems and digital traceability will become increasingly important competitive advantages.

The larger issue for ASEAN is therefore not whether China exports more food, but how its changing import demand reshapes global markets.

Third, ASEAN countries should strengthen regional cooperation and regional resilience. ASEAN should establish an early-warning mechanism to monitor Chinese agricultural production, import demand, policy changes and commodity markets. Stronger intra-ASEAN food trade, harmonised standards and more efficient customs procedures would further enhance regional resilience.

Finally, Southeast Asian governments should assist farmers and agribusinesses most exposed to changing Chinese demand by helping them diversify markets, invest in value-added production using regenerative practices and improve competitiveness. Adjustment support should facilitate long-term transformation rather than protect declining markets indefinitely.

China’s food strategy should not be viewed as a retreat from global markets but as a shift towards more selective imports, greater technological leadership and stronger domestic resilience. For ASEAN, the response is equally clear: diversify export markets, increase value addition, strengthen regional integration and closely monitor China’s evolving food policies. Countries that adapt early will be best placed to benefit from changing global demand, while those that remain overly dependent on a single market will become increasingly vulnerable.

2026/224