Competition among Thailand’s Three Largest Parties Deepens the Country’s Political Uncertainties

INTRODUCTION

With the appointment of Bhumjaithai (BJT) party leader Anutin Charnvirakul as the new Prime Minister, and the return to prison of influential former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, father of disqualified ex-Prime Minister Paetongtarn, Thai politics has entered a new phase of intensifying competition among the country’s three largest parties: People’s Party (PP), Pheu Thai and BJT.

Each of the three is facing different challenges and legal problems. How successfully they can cope will determine their political future in the general election expected to take place in the first half of next year.

The old ideological divides, once structured around support for or opposition to Thaksin and the conservative royalist-military establishment, have been supplanted by a more pragmatic three-way struggle between PP, Pheu Thai, and BJT.

This dynamic helps explain PP’s decision to support Anutin despite the risk of alienating its core supporters. Any delay could have forced Anutin to set up a new reconciliation coalition with Pheu Thai, thereby leaving PP once again isolated in the opposition and deprived of any leverage to advance its reformist agendas.

Nevertheless, the ideologically fluid alliance between BJT and PP has left PP as both formal opposition and enforcer of the terms of its political bargain with Anutin. One of these terms—constitutional reform—could prove destabilising to the three-way struggle as the parties clash over whether to replace the 2017 Constitution with a new constitution, how it should be drafted, and by whom.

PEOPLE’S PARTY IN COMMANDING POSITION

PP has the largest number of MPs, 142 in the 491-member House of Representatives.  But it had no candidate of its own to vie for the premiership after Paetongtarn was disqualified.

Doing nothing was not a viable option for PP. Any delay could force Pheu Thai and BJT to reconcile and form a new “reunion” coalition government, which would have left PP in the opposition and without any leverage to push for critical reforms until the next general election due in mid-2027.

PP’s second-best option was to support either Pheu Thai’s premiership candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, a 77-year-old former justice minister, or Anutin, the 59-year-old leader of BJT. PP finally chose Anutin, apparently because his BJT, with only 69 MPs, is much weaker than Pheu Thai, which has 139 MPs (131 if eight defectors are soon expelled). This would, in theory, allow PP to maintain some influence on the government’s direction despite remaining in the opposition and refusing to send anyone to join Anutin’s Cabinet.

To hold Anutin accountable, PP has secured the commitment of Anutin and BJT not to transform their minority government into a majority one. The commitment has been written into the controversial Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) between PP leader Natthaphong Ruangpanyawut and Anutin, which they publicly signed on 3 September. With only 159 MPs, Anutin’s minority government cannot pass any bill without the support of either PP or Pheu Thai. Should Anutin fail to deliver, PP can initiate a no-confidence motion in the House to unseat him from the premiership; however, in such a case, PP will need the support of Pheu Thai.

AT RISK OF LOSING KEY LEADERSHIP PERSONNEL

Even if PP’s support for Anutin is credited as a strategic calculation to make the most of its 142 MP seats, it has nevertheless provoked widespread backlash. Senior commentator Suthichai Yoon called the decision by PP “a deal with the Devil”. In a survey by the NIDA Poll, 46% of respondents voiced disapproval of the deal. This deal is also likely to have alienated segments of PP’s supporters who remain opposed to any government that includes BJT in the mix.

BJT and Anutin were in the government coalitions of Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the military leader who toppled the Pheu Thai-led coalition government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in a coup in May 2014, and against whom PP’s predecessor, Move Forward (MFP), had campaigned vigorously in 2023.

BJT had also been a key partner in the Pheu Thai-led ruling coalitions of Prime Ministers Srettha Thavisin and Paetongtarn, which PP opposed in parliament. BJT only broke away from the coalition government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn on 19 June, following the Paetongtarn-Hun Sen telephone controversy. This history makes PP’s support for Anutin particularly ironic and understandably upsetting to some of its core supporters.

The decline in public support for PP could come at a dangerous time, as several of its leadership figures face a potential ban. PP succeeded MFP after the latter was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in early August 2024 for opposing and attempting to abolish the constitutional monarchy. One of the violations cited as evidence was the proposed amendment to the lèse-majesté law in Section 112 of the Criminal Code. The proposed amendment was sponsored by 44 MPs of the then MFP in March 2021. But it was never accepted for consideration in the House.

Among the 44 MPs of MFP, 25 are now MPs of PP. They include party leader Natthaphong and six of his nine deputies. They will face a ban from national politics for at least 10 years if the Supreme Court eventually finds them seriously guilty of trying to reduce legal protection for the monarchy with their proposed amendment to the lèse-majesté law.

The 44 accused will be divided into two groups: those who initiated the draft bill, and those who merely endorsed it with their signatures. The former will face punishment that is more severe. Their prosecution will be on an individual basis, and may start in December, according to a spokesman for the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. Once prosecution starts in the Supreme Court, each of the 25 PP MPs among the 44 accused will be suspended from parliamentary duty.

Even if PP’s support for Anutin is credited as a strategic calculation to make the most of its 142 MP seats, it has nevertheless provoked widespread backlash. Senior commentator Suthichai Yoon called the decision by PP “a deal with the Devil”.

The Supreme Court needs to take into account the Constitutional Court’s findings and ruling against MFP in August 2024. What punishment each of them will be given depends on the Supreme Court’s judgment on the role each of them had undertaken.

All in all, it is possible that PP will eventually lose a significant number of its top personnel in this sticky quagmire. Such a loss would seriously weaken the party before and after the next general election.

 DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION?

Four months after his delivery of the policy statement, Anutin must dissolve the House for an early general election, according to the MoA signed by the two leaders of PP and BJT. But the MoA actually does not explicitly commit Anutin to supporting whatever  PP wants to do in drafting a new constitution. Strictly speaking, the MoA is not legally binding. This is where politicking could complicate, or worse, derail PP’s demand for the new prime minister to organise a national referendum on the drafting of a new constitution by a wholly-elected national assembly on or before the date of the next early general election.

On 10 September, the Constitutional Court ruled that three national referenda shall be required: first, on whether a majority of voters want a new constitution; second, on how Section 256 concerning constitutional amendment will be amended to establish a new process to draft a new constitution; and third, on whether a majority of voters approve the final draft of a new constitution. Thankfully, the Constitutional Court also ruled that the first and the second national referenda can be combined. This will save the government about three billion baht (the estimated cost per national referendum).

Another recent positive development was the entry into force on 22 October of a new law on national referendum.  Now, only a single majority of voters’ decision is required to approve or reject a government’s proposal.  Under the old law, a double majority of both the voters’ turnout and voters’ decision would be required.

Nevertheless, the Constitution Court ruled against the PP’s idea of amending the Constitution in order to set up a wholly elected national assembly to draft a new constitution. This ruling effectively affords Anutin the political space to appear responsive to PP’s demands without meeting them in full. In Prime Minister Anutin’s policy statement, delivered to the parliament on 29 September, he announced support for the national referendum “in order to listen to the people”.  In practice, BJT will retain significant control over the scope of the referendum.    Anutin has already set up a team led by BJT party secretary-general Chaichanok Chidchob to oversee its preparations.

Pheu Thai suffered a setback when its draft bill to amend the Constitution was rejected.   Although it had support from a majority of MPs, it failed to secure the support of at least one-third of the Senate membership of 199.  PP’s draft bill and BJT’s draft bill were both accepted with a majority of support from both MPs and Senators.

When it came to choosing which of the two accepted drafts would be the primary text in the second reading, Pheu Thai’s MPs supported PP’s draft, and it beat BJT’s draft in a vote of 300 – 287.

The next round of struggle will be in the second reading of the PP’s draft bill.  An ad hoc committee of 43 representatives has been set up for the arduous task.

Deputy Prime Minister Dr Bowornsak Uwanno urged the parliamentarians to adopt the final draft bill by 20 December.  This will give the Anutin Cabinet and the Election Commission enough time to hold a national referendum on the constitutional amendment bill on the same day of the next general election, which could be held on 29 March 2026.

None of the three parties can have complete control over the outcome of the upcoming national referendum. But if any two of the three team up, they might be able to mobilise enough popular support to pass or oppose any proposal made by the Anutin Cabinet. Yet, PP cannot realistically expect support from Pheu Thai, whether in terms of shaping the direction of the national referendum or in ensuring that BJT upholds the MoA. Even though Pheu Thai is now in the opposition, Pheu Thai has refused PP’s leadership and insisted on remaining “independent”.

PHEU THAI HAS MORE TO LOSE

Even more than PP, however, it is Pheu Thai that now faces the most significant leadership crisis. In two years after the 2023 General Election, Pheu Thai has lost two prime ministers, Srettha Thavisin and Paetongtarn, to disqualifications by the Constitutional Court.

Worse still, Thaksin (77), the “spiritual leader” of Pheu Thai, is now in jail, serving a one-year imprisonment, which he had avoided with his controversial “hospital gambit”. The Supreme Court on 9 September ruled that Thaksin had faked critical illnesses and sentenced him to at least four months before he can request any special parole or home detention.

On her part, Paetongtarn  may soon face criminal prosecution for violating Section 124 of the Criminal Code: revealing national secrets and jeopardising national security. The violation is punishable by a jail term of up to 10 years.

Paetongtarn finally bowed out, resigning as the party leader on 22 October.  One of her reasons was to give Pheu Thai a “free hand” to reorganise its leadership.  Pheu Thai has scheduled an urgent party congress on 31 October to elect a new party leader and a new executive committee.

Former Deputy Finance Minister Julapun Amornvivat, 50, was chosen unopposed as the new party leader of Pheu Thai.  The 5-time MP in Chiang Mai is widely seen as a loyal supporter of the Shinawatra political clan.  A real surprise was in replacing Sorawong Tienthong,50, with Prasert Chantharuangthong, 65, as the new party secretary-general.  Sorawong is now one of the 12 deputy party leaders.

Prasert is a veteran politician from Nakhon Ratchasima, the largest province in the Northeast.  He held the same post when Pheu Thai was led by Dr Cholnan Srikaew (2021-2023).  Prasert’s return is widely seen as an attempt by the Shinawatra family to try to stop Pheu Thai’s MPs in northeastern provinces from defecting to join BJT or its ally Kla Tham.

In addition to leadership transitions, the Paetongtarn administration has also been accused of misappropriating about 35 billion baht originally intended for servicing public debts to pay for the troubled scheme to give each poor Thai 10,000 baht in a cash handout. This is potentially a violation of Section 144 in the Constitution.

In this case, the Paetongtarn Cabinet – including Anutin, who was then a deputy prime minister and concurrently the interior minister, 309 government MPs (including those in BJT), and 175 senators who took part in approving the budget misappropriation – may be punished. The case is still pending in the Constitutional Court after it was accepted for deliberation on 9 August.

In a similar case, Deputy House Speaker Pichet Chuamuangpan (MP of Pheu Thai, Chiang Rai) was disqualified from holding political office on 1 August after the Constitutional Court ruled that he was guilty of diverting budget money to his constituency in the northernmost province of Chiang Rai. Pichet has also been banned from national politics for 10 years.

At the individual level, Paetongtarn has a number of cases pending investigation by the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (ONACC). Any negative outcome in any of these cases will disqualify her from leading Pheu Thai or holding any other political office.

BHUMJAITHAI’S TWO FESTERING WOUNDS

Anutin, along with several senior leaders of BJT, has been accused of attempting to elect pro-BJT candidates to the Senate in June 2024. Anutin has confirmed receiving a summons from the Election Commission in early June to testify. Also implicated are 138 of the 200 Senators, and 91 BJT party executives and senior members.

Anutin has maintained that he and his BJT colleagues have done nothing wrong or unlawful, and that the accusation is part of a “political game” to discredit him and undermine his party.

The Election Commission has 240 days to finish its investigation and reach a final decision on which of the accused are to be referred to the Supreme Court (for holders of public office) for a trial. If found guilty, these accused may be barred from holding public office, banned from national politics, and may even be jailed.

An older problem troubling Anutin concerns the alleged large-scale encroachment of the State Railway’s land on Khao Kradong hill in Buriram, the stronghold of BJT in the lower northeastern province. Anutin is not directly implicated, but the Chidchob family of his mentor, Newin, has been entangled in disputes with the State Railway for over five decades. The Chidchob family has built a football stadium and a world-class motorcycle race course, among other things, on the disputed land. In 2017, the Supreme Court finally ruled that the land, estimated at 5,083 rai (or about 8.132 million square metres), belongs to the State Railway.

The State Railway wants the cancellation of all land title deeds issued to people occupying its lands in the Khao Kradong area. In return, it is willing to let those people stay on under lease agreements.

Pheu Thai  is in the worst position of the three parties. It had failed to achieve any significant policy success during the Srettha and the Paetongtarn administrations. With Thaksin now out of action, at least temporarily, Pheu Thai will soon need to find a more charismatic leader to succeed Paetongtarn.

However, Pheu Thai and other parties – including PP in the past – want to see the Chidchob family put on trial for alleged encroachment of public land and money laundering. Pheu Thai’s Phumtham, when he was the acting-Prime Minister, reminded Natthaphong in early September not to let Anutin interfere in the Khao Kradong case.

Anutin’s new justice minister is Pol Lt Gen Ruthhapol Naowarat, a former provincial police chief of Buriram and known ally of the Chidchob family. The retired police lieutenant general will be in a strategic position to help BJT’s Anutin and the Chidchob family cope with legal problems.

More importantly, Anutin has persuaded Dr Borwornsak Uwanno to join his Cabinet as a deputy prime minister in charge of legal affairs. The 71-year-old law professor of Chulalongkorn University is one of Thailand’s leading experts on constitutional law. He will be the key man to help Anutin untangle legal and constitutional knots, just as Dr Wissanu Krea-ngam did in the Prayut administration.

Moreover, Anutin has to accept the risk that some of his cabinet members might turn out to be “tarnished” or “inappropriate”. He could then face a sudden dismissal by the Constitutional Court, just like in the case of Prime Minister Srettha in August 2024.

One of his Cabinet members, Deputy Finance Minister Vorapak Tanyawong, abruptly resigned on 22 October.  He has been accused of having an inappropriate link to the BIC Bank in Cambodia before he joined the Anutin Cabinet.  The Cambodian bank has been cited by the US as “an entity of interest” for allegedly laundering money of major scammers in Cambodia.  Anutin had asked for a written clarification, but Vorapak resigned, even though he insisted he was innocent and had nothing to hide.

CONCLUSION

BJT and Anutin currently have the political advantage. Two immediate issues they face are the Thai-Cambodian border situation and the alleviation of Thailand’s economic woes. They will also have the incumbent’s advantage of organising the next early general election.

Success on their part will come at the expense of both PP and Pheu Thai. PP will have nothing much to gain if the Anutin administration succeeds and gains more popularity.

Pheu Thai is in the worst position of the three parties. It had failed to achieve any significant policy success during the Srettha and the Paetongtarn administrations. With Thaksin now out of action, at least temporarily, Pheu Thai will soon need to find a more charismatic leader than Julapun to succeed Paetongtarn. The party’s chances of winning the early general election next year look slim and are diminishing.

As things now stand, none of the three largest parties looks capable of winning enough seats in the next general election to form a single-party majority government. It’s likely that two of them will have to team up to form a new coalition government.

But which two is anybody’s guess right now.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/85 published on 6 November 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.