Conscription in Myanmar Pushing Young Men to Choose Sides

On 10 February 2024, the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime in Myanmar revived the Military Service Law which has been dormant since its last update in 2010. Coming ten days after the three-year mark of the 2021 coup, the move sent shockwaves through Myanmar and diaspora communities. The SAC’s intent to start recruiting by April after the Thingyan New Year holiday has caused widespread concern and panic over the prospect of forced conscription, with unprecedented queues (for education or work visas) at embassies in Yangon and at passport offices.

Ostensibly, the SAC argues that the revival of the law seeks to bolster national security and solidarity, but rather, it has accentuated political divisions. The Law’s activation has led to much anger and frustration directed at the military, even among those seeking to stay neutral between competing political divides. Initial reactions from potential conscripts interviewed by Nikkei Asia revealed their preferences to flee Myanmar or join a resistance force. Some even spoke of sabotaging the Tatmadaw or harming themselves if they are compelled to comply.

Their hesitation and resistance against conscription are understandable, given that this would force them to fight against their fellow citizens to uphold a regime that brutally suppresses them and has illegitimately removed their elected government.

Faced with the choice of forced military service or the uncertainties of seeking refuge elsewhere, many young men have opted to join People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups which welcomed volunteers following the SAC’s announcement. However, not all may be against conscription. Some men in pro-SAC strongholds have reportedly volunteered for military service, influenced by religious or community leaders. The actual figures for SAC and PDF recruitment are hard to obtain but it is widely thought that the former has incorporated significantly fewer recruits compared to the latter.

Faced with the choice of forced military service or the uncertainties of seeking refuge elsewhere, many young men have opted to join People’s Defence Force (PDF) groups which welcomed volunteers following the SAC’s announcement.

The Law requires men aged 18 to 35 years and women between 18 to 27 years of age to serve a minimum of two years in the military, extendable up to five years “in times of emergency”. The draft age for those with professional and technical qualifications goes up to 45 years old for men and 35 for women. The law allows temporary deferments and permanent exemptions. However, those deferring would still have to serve the required term in full. Criteria for exemption, albeit vague, are for persons with disabilities, married women, members of religious orders, people caring for aged parents, and those deemed unfit by the medical military board. In a seeming climbdown in reaction to the public outcry, the SAC said in February that women were exempted “for the time being”.

Resistance to conscription is not new. The SAC spokesperson argued that Myanmar was not exceptional and that the current move “aligns with international practices”, claiming that 18 countries practised conscription. A glaring omission is that the primary purpose of conscription is for a country’s defence against external threats, not for the prosecution of internal civil conflicts against one’s fellow citizens. He also clarified that the 2010 Military Service Law was not without precedent. The law and its present activation stem from the 1959 Military Service Law promulgated by the caretaker government under then commander-in-chief General Ne Win, to which Burma’s then civilian government ceded power constitutionally from 1958 to 1960.

There are historical precedents for the authorities pressing civilians into ancillary roles in the military. This is the key reason why the update of the 2010 Military Service Law has triggered much concern. For example, the 1907 Village Tract Act, enacted when Burma was a British colony, empowered the authorities to requisition local services, such as for porters, in law enforcement activities. This was technically not conscription, but the military used the Act to press-gang civilians as porters for counter-insurgency operations.

The practice continued after Burma’s independence in 1948. There are documented instances of porters used as human shields and cannon fodder or as labourers in military camps. Though military authorities issued an order in 1999 to stop “exercising powers” under the 1907 Act, it was repealed only in 2012 and replaced by new legislation that sought to address international pressure to reduce forced labour and conscription practices.

Introduced before the military’s shift to a quasi-civilian administration, the 2010 law improved upon the 1959 version by clarifying and simplifying eligibility criteria and terms of service. However, several vague clauses retain significant discretion for the military, including whether Islamic clergy are included in the exemptions for members of religious orders.

The SAC is not the only entity resorting to conscription. Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), whether adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed before the 2021 coup or those aligned with the post-2021 resistance coalition against the military, have similar practices. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang EAO that recently recaptured northern Shan State’s Kokang region from the SAC, is reportedly forcibly recruiting men from refugee camps and demanding manpower quotas from local communities. The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), an ethnic Shan EAO in southern Shan State, has threatened to confiscate the properties of families whose members evade conscription. The Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), another Shan EAO, has practised brutal conscription tactics for several years.

The consequences of activating the Military Service Law are hard to ascertain. The SAC’s stated quota of 5,000 conscripts a month may negatively affect productivity and affect many households already living below the poverty line. The SAC’s justification of conscription ignores the larger, more pressing economic and social realities in post-coup Myanmar. The law’s activation amidst continuing conflict upends the SAC’s stated aim of building national solidarity. In fact, it serves as the final push for many in Myanmar to choose sides between the junta and the resistance forces arrayed against it.

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