The Myanmar Junta’s Unhappy New Year

2024 did not start well for Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC). On 4 January, Myanmar marked its 76th anniversary of national independence. The SAC leadership’s hosting of the Independence Day dinner masked the stark reality on the ground for the Myanmar military. It has lost at least eight generals (killed, captured, or surrendered), six infantry divisions, and one regional operation command in the past two months of fighting in northern Shan State.

This was after the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) – comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA) – launched Operation 1027 in late October 2023. The 3BHA’s list of objectives includes autonomy, deterring bombardments by the Myanmar military, combating online gambling, and “eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship”. The alliance even controlled most parts of the Sino-Burmese trade route before the Chinese-mediated ceasefire took effect.

In addition, six commanders of the Myanmar military, all of brigadier-general (BG) rank, have surrendered to the 3BHA, along with more than 2,000 troops at the Regional Operation Command in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region. Laukkai is a strategic town on the Sino-Burmese border. In mid-December 2023, the TNLA captured BG Min Min Tun, commander of Light Infantry Division 101, in a valley hideout after he lost communication with his troops. To date, Min Min Tun is the highest-ranking active-duty commander of the Myanmar military captured by the resistance forces.

The Myanmar military lost its first division commander to Operation 1027 in the early days of that offensive: a drone attack on a key outpost in Mongko killed BG Aung Kyaw Lwin, commander of Light Infantry Division 99, and two deputies.

This situation constitutes the SAC’s biggest military defeat since the February 2021 coup. The tables have turned: the losses in Laukkai signalled the MNDAA’s regaining of control of the Kokang region. (In August 2009, the MNDAA had lost this territory to the Myanmar military.)

Since October, the Myanmar army’s losses have continued to mount. On 12 January 2024, the MNDAA captured Hopang, the gateway to the Wa self-administered region, and Panlong in northern Shan State. The TNLA seized other strategic towns in northern Shan State, such as Hsenwi and Kutkai. Prior to this, the Myanmar military had never lost control over those towns. Kutkai is significant, as it is the key location of the military’s integrated air defence system in northeastern Myanmar.

The Northeastern Regional Military Command is currently holding only Lashio, where its headquarters are located, and the border town of Muse.

In sum, six of the Myanmar military’s infantry divisions and one regional operation command – including Special Light Infantry Divisions 99 and 55 deployed in northern Shan State – have fallen or surrendered to the 3BHA. Infantry divisions such as Military Operations Commands (MOC) 14 and 16 in northern Shan State, and parts of MOC 12 have also surrendered. The Myanmar military, which once prided itself on being one of strongest in the region, is a shell of its former self.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made no reference in his New Year and Independence Day speeches to the conflict in northeastern Myanmar nor recognised any military defeat. He instead highlighted the junta’s plans for elections and small and medium-sized enterprise projects.

With these losses, the Myanmar military is facing the biggest defeat in its history, a circumstance which has shaken its leadership.

A previous article by the same author pointed out the Myanmar military leadership’s policy errors which have led to the Myanmar army commanders’ lack of battlefield experience. Another policy error is the lack of balance in military training. Former and current officers have indicated that the post-1998 military leadership, under then commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe, established a new officer training project called “Botataung (“Thousand Officers”) Project”. The idea was to produce more officers than in the past for defence and administrative roles, mainly by reducing the duration of the Defence Services Academy (DSA) course from four to three years.

DSA Intakes 41 and 42 graduated together in April 2000. The Officers Training Course (OTC) stopped taking in cadets after the thirtieth intake – the OTC mainly comprised combat field training for rank-and-file soldiers and high school graduates who could become officers. The botched results of this project are now evident: commanders and their deputies who have recently been killed or captured or who have surrendered are all graduates from the intakes following the launch of Project Botataung.

With these losses, the Myanmar military is facing the biggest defeat in its history, a circumstance which has shaken its leadership. A claimed ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the 3BHA, mediated by China, is on thin ground. The so-called ceasefire is only temporary; the war has widened to include parts of western Myanmar near the border with India. A true reality check requires that the SAC reconsider its insistence on its current military strategy, particularly when it has to rely on officers trained under the Thousand Officers Project for victory.

2024/18