Dangers of Delay: US-Philippine Defence Cooperation in 2026

Iran’s drone and missile strikes against Gulf countries hosting US military bases have prompted calls to review the Philippines’ revised 2023 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US, particularly the risks of potential attacks on the nine sites around the country that host US forces on a rotational basis. The Department of National Defence and National Security Council have quickly rebuffed such claims, focusing on the technical improbability of Iranian precision fires reaching the Philippines. However, the statements sidestep the broader issue of whether the Philippines and the US have substantially mitigated such risks, particularly from any attack by China in a US-China conflict, even if this remains a low-probability scenario.

Polls have repeatedly indicated robust public support for the US-Philippine alliance. In 2023, the Marcos administration broadened the scope of EDCA (originally signed in 2014), by expanding the number of Philippine military bases where US military forces can be forward-deployed, in exchange for US assistance in upgrading the bases’ infrastructure. However, Vice President Sara Duterte and her allies have repeatedly criticised EDCA as a source of the country’s insecurity for putting the Philippines in China’s crosshairs. They raise valid concerns, particularly in light of analogous Iranian retaliation against US allies in the Gulf States recently. However, the situation calls for EDCA’s recalibration, not renunciation. The Marcos and Trump administrations would be well-served by taking four measures to ensure that EDCA remains politically viable in the Philippines.

First, the US and Philippines should consider fast-tracking the development of the nine EDCA sites. The Trump administration’s softening stance on China has likely led Washington to proceed cautiously on EDCA. Three years since the 2023 deal, an observer bluntly stated that “calling the[m] bases is extremely generous”. US funding since 2023 has focused on command-and-control infrastructure, fuel storage, and runway improvements, but the EDCA sites are a far cry from US basing in Japan or Korea. Moreover, there is no indication that the US intends to replicate such infrastructure.

In contrast, China has increased its incursions, military drills, and force projection in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone following the revised EDCA deal. The Marcos Jr. administration — whose popularity is struggling — is under pressure to showcase the benefits of the calculated risk he took with EDCA, which is ultimately about inviting US support to counterbalance China.

Second, both sides must address the insufficiency of the Philippines’ integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) networks, which are necessary to offset the risks of hosting US forces. The Philippine government’s acquisition of short-range SPYDER air defence batteries since 2022 is notable, but the country still lacks fundamentals, such as sufficient quantities of air defence batteries, modern fighter jets, interceptors, and medium-range IAMD. The Army Artillery Regiment’s Shore-Based Missile System programme is in its infancy, while the Multi-Role Fighter project has languished.

In the event of a military conflict, the limited air defences of the Philippines will likely be forced to prioritise defending bases or precision strike capabilities, such as Brahmos anti-ship missile batteries, rather than protect civilian population centres.

The lack of explicit and substantial integration of IAMD into EDCA planning is noticeable. The 12^th US-Philippine Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in February affirmed that both countries will “continue and work to increase deployments of US cutting-edge missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines”. However, US air defence systems such as Patriot missile defences, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptors, and the Aegis Combat System are absent in public statements from Manila and Washington. Instead, the alliance has primarily focused on anti-ship capabilities with the indefinite deployment of the US’ Typhon mid-range capability missile system and the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) in 2025, which reflect an outdated threat assessment focusing on maritime disputes between Beijing and Manila.

In the event of a military conflict, the limited air defences of the Philippines will be forced to prioritise defending bases or precision strike capabilities, such as Brahmos anti-ship missile batteries, rather than protect civilian population centres.

The ongoing Middle East conflict and shortages of interceptors and missile defences highlight the limits of the US security umbrella in Asia. The Philippines grapples with two main issues. One is abandonment: the most significant missile capabilities in the Philippines may be withdrawn by the US. Another is that the rate of IAMD rollout is too slow relative to the worsening security environment. Any successful attempt to calm fears today about EDCA sites will depend on the US and the Philippines’ joint assurances that currently fielded capabilities can defend the Philippines from most hostile drone, missile, and airpower threats. Experts say otherwise, and sceptics of EDCA raise legitimate concerns, even if overblown.

Third, Washington must decide whether to scale up US presence in the Philippines. The current US force posture in the Philippines is miniscule and has room for expansion. Recent moves in 2025 to form the Task Force Philippines and the US Army Rotational Force – Philippines (ARF-P), with merely 50 personnel, are important but arguably remain smaller than recent geopolitical flare-ups require. Without a significant force presence to offset the Philippine public’s EDCA jitters whenever China escalates maritime confrontations or political pressure, recent conflicts would only undermine confidence in EDCA.

Fourth, advancing Philippine defence interests also requires careful clarifications of defence policy. The Marcos administration has not firmed up formal policies on ballistic missile weaponry, particularly the range and class of weapons that will be allowed into the Philippines, and the extent of agreeable US presence as EDCA matures. The alternative — and current reality — of Manila’s strategic ambiguity on weapons access has its merits but neglects the need for strategic reassurance to regional neighbours.

The dangers of delay are real. The Iran conflict demonstrates the vital advantage conferred by extensive US basing access, which will likely heighten Beijing’s perceived need to nip EDCA in the bud. Meanwhile, gaps in EDCA’s implementation and China’s mounting pressure may make EDCA supporters in the Philippines decide that the risks outweigh the benefits after all. Even with cooperation moving in the desirable direction, Washington and Manila have a lot of fine-tuning to do. 

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