From Defensive to Dynamic: Vietnam’s Thirty-Year Journey in ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN on 28 July 1995 marked a turning point in its post-Cold War foreign policy, reshaping its regional standing and catalysing profound national transformations. During the subsequent three decades, Vietnam has emerged from international isolation to become a dynamic, globally integrated economy and an active player on the regional and world stage. This transformation has been underpinned by the steady consolidation of its political regime, rapid economic growth and pragmatic adaptations to the shifting international order. Vietnamese policymakers have learned to navigate and leverage international norms and multilateral processes, fine-tuning their diplomatic toolkit and development strategies to maximise national interest. In this journey, ASEAN membership has served as both a gateway and a strategic space, anchoring Vietnam’s identity within Southeast Asia and providing important platforms for the country’s engagement with the wider world.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF VIETNAM’S ADMISSION TO ASEAN

The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989 and the settlement of that conflict in 1991 enabled Hanoi to normalise relations with China in 1991 and the United States in 1995. These developments collectively marked Vietnam’s gradual emergence from Cold War-era antagonisms and ideological bipolarity, paving the way for Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN. Until then, modern Vietnam had not experienced a sustained period of peace since its struggle for independence and reunification. Vietnamese official discourse consistently underscores that the most important dividend of its ASEAN membership has been a stable, peaceful, and favourable regional environment – which enabled the country to concentrate on economic reforms under the Đổi Mới (Renovation) policy.

ASEAN played a pivotal role in Vietnam’s transition to a market economy by facilitating its integration into the global economy and offering development models from more advanced member states. In the early 1990s, Vietnam faced the challenges of diversifying external economic ties beyond the former Soviet bloc and acquiring the institutional capacity to navigate international trade rules. ASEAN provided Vietnam with sustained exposure to multilateral economic diplomacy through platforms such as the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meetings (AEM) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA marked Vietnam’s first experience with a preferential trade arrangement and introduced its policymakers to the practices of tariff reduction, trade facilitation, and regional production networks. This formative engagement not only helped Vietnamese officials gain practical experience in negotiating and implementing trade commitments, but also shaped the institutional capacity necessary for Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007, and expanding its network of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in the following decades.

Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN also marked a critical juncture in the development of its regional identity, embedding a Southeast Asian dimension into its strategic self-positioning. For much of its pre-modern history, Vietnam’s statecraft was primarily shaped by its status as a tributary state within the Sinosphere, due to close geographic proximity and cultural-political ties to China. This historical continuum was disrupted by the French colonial rule of the country in the 19^th-early 20^th century. Following independence in 1945 and throughout the Cold War, Hanoi’s foreign policy became aligned with broader anti-colonial internationalism, through close ties with the communist bloc and liberation movements of colonised peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Soviet Union’s collapse left Vietnam strategically adrift, forcing its leadership to reassess its global positioning. Accession to ASEAN marked a recalibration of Vietnam’s strategic identity in the post-Cold War era; this has been tantamount to a return to its cultural and geographic roots, which has helped Hanoi “resolve its identity crisis”. Situated at the confluence of mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s pre-modern linkages to the region had long existed but these had not coalesced into a coherent geopolitical identity in its leadership’s mental map. By the early 1990s, Hanoi’s view of ASEAN had evolved from an anti-communist bloc to a regional political-economic organisation whose member states’ objectives in nation-building and external relations were assessed to be “80 per cent” similar to Vietnam’s.

Through regular participation in ASEAN’s institutional apparatus, Vietnamese policymakers were progressively socialised into ASEAN’s diplomatic culture or the “ASEAN Way” – characterised by its emphasis on cultivating personal rapport among ASEAN leaders, decision-making through consultation and consensus, and respect for non-interference, national equality and sovereignty. Through this exposure, Hanoi came to appreciate ASEAN’s pragmatism in navigating its internal diversity, and concluded that while many ASEAN governments were ideologically pro-West and historically anti-communist, they were also deeply nationalist and determined to defend their ruling regimes – traits closely aligned with the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)’s raison d’être.

Vietnam’s maritime pivot has also been shaped by shifting power dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia, where China’s expanding influence has steadily eroded Hanoi’s traditional footholds – particularly vis-à-vis Cambodia and Laos, both of which now tilt more towards Beijing than Hanoi on the South China Sea issue.

Recollections by senior Vietnamese diplomats attest to this process of elite socialisation. Former Foreign Minister Nguyễn Dy Niên, for instance, recounted the importance of personal friendships forged with his Southeast Asian counterparts through ASEAN, while Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyễn Tâm Chiến has reflected on the cultural affinity he discovered during ASEAN engagements. Such reflections underscore how ASEAN served not only as a strategic anchor, but also as a socialising space for Vietnam’s regional reintegration.

THE EVOLUTION OF VIETNAM’S APPROACH TO ASEAN

Vietnam has been one of Southeast Asia’s most remarkable stories of transformation post-Cold War. In 2024, its GDP reached US$476.4 billion, a 23-fold increase from 1995. Its share of the bloc’s GDP surged from 3.1% in 1995 to 12% today. GDP per capita rose 16 times, jumping from the second lowest within ASEAN in 1995 to the 6^th level in 2024 (Table 1). Vietnam is now among the most open economies in Southeast Asia, with a trade-to-GDP ratio of 165%, second only to Singapore’s 326%. This high degree of openness is underpinned by multiple free trade agreements, including eight FTAs within ASEAN-led frameworks, eight bilateral FTAs with major partners like Japan, the EU and the UK, alongside membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Table 1: Vietnam’s Economic Transformation (1995-2024)

Indicator	1995	2024
Population (million people) Ranking within ASEAN	72 3rd	101 3rd
GDP (in US$ billion) Ranking within ASEAN	20.7 6th	476.4 4th
GDP per capita (in US$) Ranking within ASEAN	288 9th	4,717 6th
Trade (% of GDP) Ranking within ASEAN	75 5th	165* 2nd
Trade in Goods (in US$ billion) Ranking within ASEAN	18.4** 6th	678.5* 2nd
FDI Stock (in US$ billion) Ranking within ASEAN	5.7 6th	229* 4th

Note: * Data for 2023; ** Data for 1996.

Vietnam’s active push for global engagement in line with its multi-directional diversification of foreign relations has been striking. Beyond ASEAN, it has established Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with 13 countries (Table 2). Its election as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2008–2009 and 2020–2021 testifies to its growing stature as an active player in the global arena.

Table 2: Vietnam’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships

Year	Partner Country
2008	China
2012	Russia
2016	India
2022	ROK
2023	US, Japan
2024	Australia, France, Malaysia
2025	New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand

Vietnam’s growing national power and its active integration into the international system provide the broader context for its evolving approach to ASEAN – from adopting a cautious, often defensive posture in the early years towards taking on a more confident and assertive role in shaping the regional agenda. This evolution can be broadly divided into two phases: the first, from 1995 to the late 2000s, was marked by a conservative, risk-averse approach with a strong continental focus; the second, from the early 2010s to the present, reflects a more active, outward-facing engagement shaped increasingly by maritime priorities and a commitment to forging an open, inclusive and rules-based regional order.

Phase One (1995-late 2000s): Conservative and Continental Focus

In its first decade within ASEAN, Vietnam was among the most politically conservative members. Shaped by its long struggle for independence and the imperatives of regime security, Hanoi was a staunch defender of ASEAN’s traditional principles for safeguarding national sovereignty and resisting external intervention – particularly consensus-based decision-making and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs. Hanoi strongly objected to any initiative which could be construed as shifting towards supra-nationality.

While the notion of ASEAN evolving into a supranational entity may now seem far-fetched, it was not entirely beyond imagination in the post-Cold War climate of the 1990s, marked by liberal triumphalism and the expanding reach of Western normative agendas in the region. At the time, there was a growing push within ASEAN – particularly from Thailand and the Philippines – for the grouping to take a more activist or interventionist stance on the political situations in Cambodia and Myanmar. A notable example was Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan’s proposal to recalibrate non-interference through the idea of “constructive intervention” or “flexible engagement”, which according to him should be activated “when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability”. Surin’s proposal was seen as too forward-leaning for most member states, particularly Vietnam, and was later softened into the more palatable notion of “enhanced interaction”.

As a newcomer to ASEAN, Vietnam was deeply wary of institutional reforms that might dilute national autonomy. Its conservatism was evident during Vietnam’s hosting of the 1998 ASEAN Summit, which adopted the Hanoi Declaration reaffirming the “cardinal principles of mutual respect, non-interference, consensus, dialogue and consultation” as foundational to ASEAN’s success. The Declaration also formally admitted Cambodia into ASEAN – despite concerns raised by several member states over the legitimacy of Cambodia’s Hun Sen regime following the 1997 coup.

Two years later, at the 2000 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Vietnam joined other conservative members to temper the momentum for a more proactive – and potentially interventionist ASEAN, in relation to the ASEAN Troika mechanism established in 1998 in response to the Cambodian crisis. The Troika’s Terms of Reference (TOR) included a safeguard requiring the consent of the country concerned for its activation, thereby ensuring the mechanism would not override national sovereignty. A similar provision was embedded in the Rules of Procedure for the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), adopted in 2001 during Vietnam’s chairmanship.

Notably, Vietnam played a pivotal role in advocating for ASEAN’s admission of the remaining mainland Southeast Asian states, forging a sub-group of like-minded, conservative, and less-developed members. Within the CLMV cohort, Vietnam – by virtue of its size, relative economic advancement, and diplomatic capacity – naturally emerged as “an informal spokesperson”. This sub-group consistently emphasised non-interference as a cornerstone of ASEAN while prioritising narrowing intra-ASEAN development gap through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). They also championed a phased, flexible approach to ASEAN economic integration, allowing newer members to adopt transitional safeguards and liberalise at a more gradual pace. A defining feature of Vietnam’s early engagement in ASEAN was thus its alignment with the CLM countries, grounded in shared political conservatism and developmental constraints. This highlighted a distinctly continental orientation in its first decade of membership.

Phase Two (early 2010s-present): Outward-Looking and Maritime Focus

The evolution of Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN from a cautious, continentally focused posture to a more outward-looking and proactive approach unfolded gradually from the early 2010s as the country became more globally integrated, economically developed, and politically secure. With growing leadership confidence, more capable human resources and mature institutions – 24 ministries/government agencies participating in all ASEAN mechanisms as of 2009 – Vietnam became increasingly adept at navigating and investing in ASEAN diplomacy. While Hanoi continues to uphold the principle of non-intervention – reflecting its enduring imperative of regime security and persistent concerns over “hostile forces” and the externally-driven threat of “peaceful evolution” via democracy and human rights agendas – it no longer places these at the front and centre of its ASEAN engagement. Instead, the focus has shifted towards championing an open, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, particularly by actively supporting the participation of all major powers within ASEAN-centric mechanisms.

At the heart of this shift lies a reorientation of Vietnam’s strategic geography towards the maritime domain. A key driver has been the rise of China and its increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea following the formal introduction of the Nine-Dash Line in 2009. China’s expansive claims, militarisation of features and coercive tactics pose direct threats to Vietnam’s sovereignty and maritime interests, compelling Hanoi to elevate the strategic importance of its seaboard and adopt a more forward-leaning maritime posture. In parallel, Vietnam’s rapprochement with the US has progressed steadily, with the establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership in 2013 and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023. The mutual recognition of each other’s political systems, as articulated during VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s 2015 visit to Washington, laid the foundation for deeper mutual trust and geopolitical alignment. Both countries now share converging concerns over China’s assertiveness in regional waters, providing a strategic ballast to their growing cooperation.

Vietnam’s maritime pivot has also been shaped by shifting power dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia, where China’s expanding influence has steadily eroded Hanoi’s traditional footholds – particularly vis-à-vis Cambodia and Laos, both of which now tilt more towards Beijing than Hanoi on the South China Sea issue. As Vietnam’s traditional influence in Indochina diminished, Hanoi found greater strategic alignment with maritime ASEAN states such as Indonesia and Singapore, which similarly advocate for the upholding of international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in managing the South China Sea disputes. The result is a significant realignment in Vietnam’s ASEAN engagement, reflecting a deepening convergence of security interests with fellow maritime states, a growing willingness to project its strategic agency through ASEAN, and a stronger outward orientation shaped by the exigencies of its maritime security.

Vietnam’s strategic reorientation found expression in several ASEAN diplomatic milestones that bore its imprint. At the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) during Vietnam’s chairmanship, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared America’s “national interest” in freedom of navigation, unimpeded access to maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. Though not orchestrated by Hanoi, the statement aligned squarely with Vietnam’s interest to internationalise the South China Sea issue and embed it within ASEAN’s security agenda. That same year, Vietnam hosted the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), institutionalising the involvement of extra-regional powers in regional defence diplomacy. Hanoi also played a pivotal role in ASEAN’s decision to admit the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS) during its 2010 chairmanship. Across many ASEAN-led platforms, Vietnam consistently pushed for a robust maritime cooperation agenda and greater involvement of external powers, particularly the US, as a counterweight to China’s growing assertiveness in regional waters.

Vietnam also actively advocates for a rules-based maritime order anchored in UNCLOS. During its 2020 ASEAN chairmanship, Hanoi successfully foregrounded UNCLOS as the normative anchor for ASEAN’s position on the South China Sea. The Chairman’s Statements of the ASEAN Summits and ASEAN’s meetings with key Dialogue Partners that year underscored UNCLOS as “the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones” and as “the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out.”

Compared to its early years in ASEAN, Vietnam’s engagement in the second phase reflects a keen awareness of its strategic positioning in the changing regional order. This stems from its growing maritime concerns in the South China Sea, its elevated position in the regional strategies of major Indo-Pacific powers, its open economy, and its growing diplomatic capabilities. Over time, its foreign policy has evolved from one driven primarily by the imperatives of preserving national autonomy and regime security to one shaped by the broadening of its national interests amid the region’s changing geopolitical balance, which now informs its more active and realpolitik-inspired role within ASEAN.

VIETNAM’s FUTURE ROLE in ASEAN: Leading from the middle?

Vietnam’s official documents and leadership statements consistently underscore its commitment to active, proactive, and responsible ASEAN membership, identifying the bloc as a cornerstone of its multilateral diplomacy. Yet beneath this high-level political endorsement lies a more ambivalent reality. Among Vietnamese officials, diplomats, and scholars, there is persistent scepticism towards ASEAN as being ineffectual, disunited and prone to inertia in the face of emerging regional challenges (Table 3).

Table 3: Vietnam’s Top Concerns about ASEAN

Perception	2023		2024
	Vietnam	ASEAN	Vietnam	ASEAN
ASEAN is unable to return to pre-pandemic economic growth	24.3%	37.2%	72.5%	59.9%
ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited	69.1%	60.7%	49.5%	51.6%
ASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary people	22.8%	46.6%	15%	35.1%
ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments, and is becoming irrelevant in the new world order	93.4%	82.6%	78.5%	77.0%
ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition, and its member states may become major power proxies	90.4%	73.0%	84.5%	76.4%

This frustration became pronounced in the 2010s, when Vietnam bore the brunt of Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. Hanoi’s attempts to galvanise a strong ASEAN response were repeatedly thwarted by China-friendly states such as Cambodia and Laos. Vietnam’s own experience illustrates the double-edged nature of ASEAN’s institutional design: while consensus allows Hanoi to prevent unwanted outcomes – such as moves toward a more interventionist ASEAN – it simultaneously limits its ability to mobilise a robust ASEAN position against China’s maritime assertiveness. As noted by Le Hong Hiep, ASEAN’s consensus “enables Vietnam to effectively veto… but it also constrains Vietnam’s efforts to forge a common position.”

Despite its rhetoric championing ASEAN unity and centrality, Hanoi realistically acknowledges that ASEAN enables member states to “talk together” but not often “act together”, hence its willingness to pursue non-ASEAN approaches to best serve its interests.

This trade-off is not unique to Vietnam, but a structural dilemma that all ASEAN member states grapple with. In a policy speech at the ASEAN Secretariat in March 2025, VCP General Secretary Tô Lâm acknowledged this tension, stating that ASEAN must adopt “creative, flexible and innovative approaches, including in the decision-making process” to meet today’s challenges. Such remarks, while suggestive of some interest in institutional reform, remain more a rhetorical positioning than a concrete attempt to revisit ASEAN’s core norms.

This begs a question: will Vietnam take on a more assertive leadership role within ASEAN, or continue its pragmatic, interest-driven approach tailored to specific issues? The trajectory thus far suggests the latter. While remaining invested in ASEAN as a cornerstone of its regional diplomacy, Vietnam’s strategic horizons have expanded beyond the bloc. Hanoi has actively pursued a diversified foreign policy – cultivating strategic partnerships with major powers, deepening economic ties through FTAs outside ASEAN frameworks, and positioning itself as an active player on the global stage. This expansive engagement reflects a flexible multi-track approach rather than a consistent “ASEAN-first” posture. For instance, Vietnam made deeper and more comprehensive liberalisation commitments in its separate FTAs with the EU and CPTPP partners than in ASEAN-plus agreements, the latter of which are characterised by phased reductions and broader exemptions. Hanoi’s early, direct outreach to Washington following US President Trump’s announcement of tariff hikes on 2 April 2025 underscores its pursuit of parallel and faster-moving channels when ASEAN processes cannot deliver timely results. Despite its rhetoric championing ASEAN unity and centrality, Hanoi realistically acknowledges that ASEAN enables member states to “talk together” but not often “act together”, hence its willingness to pursue non-ASEAN approaches to best serve its interests.

This prevailing pragmatism partly explains Vietnam’s middle position among ASEAN countries in terms of perceived leadership within ASEAN, despite its growing national capacity and strategic weight. According to the State of Southeast Asia survey, Vietnam ranked fifth in contributing to ASEAN’s long-term development, with the vote share of 15.3% in 2024 and 14.4% in 2025, trailing Singapore (over 60%), Indonesia (over 40%), Malaysia, and Thailand, but ahead of the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Amid ASEAN’s persistent structural constraints and internal divisions – evident in the recent Cambodia-Thailand conflict and the bloc’s failure to present a unified response to Trump’s tariffs or China’s actions in the South China Sea – Vietnam’s pragmatic, calibrated engagement will likely persist. Leading from the middle enables Hanoi to shape ASEAN’s direction in its interest where conditions allow, without overcommitting to an institution often weighed down by discord and inertia.

---

This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/61 published on 20 August 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.