How a Provincial Election in Udon Thani Became a National Battleground

“All politics is local,” as the saying goes, but not all local politics truly centres on local concerns. Far from being a mere contest for control of provincial government between former Pheu Thai (PT) MP Sarawut Phetpanomporn and the Progressive Movement’s Kanisorn Khurirang, the 24 November election for the chief executive of the Udon Thani Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) turned into a full-blown struggle for national influence, with the political survival of their high-profile backers and the fate of their parties at stake. While leveraging local elections as a battleground for national politics might reap dividends for political parties in the short-term, it could come at the expense of building a strong local base and effective local governance if the needs of constituents are made secondary to clashes between political icons.

Sarawut, who still retains ties to PT, won by a comfortable margin of around 58,000 votes, but the victory may not have been his so much as who he represented. At the epicentre of it all was Thaksin Shinawatra, who did far more than just campaign for Sarawut during his two-day visit to the northeastern province. In what was widely reported as his first public address in 18 years, Thaksin stirred the crowds at three separate rallies, big and small, where he promoted his daughter’s government and praised her leadership. He downplayed PT’s recent election loss as a mere blip, reignited his ties to the Red Shirts, and underscored the advantages of having a provincial government aligned with the PT-led central government.

In his usual style, Thaksin mocked the People’s Party (PP) — the reincarnation of the recently dissolved Move Forward Party (MFP) — by pointing out that they had to fly former MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat in from the US to campaign, rather than relying solely on its current leader, Nattapong Rueangpanyawut (the Progressive Movement functions like the party organisation and is the extension of the MFP/PP at the local level). Thaksin even declared war on drugs, telling the crowd, “If you see any drug dealers, tell them that Thaksin has returned.” Surrounded by the press, he also took aim at Progressive Movement leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, blaming his views on structural reform and Article 112 (the lèse majesté law) as the reasons the proposed coalition between the MFP and PT could not move forward.

Put simply, Thaksin used the local election as a national platform to stage his political comeback and revive a party whose momentum he had derailed in the first place by using it as a bargaining chip for his return to Thailand — a move that forced the party to abandon its election pledge and form a coalition with military-backed parties in the aftermath of the 2023 general election. Thaksin made his ambitions clear, stating that “Pheu Thai will win no fewer than 200 seats in the next general election.”

Achieving this would, of course, require PT to do more than just win back voters who have shifted their support to other parties on ideological grounds; it must also appeal to younger demographics, many of whom have gravitated toward the MFP and PP. All of this, however, starts with retaining the support of PT’s traditional base, which may have grown increasingly disenchanted with the PT of today. This base is no longer swayed by nostalgia for what the party once represented nor by campaign promises that now ring hollow after PT struggled to deliver on key policy commitments. This is despite the party being in power for over a year.

Only time will tell if Thaksin’s appearance in Udon Thani will trigger a domino effect, leading to victories for PT in the remaining PAO elections, which are set to conclude by February 2025, and the general election that comes after.

Thaksin’s larger-than-life presence in Udon Thani was a calculated response to this predicament. What better way to reignite trust and confidence in PT than by drawing national attention to an election in a province nicknamed the capital of the Red Shirts? Unlike the PAO election in Pathum Thani last June — where Thaksin publicly backed a candidate who eked out a razor-thin victory, only to see the result nullified and ultimately lost in a re-run — a victory in Udon Thani seemed far more certain. A PT-backed candidate had dominated the 2020 PAO election in Udon Thani, and in the 2023 general election, the MFP managed to win only one seat in a constituency representing Udon Thani’s urban centre. A province-wide election, combined with the absence of out-of-district advance voting — largely cast by younger, working populations residing in cities who had fueled a surge in turnout for the MFP in the general election — was expected to favour PT. In short, Thaksin picked a low-hanging fruit and made a big show of it to remind everyone of his political clout.

Nevertheless, the low-risk nature of this opportunity belies the high return it offers. Most would interpret the election results as a decisive victory that sends a clear message: PT, with Thaksin leading the charge, can still command loyalty among its core supporters despite recent setbacks. Yet, even more significant than the election results was Thaksin’s success in projecting his commitment to nurturing alliances and rebuilding the network of local leaders under the PT umbrella, beginning with PAO chief executives. Their extensive control over local government resources and personnel will prove crucial to the party’s electoral machinery in the general election three years from now. This is particularly true in provinces where it must face off against its true rival in the ground war: Bhumjaithai. In recent years, Bhumjaithai has consolidated its influence at the local level by expanding its networks of village health volunteers and local authorities. If Bhumjaithai achieves further success in local elections, PT could be left without an electoral backbone and forced to rely only on the organic support for its ideology (if any), policies, and leaders, which may not be enough to sustain its dominance.

Only time will tell if Thaksin’s appearance in Udon Thani will trigger a domino effect, leading to victories for PT in the remaining PAO elections, which are set to conclude by February 2025, and the general election that comes after. However, the mechanisms linking local success to national gains may not be as straightforward as many believe, or as Thaksin hopes them to be. The MFP-aligned Progressive Movement experienced a string of defeats in PAO chief elections since its founding in 2020, failing to win a single seat. Yet, this did not stop the MFP from winning the 2023 general election.

At the end of the day, however, both camps should do well to recognise that building a lasting political base ultimately depends on addressing the specific needs and concerns of local communities, ensuring that their priorities — and the representatives who champion them — take centre stage, rather than fading into the background while national politicians, especially those currently ineligible to hold office, seize the limelight. When local elections become proxy battlegrounds for national political agendas, they risk undermining the decentralisation these elections are meant to foster.

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