How Cambodia’s Relationship with the US Can Stop Being “One-Sided Love”

Cambodia’s close alignment with China and its strained relationship with the United States is a topic of debate among analysts and pundits. The former perception largely stems from China’s extensive investment projects in and aid to Cambodia in the past decades, which have also bolstered the political authority and legitimacy of Cambodia’s ruling party. Conversely, Cambodia’s fluctuating relationship with the US can be attributed to Washington’s persistent criticism of Cambodia’s democracy and human rights record, exacerbated by a long list of economic pressures.

The diminishing presence of the US in regional trade agendas and its reduced engagement in Cambodia provided China with an opportunity to assert its influence. Consequently, it might seem that Cambodia is aligning itself with China at the expense of its relationship with the US. However, such a simplistic interpretation misses the nuanced realities of Phnom Penh’s foreign policy. Cambodia cannot afford to alienate either global power. Behind the scenes of tension and geopolitical posturing lies a lesser-known narrative — a story of Cambodia’s quiet efforts to mend its frayed relationship with the US.

The notion of Cambodia’s one-sided love with the US permeates the former’s foreign policy. This asymmetrical partnership has prompted Cambodia’s earnest efforts to improve relations even with perceived US indifference, particularly concerning the protection of its economic interests. The US is the largest export market for Cambodian products under the Generalized System of Preferences, accounting for 40 per cent of total exports, primarily comprising garment, footwear, and travel goods. However, Cambodia’s reputation among American politicians has increasingly deteriorated, leading to mounting economic sanctions. In 2021, the US Congress called for the suspension of Cambodia’s trade preference status, citing its worsening human rights situation.

Towards the end of Hun Sen’s term, Phnom Penh took a few significant steps towards improving relations with Washington. His rare visit to the US Embassy in Phnom Penh in December 2022, during Cambodia’s chairmanship of ASEAN, signalled the country’s push for not only a strategic engagement with America in regional forums, but also a balancing act where Cambodia aims to maintain diversified trade and investment from and maintain positive relationships with other powers beyond China. This strategy continues under the new Hun Manet government, where several US-friendly intellectuals have been appointed to the Foreign Ministry and in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, actively working on diversification strategies and enhancing engagement with America and the West.

While Cambodia has supported Chinese global initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has often expressed a desire for US-led initiatives. This contradicts some foreign analysts’ view that Cambodia is a “full-blown” client state of China. During former US president Barack Obama’s term, Cambodia was eager to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) despite not being fully prepared due to internal capacity constraints and its strong dependence on China. Similarly, during the Biden Administration, Cambodia has expressed interest in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), aligning with the US’ efforts to counter Chinese influence through the BRI. While Cambodia has reached out to America for months to join IPEF discussions, American officials have consistently rebuffed its efforts, revealing Washington’s true reasoning — its perception that Cambodia is already aligned with China and, consequently, does not merit an invitation to IPEF.

Under Hun Manet, Cambodia seeks more US investments by engaging more American business leaders, even as China remains the country’s top foreign direct investor. The Cambodian government has embarked on 12 international trips in less than nine months since the new administration assumed leadership in August 2023. There has been a surge in foreign investment projects totalling US$1.39 billion in the first quarter of 2024, a 500 per cent increase compared to the same period last year. The ASEAN-led trade initiative, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force during Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship, significantly boosted Cambodia’s exports. This growth was attributed to the kingdom’s expanded trade with RCEP members like Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Cambodia has demonstrated its intention to connect with more diverse international markets, including its willingness to host the RCEP Secretariat, which is expected to help improve its investment laws, bureaucracy, and infrastructure. All the above indicates Cambodia’s indirect support for America’s balance of power strategy in Southeast Asia.

Amidst worsening China-US rivalry, Cambodia, like other regional states, has cautiously manoeuvred these turbulent geopolitical waters. The 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute revealed a surprising trend among Cambodian opinion leaders, however, who expressed positive views towards the US. When asked which country they had the most confidence in to uphold the rules-based order, Cambodian respondents’ trust in China declined from 65.4 per cent in 2022, to 2.2 per cent in 2023, then 9.5 per cent in 2024. Conversely, their confidence in the US increased, rising from 19.8 per cent in 2022, rising to 48.5 per cent in 2023, then a drop to 39.7 per cent in 2024.

This is a crucial moment for Cambodia and the US to strengthen mutual trust.

Over the same period, Cambodian respondents consistently favoured the US over China when faced with the hypothetical scenario of being forced to choose a side — support for China declined from 81.5 per cent in 2022 to 26.9 per cent in 2023, then rose to 45 per cent in 2024. Meanwhile, support for the US increased from 18.5 per cent in 2022 to 73.1 per cent in 2023, evening out at 55 per cent in 2024. A key reason behind these trends is the leadership transition following Hun Sen’s intention to leave a legacy of improving Cambodia’s international standing while attracting foreign investment beyond China. Cambodian elites’ positive perception of the US is likely to persist, as diversification away from China has been mainstreamed in foreign policy strategies under the new administration.

The Financial Times suggested that the visit of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin today (4 June) signals an effort to distance Cambodia from China. This interpretation is misleading.

For Cambodia, hedging against China’s power is essential amid China’s growing influence, which threatens Phnom Penh’s strategic autonomy. Austin’s visit is an opportunity to show Phnom Penh’s sincere intent to cooperate with and to assuage Washington’s misperception of Cambodia’s strategic alignment with China.

This is a crucial moment for Cambodia and the US to strengthen mutual trust. Washington needs to reassess its approach to Cambodia. Its previous stance did not detach Cambodia from China’s influence but instead pushed Cambodia closer to China. For the US, engaging Phnom Penh should be based on pragmatic cooperation in areas such as defence and humanitarian issues, and economic development. It would be a mistake for the Americans to think engagement with Cambodia can push China out. Instead, the US needs to accept that China will be here to stay. However, a strong American commitment to trade and cooperate with Cambodia will leave Phnom Penh more room to manoeuvre against Chinese pressure.

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