How the ‘Deal to Sell Out the Country’ Paved the Way for Thaksin’s Return as Thailand’s Biggest Red Herring

The 37-hour censure debate against Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra last week served as a powerful reminder that, despite Move Forward’s 2023 election triumph on a reformist platform, Thailand remains trapped in Thaksin’s political legacy. The paradox lies in the fact that the more the debate rekindled the pro- and anti-Thaksin divide that had polarised Thai politics for nearly two decades, the more it obscured Thailand’s deeper structural challenges.

Given the coalition’s comfortable House majority, it was no surprise that Paetongtarn emerged unscathed, securing 319 votes in her favour versus 162 against and seven abstentions. This was Paetongtarn’s first censure debate, just six months into her premiership, and potentially the last before 25 Members of Parliament (MPs) from the People’s Party (PP, previously the Move Forward Party), including party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, face possible suspension and a lifetime ban over allegations that their attempt to amend Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, the lèse-majesté law, constituted a serious ethical breach.

With the stakes much higher for the opposition, they wasted no time crafting key political narratives to rally support against Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai ahead of the next general election — whether held as scheduled in 2027 or sooner if the House is dissolved. In his opening address as opposition leader, Natthaphong framed the debate around what he described as the Shinawatra family’s “deal to sell out the country” (ดีลแลกประเทศ), accusing Pheu Thai of trading away promised reforms in exchange for Thaksin’s return from exile and Pheu Thai’s rise to power.

Natthaphong then proceeded to outline what he portrayed as the national toll resulting from this grand compromise. Chief among these was a “dual leadership arrangement” in which Paetongtarn serves as a proxy prime minister, allowing Thaksin to dictate her government’s policy and direction without any oversight or accountability. Natthaphong’s accusation is difficult to dismiss. Even casual observers can see that what Thaksin says today often becomes government policy tomorrow. As a case in point, in August 2024, marking a year since his return to Thailand and shortly after receiving a royal pardon that ended his parole early, Thaksin delivered a speech at an event titled “Vision for Thailand,” where he outlined several key policy proposals for the government. These included expediting negotiations with Cambodia to jointly utilise offshore fossil energy in the Gulf of Thailand, as well as stimulating tourism and the economy by investing in entertainment complexes, which would feature a mix of large-scale venues offering shopping centres, luxury hotels, sports and recreational facilities, and, at the heart of significant controversy, casinos.

These proposals quickly made their way into Paetongtarn’s subsequent policy statement to parliament upon taking office. More recently, Thaksin proposed a plan to ease the financial burdens of Thai citizens by purchasing their debts from financial institutions and wiping their credit histories, allowing them to start fresh. It remains to be seen if this, too, will be adopted as a policy of the Paetongtarn government.

Regardless of one’s view on Thaksin’s intentions, the undeniable fact remains that key government decisions are being shaped by someone who operates outside government, does not answer to an electorate (at least not directly), and is subject to none of the institutional constraints that typically check the exercise of political power. Simply put, Thailand is once again at Thaksin’s mercy.

… Thaksin remains a red herring, a distraction that prevents Thais from seeing the underlying authoritarian and oligarchic structure still in place despite the transition to a civilian government.

As several opposition MPs made clear during the debate, what serves Thaksin’s agendas is not always in Thailand’s best interest, to say the least. They argued that Thaksin’s return came at the cost of accommodating Thailand’s entrenched elites. This forced the Pheu Thai-led government to abandon constitutional and military reform to appease the royal-military power nexus, turn a blind eye to the enduring influence of unelected institutions, and prioritise political expediency — especially in dealings with coalition partners — over public welfare. As a result, the only initiatives that move forward are those that benefit the elite, while ordinary Thais are made to shoulder the costs. Among these are the aforementioned entertainment complex project, which the opposition argued opens the door to policy corruption, and opaque energy deals that drive up electricity costs while enriching politically connected businesses linked to Thaksin’s inner circle and his golf partners.

Yet, the irony is that the most memorable line of attack had little to do with the opposition’s painstaking effort to recast Thaksin from political hostage to willing accomplice in Thailand’s entrenched power structures. Instead, it was PP MP Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn’s scrutiny of Paetongtarn’s financial dealings — particularly her use of promissory notes — that stole the show. Wiroj revealed that Paetongtarn had received approximately 4.43 billion baht (US$130.6 million) worth of shares from five relatives, but instead of paying for them outright, she issued nine promissory notes with no due dates or interest. This, he argued, was a deliberate scheme to avoid an estimated 218.7 million baht (US$6.45 million) in taxes. Rather than addressing these allegations directly, Paetongtarn brushed them aside with a retort: “Although I am younger, I am confident that I have paid more taxes than [Wiroj] has.”

Paradoxically, bringing Thaksin back in and bringing up the Shinawatra family’s familiar pattern of questionable dealings only served to eclipse nearly every other pressing issue, from economic mismanagement to the internationally condemned deportation of Uyghurs. Even the most damning revelation was nearly drowned out: in the final hours of the debate, PP MP Chayaphon Satondee disclosed how the military has expanded its information operations, systematically surveilling and targeting opposition MPs, academics, civil society organisations, and government officials — including Paetongtarn. According to his evidence, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) — which Paetongtarn nominally chairs as prime minister — identified her father, Thaksin, among those “exploiting the monarchy for personal gain.”

When Deputy House Speaker Pichet Chuamuangphan abruptly halted and censored this inquiry, he inadvertently exposed Thai democracy’s true constraints. What this debate ultimately proved is that Thaksin remains a red herring, a distraction that prevents Thais from seeing the underlying authoritarian and oligarchic structure still in place despite the transition to a civilian government. While the opposition did its best to show Thaksin’s complicity in this system, public discourse will likely revert to the well-worn and grounded assertion that any Shinawatra government “puts the interests of the Shinawatra family first, their political and business allies second, and the country and its people last.”

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