Humanitarian Aid in Myanmar’s Polycrisis: Navigating Disaster Amid Conflict

On 28 March 2025, a powerful earthquake measuring 7.7 on the Richter scale devastated parts of central Myanmar, sending tremors as far as Thailand and Vietnam. The worst-hit areas — Naypyidaw, Mandalay, and Sagaing — have suffered extensive damage to infrastructure, and a mounting official death toll now exceeding 2,700. The State Administration Council (SAC) issued an appeal for international assistance hours after the quake, signalling its inability to cope with the disaster’s severity.

The international community has responded swiftly and unconditionally to assist the Myanmar people. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) has deployed its emergency response and assessment teams. Myanmar’s neighbours and ASEAN members, including Singapore and ASEAN chair Malaysia, have sent civil defence forces to assist in urban search-and-rescue (USAR) operations. An emergency meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on 30 March confirmed the AHA Centre’s coordinating role and supported the SAC’s request to re-activate the ASEAN secretary-general’s humanitarian assistance coordinator mandate. This emergency meeting seems to have dispensed with the non-political representative restriction, as the SAC’s foreign minister provided updates. After the meeting, Singapore’s foreign minister called for a ceasefire to facilitate aid delivery.

The earthquake was the most catastrophic in Myanmar’s recent history, occurring amid a prolonged political crisis and escalating civil war triggered by the 2021 military coup. The overlap of a natural disaster with a governance crisis complicates relief efforts and raises questions about how aid can be delivered efficiently and equitably.

Myanmar’s response to past disasters provides precedents and cautionary tales. The 2008 Cyclone Nargis response is oft-cited as a rare instance of the Myanmar military working with ASEAN and the United Nations (UN) to assist all affected communities. Incidentally, the ASEAN-led coordination mechanism in 2008 led to the establishment of the AHA Centre in 2011.

Several natural disasters have confronted the SAC since 2021. The Covid-19 Delta wave in 2021, Cyclone Mocha in 2023, and Typhoon Yagi in 2024 revealed how post-coup tensions led to the SAC restricting humanitarian visas and travel permits, and imposing stringent controls on aid distribution.

Even so, coordination with Myanmar’s authorities is necessary for ongoing post-earthquake aid efforts. ASEAN may yet find itself as the default coordinator for disaster response, though in what form it would do so, and whether with an on-ground presence (as in 2008) to ensure continuity and monitor coordination, are uncertain. Regardless of who the key coordinator is, the SAC will likely insist on having the final say in aid delivery. The 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the AHA Centre’s reference document, provides that assistance can be delivered only upon the host or receiving country’s request or consent and that the receiving country “shall exercise the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of the assistance within its territory”.

In the present circumstances, the SAC will likely assert full control of where and how the incoming aid will be delivered. This logic also applies to contributions from the international community, directly or through UN agencies, which will likely support the AHA Centre’s work.

Myanmar’s current humanitarian crisis is uniquely complex, resulting from protracted armed conflict combined with intermittent natural disasters, including last week’s quake.

So far, ASEAN members and Myanmar’s neighbours have provided the most significant aid contributions and deployment of large USAR teams. Australia pledged A$2 million (US$1.3 million) to the International Committee of the Red Cross, while the British Red Cross raised over US$52,000 in two days. An inter-governmental protocol still reigns for such arrangements; the likely local counterpart is the Myanmar Red Cross under the SAC. The US has pledged US$2 million through Myanmar-based humanitarian assistance organisations. The European Union has released €2.5 million (US$2.7 million) in initial emergency assistance via vetted humanitarian organisations in Myanmar. The Myanmar diaspora has reactivated or put together several fund-raising initiatives to reach local communities. Working with local civil society organisations is the best bet for reaching as many communities in need as possible.

Some observers have raised concerns about the lack of central coordination, transparency, and the sustainability of operating in this manner for an extended period.

Given Myanmar’s current conflict situation, it is unclear how all these organisations can navigate conditions that the SAC may set for access to communities in opposition-held areas. At the time of writing, the SAC chief seems to have ignored calls for a temporary ceasefire. The parallel National Unity Government had announced a partial ceasefire, offering affiliated medical workers if their safety can be assured, and working with international aid agencies. Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in the Three Brotherhood Alliance announced a month-long unilateral humanitarian pause, while other EAOs expressed humanitarian needs and concerns.

Myanmar’s current humanitarian crisis is uniquely complex, resulting from protracted armed conflict combined with intermittent natural disasters, including last week’s quake. While this moment may present a chance to establish a more robust and impartial humanitarian response mechanism for Myanmar, the international community must learn from past experiences to ensure aid reaches those in need without becoming instruments for political manipulation.

ASEAN has an opportunity to reaffirm its role as a key regional actor in disaster response. This requires exercising adroit diplomacy to ensure that aid reaches all communities in need. ASEAN needs to consider setting up strict monitoring and reporting mechanisms so that aid offered unconditionally is distributed (and received) in the same spirit. Neither side of Myanmar’s political divide should use the present disaster for political ends.

There are reports that post-quake, the SAC has continued airstrikes in the Sagaing and Magway Regions and Shan State, imposed curfew and continued forced conscription, restricted Internet and media access, while allegedly denying international USAR teams entry and restricting aid delivery to areas under opposition control.

The SAC’s cooperation is a logistical necessity for foreign humanitarian aid. Myanmar’s humanitarian needs will evolve into longer-term recovery needs as the earthquake relief efforts move from providing urgent rescue and relief to post-disaster health, sanitation, and rebuilding needs. If the SAC becomes the sole arbiter of aid delivery and humanitarian imperatives for Myanmar, past precedent and experience show the need to avoid trusting an arsonist to lead the fire brigade.

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