Indonesia Joining the Board of Peace: At What Cost?

Indonesian Islamic groups have long regarded the Palestinian struggle as integral not only to their faith but also to their conviction that freedom is the right of all nations. Although the various groups differ in their religious views and ideologies, they are unanimous in their support for the Palestinian cause.

This political consensus is subtly changing under Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. His hands-on approach to diplomacy — which has reportedly marginalised career diplomats safeguarding the nation’s long-standing free and active diplomacy — seems to have compelled the leaders of the main Indonesian Islamic groups to toe the president’s line on the question of Palestine, a stance that risks being seen as an abandonment of Indonesia’s long uncompromising support for Palestinian aspirations.

This is reflected in their stand on Prabowo’s controversial decision to join US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP), which was established in the context of efforts to implement the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and post-conflict reconstruction in the Gaza Strip. Indonesia accepted Trump’s invitation to join the BoP, along with several other Muslim countries, including Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia. Major Western countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and France, meanwhile, declined the invitation on the grounds that the BoP’s mandate overlaps with the United Nations and risks undermining the prevailing international order.

Foreign policy experts have criticised Prabowo’s move, citing the absence of Palestinian representatives and the outsized US role in the BoP. The requirement that countries pay USD1 billion to become permanent members is another point of contention, given Indonesia’s existing fiscal strain from funding Prabowo’s populist policies. 

This policy, at least initially, was not popular among Muslim leaders either. Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, a vice-chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), is sceptical of the BoP, noting that its “leadership and dominant influence lie in the hands of figures and Western networks whose record on Palestine has long been controversial”. Another MUI leader, Cholil Nafis, called on the government to withdraw from the group.

Clearly, there are genuine and reasonable concerns that the BoP may only perpetuate, if not exacerbate, the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza, given how peace is being defined, who controls the process, and what structural injustices are being ignored. Palestinians, for example, are not actively involved in the BoP’s decision-making processes and are not even clearly positioned as key beneficiaries in these processes.

This consequently casts the victims as objects rather than subjects in the peace process. While the BoP aims to aid reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip, the problem of structural injustices in the Gaza conflict remains unaddressed. Several analysts have even suggested that Prabowo was driven more by his ambition to improve Indonesia’s standing in global fora than by a commitment to the Palestinian cause. Others have surmised that Prabowo joined the BoP to avoid another trade war with the US.

Amid this pushback, Prabowo gathered 16 Indonesian Islamic organisations, including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and MUI, on 3 February 2026 to brief them on the BoP. After the meeting, these organisations unanimously supported Prabowo’s geopolitical gambit. They believe the Prabowo government’s claims that joining the BoP is the only way to help the Palestinians. Indonesia, they argue, should remain in the BoP to counter Western interests and leave the group if it does not lead to a two-state solution.  

Their joint statement, endorsed by NU Chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf, Muhammadiyah Secretary-General Abdul Mu’ti, and MUI Chairman Anwar Iskandar, effectively delegitimised and drowned out critical voices within the Muslim community, including those from the MUI leadership.

While Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have traditionally been politically distant from the government, they now appear to have less leverage to play their critical roles as civil society movements.

Certainly, differences of opinion within an organisation are nothing unusual. The problem with the BoP debate is that the split occurred shortly after the top leaders of these Islamic organisations met with Prabowo at the State Palace. At best, support for his stance reflects only the opinions of the religious elite. At worst, it indicates an orchestration by the president to turn public opinion against his deeply problematic decision to join the BoP.  

It is important to frame this support in the context of the deepening co-optation of religious organisations by the Prabowo government. This is not the first time that NU and Muhammadiyah have defended the government’s controversial policy on Palestine. In May 2025, they endorsed Prabowo’s plan to relocate wounded Gazans to Indonesia despite concerns that it would play into the US and Israel’s plan to empty out Gaza.

While NU and Muhammadiyah have traditionally been politically distant from the government, they now appear to have less leverage to play their critical roles as civil society movements. Under Prabowo, some members of these organisations have been appointed to cabinet positions, while others are facing legal proceedings for alleged corruption. This situation has made them more reliant on Prabowo, who has used his executive powers to pardon several high-profile graft convicts, including a top Muhammadiyah executive.

It is clear that Prabowo seeks to shore up domestic support for his foreign policy, particularly regarding the sensitive Israel-Palestine issue. Certainly, not all NU and Muhammadiyah members support Prabowo’s gambit with the BoP. Former Muhammadiyah chairman Din Syamsuddin, for example, called the BoP a new “colonialism” and “imperialism”. Loyalists of former NU chairman Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid, known as the “Gusdurians”, meanwhile, argued that Indonesia’s involvement in the BoP would only “legitimise the interests of global powers and prolong the persecution of the Palestinians”. That said, the seeming instrumentalisation of Islamic groups by Prabowo to counter those critical of his policies is alarming. The changing political climate in Indonesia may not only affect Indonesians but also the Palestinians, who have for so long relied on Indonesia’s political support to achieve full independence.

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