Indonesia’s August-September 2025 Mass Arrests: What Do They Reflect?

As of March 2026, reports from human rights organisations have documented that there are about 700 people still in jail, who were arrested in connection with angry protests against the Indonesian government and elite in late August to September 2025. Initially, it seemed almost 7,000 people had been arrested. While small organised groups may have called for demonstrations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and others may have attended as marshals, legal advisors or medics, the crowds of up to a hundred thousand people on the streets were there in a spontaneous explosion of anger. 

Months of displays of elite wealth, including excessive increases in parliamentary allowances amidst ongoing reporting of corruption, laid the groundwork. Following the central government cutting their funds, regional governments raised taxes that hit the informal sector, provoking major protests. When demonstrations started against the parliamentary allowances, a platform motorcycle driver was run over by an armoured police car, which further inflamed protests targeting government offices and parliamentary buildings. Some buildings were set on fire, with deaths occurring. These events were researched in detail and published in the Fact Finding Report of civil society organisations (CSOs).

The protests evolved into confrontations with the police, who reacted violently but since then have taken the protests as a general affront. As one study on the police reaction has concluded, the police have positioned themselves as the victims, with many detainees charged with using collective violence against police officers. A few have been charged with agitating to provoke violence or for children to be involved in the protests. However, some charges were dismissed at trial and the detainees concerned released.

There is not a totally clear picture of the fates of the 700+ detainees. A February 2026 report by the Youth Movement Fighting Criminalisation (Gerakan Muda Lawan Kriminalisasi, GMLK) stated that 460 had been convicted, with 170 still detained, 25 released or on bail, one death in custody and the outcomes for 30 people remaining unknown. Many are being held in small towns, reflecting the widespread nature of the discontent. According to at least one report, many detainees do not have access to any legal aid.

While the most critical sentiment attacks the government as a whole, the most specific and frequent demands were for police reform, with many arguing that police methods contributed to the escalation of the confrontations. The protests, support for the protests, and reactions to the arrests and trials all point to a deepening generational alienation from the government and from elites. A study by the investigative journalist platform, Project Multatuli, confirmed that the overwhelming majority of those arrested were in their twenties. There were already earlier signs of this, via the groups using the pirate flag symbol from the popular Japanese anime One Piece, and the #IndonesiaGelap (Indonesia in darkness) and #KaburAjaDulu (“Let’s Escape First”) protests and social media waves.

Despite this consolidation of alienated sentiment among a significant layer of Indonesia’s Gen Z, this sentiment is still primarily reflected in social media.

This alienation was reflected in the response to the trials. The slogan Semakin Ditekan Semakin Melawan (“The more repressed (we are), the more we fight”) has a strong resonance in the dissenting sector of Indonesian social media. Those on trial have been militantly defiant in the courtroom. The broad coalition GMLK has been able to ensure that the basic sentiment of alienated youth remains in the public space.

Despite the large-scale arrests, including the intimidatory arrests (after the demonstrations) of activists in their homes, there has been little chilling effect. If anything, the arrests and trials have deepened the alienation of this Gen Z generation, reflected in their increasingly savage and biting social media attacks on the elite and its government. Long-standing human rights and other CSOs have continued to be as active as ever. This resilience of protest has also been reflected in the broad, outspoken protests against the physical acid attack on 12 March 2026 on human rights activist Andrie Yunus of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) and calls for accountability.

Despite this consolidation of alienated sentiment among a significant layer of Indonesia’s Gen Z, this sentiment is still primarily reflected in social media. While groups like GMLK have been able to collect valuable data and provide legal assistance to some, there are few signs of new political or campaign organisations. Even where outspoken criticisms of the regime have emerged from within an on-the-ground organisation, such as the sharp criticism of the Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) or free nutritious meals, a flagship programme of President Prabowo Subianto’s administration, from Gajah Mada University student council (BEM) chair Tiyo Ardianto, this base tends to be a launchpad into the virtual space rather than a precursor to any immediate ground campaign or organisation building, at least thus far.

Some researchers and commentators have noted a preference for a looser organising, likened to a rhizome (rimpang), and something facilitated by social media. This has facilitated the growth of rhizome-like WhatsApp or Instagram and TikTok follower “networks”, where some members are based in NGOs or similar organisations.

The deepening alienation is primarily expressed through social media; Indonesia’s Gen Z has not shown any desire to form new political organisations or more robust campaign organisations. It is unclear, at this point, whether this alienated critical sentiment, will descend from the ‘cloud’ to earth, to start such organisations. Whether it does so or not may be a crucial question for what happens next in Indonesia.

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