Indonesia’s Party Cartel System and the New ‘People’s Movement Party’

On 18 January 2026 in Jakarta, a new political party was formed: the People’s Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Rakyat, PGR). PGR was born from a pre-party formation, the People’s Movement Organisation (GR), formed by people who had been volunteers in the 2024 presidential election campaign of former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan. PGR’s first elected chairperson, Sahrin Hamid, stated that PGR wanted to see Anies become president. Hamid is a long-term associate of Baswedan and was previously active in the National Mandate Party (PAN).

There are a few processes underway that embody challenges to the dominance of the party cartel, represented by the ruling coalition, Prabowo’s ‘Advance Indonesia Coalition Plus’ (KIM Plus) The KIM PLUS contains 14 parties, seven of which are in parliament: Prabowo’s Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, the Democratic Party, the National Democrats (Nasdem), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the United Development Party (PPP). Leaders of KIM Plus, including President Prabowo, have called for a permanent coalition.

A permanent coalition of these seven parties would consolidate what is now sometimes called a ‘party cartel state’. There have been calls for local parliaments to choose district and province heads – replacing Indonesia’s direct regional elections with negotiations within the dominant party cartel.

There are two processes, both at an embryonic stage, outside this cartel, which represent an implicit challenge. The first is the emergence of a minority current within the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) that wishes the party to offer a different set of policy priorities, sometimes even using the word “oppositional”. However, it appears a majority within the PDI-P prefer either accommodation or even membership with the KIM cartel.

The second process has been the Labour Party’s formation. Partai Buruh, PB, which stood candidates in the last parliamentary elections, won only a handful of seats in the regional parliaments and is also divided, between a majority wing that appears to seek accommodation with or membership in the cartel and a minority known as the National Political Committee (Kompol) that seeks to differentiate itself from the KIM Plus government.

The PGR’s formation adds a third visible process that can be seen as an embryonic challenge to the cartel’s dominance. While new and untested, its association with a presidential candidate who won 25 per cent of the vote (around 40 million votes) means that its formation cannot be ignored. The GR has been able to sustain itself since its founding in February 2025. Together with the PDI-P, whose 2024 PE candidate Ganjar Pranowo scored 16 to 17 per cent of the national vote, there are potentially two parties that can point to a combined potential support base of 42 per cent of voters. GR’s leadership has claimed that it now has 1,934 verified branches in all 38 provinces.

There are a few processes underway that embody challenges to the dominance of the party cartel…

PGR’s policy stance remains at a general or abstract level. However, its electoral ‘branding’ flowing from Baswedan’s presidential campaign is that it stands for “perubahan” (change), implying that it is an alternative to the KIM Plus / Prabowo government. To date, GR’s platform has been defined by a series of normative, general policy values. These are: Food, Energy and Water Sovereignty; Poverty Alleviation, Employment and Economic Equity; Ecological Justice and Sustainable Development; Healthy, Intelligent and Moral Human Resources; Fair and Integrated Development of Cities and Villages; Prosperous and Happy Families; Indonesia’s National Defence and Global Role; and Quality Democracy, Fair Law and Clean Government.

Articulated at this level, with just brief elaborations, these normative guidelines seem similar to those of all the parties, including those in government. Until a more concrete set of policies is well publicised, the concrete meaning of “change” will remain unclear. It must be noted that at the local level, the approach of GR/PGR branches has been to intervene on the side of locals who have been suffering injustices of some kind, with the GR holding government policies responsible. This includes responding to cases like a child suicide (apparently motivated by the child’s inability to purchase textbooks) and fishermen hit by bad weather.

However, there has been no widely reported interventions into major debates such as the sovereign wealth fund Danantara or the free school meals programme (MBG), even though PGR Deputy Chairperson, Yusuf Lasakeng, whose history goes back to the pro-democracy movement of the 1990s, has critiqued Prabowo’s decision to join Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’ (BoP). Lasakeng’s critique spoke against Indonesia’s membership in the BoP, citing Trump as a violator of peace and the sovereignty of nations and warning about the unequal position of Israel and Palestine, as the latter is unrepresented on the Board. This critique places the PGR outside the wide range of support, including from mainstream Islamic organisations, which the government has been able to mobilise.

The PGR, like the PDI-P, has opposed the abolition of direct regional elections, an idea that has been touted by elements within the KIM alliance, including President Prabowo.

The PGR’s current public presentation of its support for change and the early branding of perubahan, its tactic of positioning itself as a critic via interventions at the local level, and opposition to the abolition of direct regional elections and the Board of Peace, all point to its relevance as an early manifestation of a challenge to party cartel politics. If the PGR is able to register formally as a political party and can harness ongoing support for Baswedan, it is an initiative to be watched. A major new factor that will be in play in the 2029 elections is the absence of a vote-share threshold for parties nominating presidential candidates. If the PGR can register as an electoral party in time, it can nominate Anies Baswedan as its candidate, even if it lacks seats in parliament.

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