Information as Ammunition: How the Thai-Cambodian Border Clash Became a Cyber War

Amid the ongoing armed skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand, a new front beyond the contested borderlands has opened — a digital battlefield where hashtags and fake videos have become almost as potent as artillery shells. But the approaches taken by the two countries varies. As the Royal Thai Army galvanises nationalist sentiment through social media campaigns, the Cambodian government and its affiliated media have disseminated manipulated content to control narratives.

In Thailand, the military’s digital strategy hinges on mobilising public support through hashtags like #ไทยนี้รักสงบแต่ถึงรบไม่ขลาด (Thais love peace but are not cowards), #กัมพูชายิงก่อน (Cambodia fired first), and #CambodiaOpenedfire. These hashtags frame Cambodia as the aggressor behind the latest 24 July hostilities, which resulted in at least 20 deaths of civilians and military personnel and the evacuation of 97,000 civilians from high-risk border villages into designated safe zones across four provinces (Figure 1). This tactic of asking people to use these hashtags taps into deep-seated nationalist narratives and reflects a broader state strategy of “information mobilisation”, where citizen participation in digital discourse becomes a force multiplier for state objectives.

Mobilising Public Support

Figure 1: Screenshot from the Thai Second Army’s Facebook Post

On the Cambodian side, state actors have leveraged state-aligned media and social media to propagate counter-narratives. On his official page, Hun Sen called the event a retaliation for Thailand’s aggression (Figure 2). This is despite the chaotic nature of conflict that generally makes it difficult to ascertain who fired the first shot in anger.

Retaliating Against ‘Thai Aggression’

Figure 2: Screenshot from Hun Sen’s Facebook Post

Meanwhile, the Cambodian media and online influencers spread disinformation with a fabricated video of a “Thai air raid” that was widely circulated online, portraying it as an aggressive incursion repelled by Cambodian forces. Upon further inspection, the footage which appeared to show a Thai jet being shot down was actually recycled from the Russia-Ukraine war (Figure 3). The video’s intent was to rally Cambodian domestic support and boost public morale by projecting an image of successful resistance, suggesting that Cambodia’s military can defeat Thai air power. This serves to reinforce the narrative of Cambodia as the resilient underdog. It also mirrors tactics used in other conflicts, where recycled foreign footage is strategically deployed to provoke outrage and manipulate public perception.

Recycling Foreign Footage To Provoke

Figure 3: Screenshots from Social Media

The conflict has seen the use of social media for the strategic deployment; while Thais primarily use it for amplification, Cambodians engage in relatively more blatant deception tactics. The Thai military relies on “crowdsourced nationalism,” where public sentiment is amplified through trending hashtags, and coordinated information campaigns. Cambodia, conversely, is exploiting synthetic media, such as edited videos, fake images, and narrative distortions, to muddy the information waters. Both strategies reflect a larger trend where the line between civilian and military domains in cyberspace is blurred. The democratisation of information tools means every smartphone becomes a potential weapon in information warfare, whether wielded by a soldier, a journalist, or an ordinary citizen, creating the “fog of war” in the digital era.

Despite the current hostilities not being considered as an interstate war at this stage, the Thai-Cambodian cyber confrontation reveals a gap within international humanitarian law (IHL). While kinetic attacks are regulated under clear legal frameworks, deception and information manipulation are generally not prohibited under IHL. As the Geneva Academy, a joint postgraduate centre specialising in international humanitarian law and human rights, notes, “IHL does not expressly prohibit information influence operations, including disinformation, during armed conflicts,” unless they constitute perfidy, incite war crimes, or directly target protected persons or objects. This legal ambiguity creates a grey area, where states and non-state actors can exploit digital platforms to shape narratives, stoke nationalism, and blur the lines between truth and fabrication.

Despite the current hostilities not being considered as an interstate war at this stage, the Thai-Cambodian cyber confrontation reveals a gap within international humanitarian law.

However, the humanitarian implications are profound. The International Committee of the Red Cross underscores that disinformation in conflict zones can directly endanger civilian populations, especially when false narratives obscure actual violations, obstruct humanitarian access, or fuel retaliatory violence. Moreover, digital disinformation can complicate states’ obligations under the principles of distinction and proportionality as operational decisions influenced by false intelligence or manipulated public pressure risk breaching these fundamental norms. In the Thai-Cambodian context, the spread of false claims has inflamed public sentiment, making political and military de-escalation increasingly difficult. At the time of writing, there are already cases wherein Thai influencers created content inciting violence against Cambodians residing in Thailand or even assaulted them while recording a video.

Despite these risks, current legal instruments remain ill-equipped to regulate the intentional spread of false or misleading information in armed conflicts, unless they directly facilitate unlawful attacks or constitute prohibited conduct like perfidy. This underscores the urgent need for the international community to develop clearer normative frameworks and operational guidelines that address the unique challenges posed by disinformation in the digital age of warfare. At the least, IHL should be revised to prevent the influence operations, particularly when they involve disinformation that have the potential to cause harm to civilians caught in the middle of an armed conflict.

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