Ishiba’s New Security Proposals: A Bridge Too Far for ASEAN?

As he takes over the reins of government and prepares for the upcoming elections in Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba attended the ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Laos, and held discussions with ASEAN and regional leaders for the first time. Some of his ideas, including one to adopt a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-style arrangement in Asia, would not find much support around the region. Although Ishiba deferred raising this proposal formally in Vientiane, he sought to settle ASEAN anxieties at a press conference that the idea is “one for the future” and that Japan would remain its most trusted partner.

Nevertheless, the new Japanese premier’s strategic outlook and views on regional security will animate regional discussions in the days and months to come. Specifically, in his Hudson Institute remarks on 25 September 2024, Ishiba made a strong pitch for the establishment of an “Asian version of NATO” to deter China. Ishiba argued that the absence of a collective self-defence system such as NATO in Asia means that wars are likely to break out if there is no obligation for mutual defence. Ishiba added that the Asian version of NATO should also consider America’s sharing of nuclear weapons or the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region.

The proposals are unlikely to go down well with ASEAN member states. In particular, an “Asian version of NATO” would formalise a mechanism that identifies a particular country (read: China) as a target or threat. It would also be incongruent to equate one of ASEAN member states’ largest trade partners as a security threat.

A similar proposal — the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) — failed to take off 70 years ago as it did not have the requisite capabilities to share and obtain intelligence or deploy military forces, thus limiting the potential for collective action. In the absence of a consensus on threat perception, it would be a tall order for countries in the region to rally behind a proposal that requires a substantive commitment of political capital and military resources to build the required collective self-defence structure. 

Ishiba’s proposal for the US to share or introduce nuclear weapons into the region within the context of an “Asian version of NATO” would surely hit a raw nerve in many quarters in ASEAN, especially in light of the treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Given ASEAN’s long-standing aversion to nuclear weapons, it would be difficult to envision a scenario whereby any ASEAN member state would be supportive of moves to “introduce” them in the region. This proposal also runs counter to ASEAN’s efforts to enlist the Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) to sign the protocol to the SEANWFZ treaty.

Ishiba’s proposal for the US to share or introduce nuclear weapons into the region within the context of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ would surely hit a raw nerve in many quarters in ASEAN, especially in light of the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

In addition, Ishiba also aspires for an equal partnership with the US, elevating the US-Japan alliance to the level of the US-UK alliance. In his Hudson Institute remarks, he said, “Japan must have its own military strategy and become independent in terms of security until it is willing to share its own strategy and tactics on equal terms with the US.”   Ishiba’s formulation of “equal partners” seeks to redress the current imbalance in the bilateral security relationship in which the US is obligated to “defend” Japan, and Japan is obligated to “provide bases” to the US. He also envisages a security system in which Japan “can protect its own nation by itself”.  

This “equality” would entail improving and increasing Japan’s military power. While Japan’s expanding security role in the region, such as engagements under the Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme and the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) framework, is generally seen in a positive light among ASEAN member states, there will be some anxiety if this development provides the pretext for the US to scale back its forward-deployed presence in Japan and reduce the US’ strategic footprint in the region. In the worst-case scenario, ASEAN member states might interpret the drawdown in US forces in Japan as a sign of the reduction of US’ commitment to regional security, and may correspondingly undertake their own military build-up to bolster their defence capabilities.

On balance, Ishiba’s “Asian version of NATO” proposal and the goal to make the US-Japan Security Treaty more equal are informed by the perceived threat of an increasingly assertive and powerful China. Notwithstanding the security concerns surrounding the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the proposals to address these conundrums are unlikely to find much support among ASEAN member states due to a lack of common threat perceptions and the prevailing strategic ambivalence towards the US. ASEAN member states are unlikely to deviate outside the comfort zone of the status quo, which is undergirded by US-led alliances and partnerships in the region.

Nevertheless, it is important for the region to take a hard look at the Ukraine conflict, as the Japanese premier did, to discern lessons for improving its response to contingencies and conflicts. In this regard, Ishiba’s proposals make an important contribution by initiating discussions about new regional mechanisms that can manage the threat posed by China amid growing Sino-US tensions. 

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