Malaysia’s Failed BRICS Bid: A Blessing in Disguise?

On the eve of China’s Victory Day Parade, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim notched up a diplomatic boost in his quest to elevate Malaysia’s participation in BRICS. At their bilateral meeting on 2 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated his full support for Malaysia’s participation as a full member of BRICS. 

But despite obtaining China’s support and intensely courting Russia during Russia’s BRICS presidency in 2024, Anwar’s efforts to bring Malaysia into the inner circle of BRICS have fallen short. Malaysia did not make the cut when BRICS was expanded to nine members last year. It was also a double blow when Malaysia lost out to Indonesia which became Southeast Asia’s first BRICS full member. These blows were softened when Malaysia was accorded the status of “partner country” in January 2025.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, Malaysia continues to cultivate BRICS. Last month, Anwar invited Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and South Africa’s President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa to the 47^th ASEAN Summit as guests of the ASEAN Chair. However, Malaysia’s ambitions to play a larger role in BRICS are unlikely to materialise anytime soon due to the lack of consensus among BRICS’ founding members. On the one hand, China and Russia favour expanding the grouping to enhance their global leadership credentials and diplomatic clout. On the other hand, Brazil and India are wary that expansion would dilute their respective influence within the bloc. Given India’s reservations, it is unlikely to pursue this matter during its BRICS presidency next year. Thus, Malaysia may have to look beyond 2026 for any hope of becoming a full member.

Nevertheless, Malaysia remains upbeat on BRICS. Most recently, the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) underlined the importance of the country’s total trade with BRICS countries which amounted to 35.2 per cent of the country’s total global trade in 2024. However, MITI’s enthusiasm should be tempered with a deeper dive into the trade figures as there is a fair degree of “double counting.”

Overall, the ten BRICS countries accounted for 27.7 per cent of Malaysia’s total trade in 2022 (the latest data available from the World Bank). However, as noted by a Malaysian bank, China accounts for the lion’s share of Malaysia’s exports to and investments from BRICS countries. Indeed, the numbers would be less impressive if BRICS countries who are either ASEAN Member States (Indonesia) or have formal partnerships with Malaysia through ASEAN frameworks (Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates) were left out of the equation. Removing this “circle of partners,” Malaysia’s total trade with the remaining BRICS countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran) whittles down to 0.3 per cent. 

The minimal gains from potential trade with BRICS countries beyond the “circle of partners” weakens the economic rationale for Malaysia to deepen its engagement with BRICS. There is also little added value of the BRICS membership in terms of access to the New Development Bank (NDB), as its facilities are open to all members of the United Nations (UN).

While the economic gains are either limited or unclear, the political benefits for Malaysia are easier to discern. Participation in BRICS would give Malaysia a platform to further its foreign policy agenda on issues such as Palestine and reforming global governance institutions (i.e., the UN, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank). Likewise, Malaysia could also solidify its diplomatic standing globally through its endorsement of BRICS declarations and statements. BRICS also raises Malaysia’s profile, especially that of its prime minister, as a voice of the Global South.

Being a BRICS partner country might be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia as it walks the tight rope of navigating the uncertainties of US foreign policy helmed by a mercurial president.

At the same time, the political downside is limited by the fact that Malaysia does not have a role in the decision-making process within BRICS. This enables Malaysia to distance itself from actions that the US or the West perceive to be antithetical to their interests such as de-dollarisation. More importantly, a lower profile in BRICS would also help to keep Malaysia out of US President Donald Trump’s gunsights as he has threatened to impose a 10 per cent tariff on countries aligning themselves with the anti-American politics of BRICS.

Regardless of whether the Trump administration casts a wider tariff net to ensnarl all BRICS participants — full members and partner countries alike — or limit the “punishment” to full members, it would be prudent to take Trump’s threats seriously. As the potential political costs from being on the wrong side of Trump outweigh the economic gains from BRICS, Malaysia would do well to keep its head low and limit its visibility and engagement. In this context, being a BRICS partner country might be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia as it walks the tight rope of navigating the uncertainties of US foreign policy helmed by a mercurial president. At the same time, Malaysia could leverage and explore new economic opportunities in BRICS away from the glare of the political spotlight.

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