Malaysia’s Royal Rendezvous in Russia: Reasons and Rationale

From 6 to 10 August, Ibrahim, the Malaysian King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong), visited Russia at the invitation of President Vladimir Putin. This marked the first visit of a Malaysian head of state to Russia since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967. This also follows Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s three visits to Russia: the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) at Vladivostok (September 2024), the BRICS Summit at Kazan (October 2024), and a state visit (May 2025).

During the welcome ceremony for the King in the Grand Kremlin Palace, the two leaders exchanged warm personal remarks and hailed the relationship between their countries. After Moscow, the King spent three days in Tatarstan, visiting the Kazan Helicopter Plant among other sites. It is possible that IT security was also a topic, given the Malaysian public sector’s usage of cybersecurity solutions from the Russian Kaspersky Lab.

Beyond the optics, the visit by the Malaysian monarch raises questions. Russia faces widespread opprobrium for its war with Ukraine, and as a destination, it does not jibe with the King’s other trips. His three overseas visits since ascending to the throne in January 2024 were logical choices: Singapore is Malaysia’s closest neighbour and works closely with the Monarch’s own state of Johor; China is Malaysia’s largest trading partner; and Brunei is a neighbouring Muslim-majority monarchy.

Malaysia and Russia are not significant trading partners. With a trade volume of US$2.5 billion in 2024, Russia ranks as Malaysia’s 28^th largest trading partner. Malaysia’s exports to Russia, mostly electronic and electrical products and machinery, exceed the predominantly fuel and chemical products imported from Russia.

Furthermore, the two countries have a major bilateral issue simmering beneath the surface. During Anwar’s May 2025 visit, the International Civil Aviation Organisation ruled that Russia was responsible for shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over the Donbas region in 2014. The topic was lightly waved away, with Anwar commenting that he had raised the issue privately with Putin. This issue also did not feature during the Monarch’s visit.

One key driver for deeper bilateral engagement could be defence purchases. Malaysia has ageing military equipment. The King has taken a personal interest in this, stating that Malaysia should replace these assets and procurement should be conducted on a government-to-government basis rather than via intermediaries. Shortly after returning from Russia, he publicly urged Malaysia’s defence ministry to scrap its plans to procure second-hand US Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

Russian sources indicate that, on the trip to Russia, the Agong was shown a series of modernised Russian helicopters that can fulfil a similar range of roles to the Black Hawks. Defence Minister Mohd Khaled Nordin, who accompanied the Agong, affirmed the government-to-government procurement approach a few hours later. The procurement of the US helicopters has since been scrapped.

This is nothing new; after all, as our colleague Ian Storey notes, Russia was the largest arms exporter to Southeast Asia over the 2000-23 period, amassing US$11.24 billion in sales, with Malaysia the third largest customer (US$1.27 billion). This money went primarily towards jets, specifically 18 MiG-29 Fulcrums and 18 Su-30MKM Flankers. These – alongside the US-built F/A-18 Hornets the Royal Malaysian Air Force operates – are fourth-generation aircraft due for replacement.

The preference for Russian arms in Southeast Asia seems to be abating, but the familiarity remains. While some argue that sanctions have driven Malaysia away from Russia in recent times, the evidence suggests otherwise. Apart from the purchase of second-hand Kuwaiti Hornets that appears to be a stopgap solution, the Russian fifth-generation Su-57E Felon appears to be a long-term prospect alongside US and French options. Malaysia seems to look favourably on Russian equipment because it is cheaper, comes with fewer strings attached, and can potentially be paid in kind with products like palm oil.

…while the engagement with Russia might be surprising, it remains in line with Malaysia’s preexisting diplomatic tendencies.

Another consideration is the popularity of Putin and Russia in Malaysia. This is largely due to the Israel/Gaza conflict, which has complicated Malaysia-US relations. In contrast, Putin is seen to support the Palestinian cause, and Russia’s foreign policy is perceived to have an “Islamic dimension”. In addition, many Malaysians do not rank the Russia-Ukraine War as a major geopolitical concern. According to the State of Southeast Asia Survey 2025, only 25 per cent of Malaysian respondents judged this a “top concern”, well below their rating of Israel’s war against Hamas (75.8 per cent). Consequently, engaging with Russia can bolster domestic approval.

Furthermore, the ongoing relationship with Russia does not diverge from what international relations expert Kuik Cheng Chwee labels as Malaysia’s longstanding foreign policy of “equidistance”. This means seeking to preserve strategic distance from any specific global power or bloc to maintain autonomy. Thus, while Malaysia has a longstanding economic relationship with the United States and, indeed, much of its electrical and electronics sector depends on investment from American firms, it has traditionally sought to avoid entangling alliances. Seen from this light, Malaysia’s relationship with Russia makes sense – notwithstanding its own complications.

Finally, Malaysia’s application for BRICS membership is an ongoing foreign policy concern. This grouping can provide Malaysia a forum to speak out on issues of concern, such as Palestine, the reform of international institutions, and US protectionism. As admission to BRICS requires consensus by all member countries, a working relationship with Russia, the most heavily sanctioned founding BRICS member, is necessary. For Putin, the participation of more countries would enable Russia to develop non-Western international institutions of consequence. Thus, while the engagement with Russia might be surprising, it remains in line with Malaysia’s preexisting diplomatic tendencies. From Russia’s point of view, hosting Malaysian elite figures is a good way to promote links with Southeast Asia and limit its diplomatic isolation. In the meantime, we may see Malaysia’s military order some Russian helicopters.

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