MFP Dissolution: Inevitable But Not Inconsequential

On 7 August, Thailand’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP) and impose a ten-year ban on its executives, including prime ministerial candidate Pita Limjaroenrat. The dissolution conforms to a troubling pattern in Thailand where judicial bodies — particularly the Constitutional Court — intervene to shape political outcomes, often counter to popular will and with questionable regard for the rule of law.

The latest ruling represents the aftershock of an earlier ruling on 31 January, which determined that the MFP and Pita’s activities in advocating for amendments to the lese majeste law, or Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, constituted an attempt to undermine Thailand’s democratic system with the king as head of state.

Many parties have been dissolved for more trivial offences; for example, the Future Forward Party (FFP), the MFP’s predecessor, was dissolved for accepting illegal loans of about 191 million baht (US$5.42 million) from its founder, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. Given that the political motives and legal grounds for dissolving the MFP are not only closely linked but also involve significantly more serious transgressions than in past cases, its dissolution appeared almost inevitable.

To preserve the momentum from its May 2023 election victory, the now-dissolved MFP swiftly formed a new party called Prachachon, which translates to “People’s Party” in English — a possible nod to Khana Ratsadon (“People’s Party”) from the 1932 Revolution. It registered the remaining 143 MPs without any defections and unveiled a new leader, Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, who vowed to uphold the MFP’s ideology. This seamless transition suggests that the MFP was prepared for this scenario and is ready to compete in the upcoming by-election in Phitsanulok, replacing former MFP MP and First Deputy House Speaker Padipat Santipada. Padipat is now barred from politics due to his former role in MFP’s executive committee. He moved from MFP to the Fair Party last year (the House will also select a new deputy speaker to replace him).

While it is true that the MFP’s untimely demise may translate into surges in support for the party’s successor in the next election … it remains unclear whether such a party, even if it wins, will be able to come to power without the endorsement of the conservative status quo or create meaningful changes in areas now considered off-limits by the Court.

Yet, the predictability of MFP’s dissolution and its well-rehearsed reorganisation may have contributed to a perception that this is simply another episode in Thailand’s recurring political cycle. This belies the harsh reality that it represents the most devastating blow to Thai democracy since the May 2014 coup. First, the party was prevented from forming the government by the junta-appointed Senate. Now, that same party has been denied the very right to exist, disenfranchising more than 14 million voters who supported it in the 2023 general elections. There is no clearer reminder of the enduring legacy of the coup than the fact that the Court —an institution with members endorsed by the coup makers, directly or indirectly — continues to wield power that can dismantle political organisations that derive their existence from the people — among other powers vested in it by the junta-drafted 2017 Constitution.

The irony is that this power now appears to be treated as legitimate by the Pheu Thai (PT) Party, even when its former incarnations, Thai Rak Thai, Palang Prachachon, and sister party Thai Raksa Chart were all dissolved by the very same Court, with large numbers of party executives banned. Having formed an alliance with figures in the establishment that influenced the composition of the court, PT’s attempt to deny any responsibility or involvement in the MFP’s dissolution — despite being in government — can only be interpreted as acquiescence to the forces that once threatened their existence. In accepting the MFP’s dissolution as a consequence of its own wrongdoings rather than as a broader symptom of Thailand’s dysfunctional politics, PT has become complicit in perpetuating a system of judicialised politics that has long stifled democratic development in Thailand and that could eventually turn against the party itself.

This complicity not only normalises the dissolution of political parties, however. It also enables a unique form of judicial overreach by establishing legal precedents that constrain the scope of possible reforms related to the monarchy. After all, the MFP was not simply dissolved; it was made an example for crossing a line by attempting to amend the lese majeste law through avenues that the Court deemed to be outside the bounds of “due legislative process”. This in itself is a moving target since only the Court has the discretion to define what the phrase means in practice.

Mindful of the Court’s verdicts, many political parties — perhaps with the exception of the MFP’s successor, Prachachon — will likely self-censor or avoid proposing any amendments or bills that could be construed as attempts to “separate the monarchy from the nation,” or face potential legal repercussions in the same manner as the MFP did. This is particularly true in sensitive areas such as royal assets, budgets, and control over military personnel. This may render such parties ineffective in advancing reform agendas and make Parliament inept as a platform for deliberating on issues concerning the monarchy’s role and status at a critical historical moment when societal divisions over these issues look set to deepen.

While it is true that the MFP’s untimely demise may translate into surges in support for the party’s successor in the next election, as FFP’s dissolution did for the MFP, it remains unclear whether such a party, even if it wins, will be able to come to power without the endorsement of the conservative status quo or create meaningful changes in areas now considered off-limits by the Court. Until a broader consensus is reached on addressing not only judicial overreach but also the entrenched power structures, the MFP will not be the last party to face dissolution. Thai democracy will continue to face existential threats, and the possibility of meaningful reform will remain elusive.

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