Modernisation Is Not Enough: The Case for Transforming the Philippine Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has exerted tremendous effort in conducting internal security operations since the Philippines gained its independence from the United States. Given the Philippines’ reliance on the US’s security umbrella until the 1990s, the AFP never effectively developed the capabilities for territorial defence operations. Indeed, the Korea War of 1950–1953 is the only conflict outside the Philippines where the Philippine military forces were deployed to participate in combat operations.

The preoccupation with internal security seemed sufficient for the requirements of the Philippines until the emergence of territorial disputes in the South China Sea in the 1990s. Aggressive actions such as the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in February 1994, the Scarborough Shoal incident in 1997, the Reed Bank incident in 2011, and the more recent Ayungin Shoal incident in 2024 were strong indications that territorial defence could no longer be secondary to internal security operations in the country’s national security priorities. For the past 30 years, successive governments have set out to modernise the AFP — with limited success.

Although modernisation provides incremental upgrades to the capabilities of a military force, this process is not sufficient to build one that is capable of territorial defence. The AFP’s drastic shift in strategic posture from internal security to territorial defence necessitates a military transformation that surpasses modernisation. While modernisation involves evolutionary change through which an organisation tries to improve its ability to do what it is already doing, transformation is a more comprehensive process that aims to gradually change the way military forces fight through “new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organisations”.

There are very few debates regarding the purpose and direction of military change in the Philippines. Existing research highlighted the role of defence spending and military platforms in upgrading the capabilities of the AFP but these are insufficient if the objective is to be a 21st-century military force that is more lethal, jointly integrated and adaptive to the changing character of warfare, exemplified most recently in the utilisation of new technologies and multiple frontiers, including the cybersphere, in the Russia-Ukraine war. Consequential changes in doctrine and force structure are necessary if there is to be military transformation in the Philippines.

The AFP’s modernisation-centred approach has important elements, but it mainly provides upgrades that may not necessarily change the effectiveness of military performance.

Doctrine is a critical element in transforming military forces. It specifies “how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognised threats and opportunities”. A set of doctrinal changes was mandated in 2018 within the Philippines National Defence Strategy 2018–22. It is reasonable to expect the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC), adopted in 2024, to anchor the current doctrines of the AFP — and to maintain the focus on the shift from internal security to territorial defence articulated in 2018. The CADC emphasises greater and more elaborate roles for the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and Philippine Navy (PN), which would require the development of new doctrines that provide the fundamental principles guiding the employment of military forces in coordinated and integrated action against external security threats. However, the AFP is yet to articulate clear doctrines, despite their importance, making it difficult to evaluate progress in this area.

Force structure is another indispensable element of military transformation. This refers to the set of military units in an armed force of “a nation and describes in part the potential military capability of the armed forces or nation”. The force structure of the AFP has always been based on internal security operations, as reflected in the sustained dominance of the Philippine Army over the entire organisation. For instance, 71 per cent (103,200) of the total personnel of the AFP are assigned to the Philippine Army (PA), leaving the PN with only 17 per cent (25,450) and the PAF with 12 per cent (17,600). While this organisational configuration seems to be common in Southeast Asia, the strategic sense of an Army-centric force structure is difficult to grasp in light of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept’s commitment to defend territorial integrity, protect maritime interests, and control critical maritime areas.

While military transformation takes time, two urgent initiatives can jumpstart the process. The first is to clarify the current integration of doctrines and force structure of the AFP with the CADC. One way to achieve this is by creating a technical working group composed of civilian and military specialists to conduct a systematic review. A second initiative is for the Department of National Defence to reconfigure the budget allocation of the AFP so that the PAF and PN will have sufficient resources relative to the PA. The objective is to ensure that the PAF and PN have the capacity to transform concurrently with the Philippine Army by 2040. Military transformation is unlikely to happen if the current budget allocation of the AFP continues to favour the army.

Building a military force for territorial defence requires transformation. The AFP’s modernisation-centred approach has important elements, but it mainly provides upgrades that may not necessarily change the effectiveness of military performance. A more comprehensive process of transformation — including comprehensive changes in doctrine and force structure — is necessary to realise the AFP’s aspiration to be a capable military in the 21st century.

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