Momentum or Mirage? Anutin’s Risky Road to Re-Election

Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved the House of Representatives on Friday (12 December), paving the way for a general election in early 2026. The move is designed to avert a no-confidence vote, preserve incumbency advantage, and anchor the coming election on the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, an issue on which rival parties are poorly positioned to campaign. Yet, it offers no guarantee of Anutin’s return to the premiership and exposes his Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) to the risk of national backlash should he fall short of the nationalist expectations he has helped create. 

The dissolution may have come earlier than the original four-month timeline, but it was hardly unexpected. Under the Thai Constitution, once a no-confidence motion is filed, the prime minister loses the authority to dissolve the House. With the House set to reconvene on 12 December, it seemed inevitable that Pheu Thai (PT) would initiate such a motion, as it had the numbers to do so on its own. This would have inflicted serious reputational damage and left Anutin, who led a minority government, dependent on the People’s Party (PP) for survival. 

Rather than take that risk, Anutin moved to trigger the dissolution, which was effectively telegraphed when BJT openly violated the spirit of its agreement with PP during the second reading of the draft constitutional amendment, just one day before the House reconvened. In that parliamentary proceeding, BJT MPs and senators aligned with the party joined forces to preserve the requirement that one-third of the Senate, which BJT currently dominates, must endorse any new constitution. This move immediately prompted the PP to begin preparing a no-confidence motion. This did not materialise because the royal decree dissolving the House was requested and endorsed before the process could advance. 

As fleeting as his premiership was, Anutin made the most of it. He projected a commitment to professionalism by appointing technocrats to his cabinet and delivered on the Khon La Khrueng co-payment scheme, a signature economic quick-win policy, in his first 40 days in office. As a testament to the public’s receptivity to these early moves, NIDA polling initially showed Anutin surging in popularity. Before December, he consistently placed third in most regions, behind the undecided bloc and PP leader, Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut. His polling numbers also rose ahead of Natthaphong in the Northeast. His party, meanwhile, averaged 11.7 per cent across Thailand’s regions, trailing PP’s 25.1 per cent but maintaining a lead over PT’s 10.38 per cent. 

That may not seem like much at first glance, but these polling averages represent a significant jump relative to BJT’s three per cent share of party-list votes in the 2023 election, even if they are not directly comparable. More importantly, the newfound appeal enjoyed by Anutin and BJT serves largely as the cherry on top of what has long been the party’s real asset: a powerful network of provincial dynasties and factions equipped with the money and machines to deliver constituency votes. 

Upon becoming prime minister and returning as minister of the interior, Anutin wasted little time expanding this network beyond its traditional stronghold in Thailand’s lower Northeast. Building on the party’s gains in the South during the 2023 general election as well as its advances in recent local elections, Anutin moved to reshuffle senior bureaucrats and placed provincial governors of his choosing in key provinces. This ensures that the vote-canvassing networks running through community leaders within the state’s local administrative apparatus, such as village heads and district chiefs, are aligned with his party’s political interest.

Reflecting BJT’s growing clout, the most infamous provincial factions and dynasties (Baan Yai) have lined up to join the party. These include the quintessential provincial godfather-type Sasomsap family of Nakhon Pathom, Sontaya Khunpluem’s faction in Chonburi, and the Silpa-archa clan of the “Banharn-buri”. Together, these groups amount to roughly 40 seats’ worth of political machinery. Added to what Bhumjaithai already holds, the party is on track to command well over 100 seats, assuming both the party and these Baan Yai retain most of the seats they won in the 2023 elections. 

… the renewed border tensions with Cambodia have offered a convenient distraction from these setbacks, enabling Anutin to recast himself as a leader willing to take a nationalist, hard-line stance in defence of Thailand’s sovereignty and in support of a military that is enjoying levels of popularity not seen in more than a decade.

Yet BJT’s path to becoming a party able to deliver constituency votes through local patronage networks, while also cultivating broad national appeal, has been interrupted by a series of setbacks that have dented the popularity of both Anutin and Bhumjaithai. First came the mishandling of the Southern floods; second were allegations tying Anutin to the scam networks linked to the same individual whose name has surfaced in controversial reports involving cross-border financial transactions connected to the Hun regime and subsequent stake acquisitions in Bangchak Corporation Public Company Limited (BCP), a major energy conglomerate in Thailand.

For now, the renewed border tensions with Cambodia have offered a convenient distraction from these setbacks, enabling Anutin to recast himself as a leader willing to take a nationalist, hard-line stance in defence of Thailand’s sovereignty and in support of a military that is enjoying levels of popularity not seen in more than a decade. This is a striking turnaround: just two months earlier, he had been castigated by ardent conservatives for signing the Kuala Lumpur peace deal and for acknowledging, in effect, that Thailand has also encroached on Cambodian territory. Having embraced this hard-line posture, Anutin can no longer afford to back down by appearing conciliatory toward Cambodia, not even at US President Trump’s behest. In fact, Anutin publicly refuted Trump’s claim that Thailand and Cambodia had agreed to a ceasefire beginning on the evening of 12 December. Anutin insisted that Thailand will continue its military operations. 

The recent episodes demonstrate that nationalist sentiment is far harder to predict, control, or bend to one’s advantage than politicians like Anutin would hope. Should Anutin fail to show resolve consistent with his nationalist rhetoric, public support could erode just as quickly as it surged. Yet if he goes too far, he risks provoking further escalation, international outcry, and economic fallout, including potential disruption to trade negotiations with the United States. 

In either scenario, a national backlash against Anutin would likely translate into a poor performance on the party-list ballot, while leaving his party with less flexibility to localise campaigns on the constituency ballot, as it has traditionally done. In that case, BJT may still emerge with enough seats to play a dominant role in coalition formation. Yet, this is unlikely to provide enough seats to secure Anutin’s premiership, much less deliver a stable administration.

In all likelihood, he could end up leading another unwieldy “grand compromise” coalition that leaves him with little room to manoeuvre. The timing could hardly be worse, arriving as Thailand needs strong leadership to manage the border dispute, navigate great-power pressures, and chart a course out of economic malaise. If that is the future that awaits him, his next premiership may indeed last longer than this one — but not by much. 

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