Neighbour to Civil War: Thailand’s Relations with Myanmar in 2024

Three years after the historic coup in 2021, Myanmar is mired in civil war. It is a failed state bordering Thailand. The two countries share a border of 2,416 km, and extensive trade and security relations. Given that sections of the Thai elite, specifically the military, are quite close to the junta, any ASEAN-led overtures towards Myannar will — for better or worse —have to go through Bangkok.

Until 1988, the two countries’ proximity and Bangkok’s threat perception of Myanmar caused Thailand to pursue a buffer policy. Bangkok armed ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) along the frontier. After 1988, Thai governments and military leaders differed over how to deal with Myanmar. Since 2001, Bangkok has sought to build close military, economic, and political ties with Myanmar. But Myanmar’s 2021 coup happened, exacerbating domestic conflict. This year finds Thailand in a dilemma: Bangkok is at the forefront of ASEAN efforts to end the war, but it still has to retain its interests there.

Thailand has security concerns in Myanmar. In 2022, a Myanmar fighter jet trespassed into Thai airspace, threatening Thai border security, while the internecine conflict in Myanmar and subsequent sanctions on the junta have threatened Thai energy security. If a revolution occurred in Myanmar, this would affect Thailand’s concessionary negotiations to tap Myanmar’s energy.  In 2023, Thailand imported approximately 15 per cent of its natural gas from Myanmar. According to Thai political economist Ukrist Pathmanand, Thailand has been importing as much as 15 per cent of its electricity from Myanmar

The economic fortunes of Thailand and Myanmar are intricately linked. In 2022, Thailand exported US$4.4 billion to Myanmar. In turn, Myanmar exported roughly the same — US$4.43 billion — to Thailand. In 2024, the Karen Border Guard Force’s brief takeover of the town of Myawaddy on the Thai-Myanmar border threatened the Thai-Myanmar border trade at Mae Sot-Myawaddy, valued at 130 billion baht (US$3.5 billion). In 2023, Thailand was the third-largest foreign investor in Myanmar.  Myanmar’s cheap labour, natural resources, and the disengagement by sanction-wary Western corporations have encouraged Thai businesses to remain involved in the war-ravaged country.

In 2024, Thailand’s PTT became the largest shareholder (63.0 per cent) in Myanmar’s Yadana natural gas project. Other Thai ventures in Myanmar include Northern Gulf Petroleum, Osotspa Glass, CP, Siam Cement, ThaiBev, Boonrawd, Bangkok Bank, and Siam Commercial Bank.  Thai investors have increased their shares in Myanmar’s Thilawa Special Economic Zone. The son of Thailand’s current foreign minister heads up Yangon-based, Myanmar military-linked Hlaing Sang Holdings. Thais own shares of casinos throughout Myanmar, with at least 17 of them in Myawaddy alone. Shady Thai interests include those of Thai Senator Upakit Pachariyangkun, who has operated businesses with the Myanmar military. Active-duty and retired Thai military and police, including a former army chief-of-staff, have been said to hold shares in “entertainment complexes” in Myanmar,  with some complicit in profiting from illegal call centres.

Another issue for Thailand in Myanmar is what might be termed “migration insecurity.” Ministry of Labor statistics state that there are officially 1.8 million Myanmar workers in Thailand. This figure does not include unregistered workers or account for migrants fleeing from the civil war from Myanmar. Refugee management places an onus on the Thai budget while the war on the frontier influences border security.

One of the most difficult challenges facing Thailand’s Myanmar policy is that recent Thai military officers (and traditional politicians) have had affable relations with Myanmar state officials making it hard to deal with anti-state actors.

The close ties between Thailand and Myanmar affect how ASEAN deals with the problem of Myanmar. In March 2024, Thailand tried to commence an ASEAN-endorsed initiative to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in the quasi-independent Karen State. This was an effort to be directed by the Thai Red Cross and Myanmar Red Cross, though the latter’s connections to Myanmar’s State Administrative Council (SAC) raised suspicions from Myanmar’s EAOs. The plan signalled Thailand’s preference for working with the SAC instead of refugee-related non-government organisations (NGOs) along the Thailand-Myanmar border.

One of the most difficult challenges facing Thailand’s Myanmar policy is that recent Thai military officers (and traditional politicians) have had affable relations with Myanmar state officials making it hard to deal with anti-state actors. The Thai army especially prefers to collaborate with the Myanmar army: senior officers from the two countries meet regularly in the promotion of defence diplomacy.

Since the formation of the Srettha Thavisin-led Pheu Thai government in 2023 (informally controlled by ex-Premier Thaksin Shinawatra), there has been policy discord on the issue of Myanmar between the government and military. Overall, civil-military relations have been strained — a reality affecting Thailand’s Myanmar policy. Srettha’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and National Security Council control official Thai decision-making toward Myanmar, while the Royal Thai Army, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), and Naresuan Task Force control Myanmar policy on the ground. 

In April, Thaksin, who has enjoyed economic ties with Myanmar’s military-dominant regime, reportedly met with representatives of the dissident National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs to explore possibilities of mediating peace talks between them and SAC. In a June social media post, a Thaksin-confidant revealed that the talks were continuing: “a secret-urgent mission involving ethnic groups in Myanmar and the [SAC] is reaching a critical stage.”

According to a source close to the Thai military, senior military officials were infuriated because the government had them out of the loop about Thaksin’s peace forays. The irritation grew when Thailand’s Foreign Minister, himself a Thaksin-confidant, appeared to back Thaksin’s efforts, speaking of the need for more dialogue. Indeed, in Srettha’s push for a more proactive Myanmar policy, the Thai military’s inputs have repeatedly been ignored. According to another well-placed source, Srettha’s 2024 appointment of Police General Roy Ingkhapairoj (instead of an army official) to head the National Security Council has, with regard to Myanmar policy, influenced that body to cooperate less with the armed forces.  Civil-military tensions make it unlikely that Thailand can establish any effective Joint Task Force in Myanmar encompassing civilian agencies and the military.  The government seems bent on keeping the military out of Myanmar policy, but a lot will depend on whether the former can successfully influence Thailand’s October military reshuffle.

Ultimately, Thailand is extremely dependent on Myanmar for a wide range of needs. Thai policy toward Myanmar remains directed towards SAC when it should consider cooperating with the NUG and EAOs.  However, the Thai government and its military are increasingly at odds with Myanmar policy.  Such factors weigh heavily on any possible ASEAN-supported Thai efforts to achieve diminished hostilities in Myanmar.

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