Nguyen Phu Trong and Vietnam: The Loss of Ideological Cover

The passing of Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), marks the end of an era for the party. Trong, the CPV’s chief theorist, passed on without an apparent ideological heir. This will also make it challenging for the party to maintain a cohesive ideological core that has underpinned Vietnam’s resilience as it became more integrated into the global order.

Trong, who passed away on 19 July, was often seen as the “last communist” for his unwavering commitment to Marxist-Leninism. He was the country’s only remaining leader who came of age during the Vietnam War.

He authored numerous books that provided an ideological framework for Vietnam’s path to socialism during the Reform (Doi Moi) era in fields such as the economy, diplomacy and party discipline. As the party chief, Trong boldly proposed a new definition of socialism for Vietnam to maintain the CPV’s monopoly of power. This was laid out in a series of publications developed during the time he was the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Review (1991-1996) and Chairman of the Central Theoretical Council (2001-2007). His writings were complemented by his own experiences as the Chairman of the National Assembly (2006-2011) and the General Secretary of the CPV (2011-2024).

In essence, he rejected the orthodox interpretation of the world through the prism of a constant struggle between capitalism and socialism. While reaffirming the leading role of the CPV, he commanded it to accept “the achievement and civilisational values that mankind had attained during the process of capitalist development”. In practice, his definition of “Vietnam’s market economy with socialist orientation” (essentially, as an economy in transition) helped facilitate Vietnam’s integration into the global economy.

Externally, the theoretical framework, outlined in many of his writings and speeches, also help Hanoi to re-orient its foreign policy to be more multilateral. Trong’s “bamboo diplomacy” was designed “to make friends with all countries”, and leverage “all common interests” with big powers. This put behind Hanoi’s historical siding with ideological allies during the Cold War. 

Domestically, Trong was able to frame anti-corruption not as an infighting within the party but as a moral crusade to save it. In addition, his skilful use of the Party’s theory helped him uphold discipline and consolidate his personal authority by removing rivals. For example, he used Decision 244 to oust PM Nguyen Tan Dung at the 12th Party Congress in 2016. This was derived from his 1990 book, Is the Principle of Democratic Centralism Outdated?

He urged greater efforts to educate the next generation in Leninism, despite its waning appeal. If he could not arrest the trend, it is highly unlikely his successors can.

His perception of corruption as the biggest threat to the survival of the party stemmed from his research into the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This led to his determination to cleanse Vietnam of corrupt elements. Based on this concept, he sought to restore public trust in the CPV’s rule and maintain its political legitimacy. He issued strict conduct guidelines for party members. Again, parts of these guidelines come from his own reflections of the situation, including his 2005 collection, Party Building and Rectification – Some Theoretical and Practical Issues. Violators of these regulations were purged, resulting in hundreds of thousands of government officials being disciplined, demoted, or imprisoned during his decade-long anti-corruption campaign.

With his PhD in Leninism (he studied in Moscow in the 1980s), Trong creatively interpreted an ideology that otherwise would have been outdated for modern Vietnam. His selected works helped the party to navigate internal and external challenges. His successors will struggle to uphold that legacy and use it to hold the party together for three reasons.

First, all top potential successors to Trong have police and military backgrounds. They lack his theoretical acumen and experience in using ideology to galvanise their base and unify the party’s five million members. Immediately after his death, Trong’s spiritual role was highlighted by President To Lam in an obituary, which merely echoed Trong’s words without adding any significant theoretical elaborations. Lam, a former Minister of Public Security, is known as a pragmatist, not an ideologue. Generals Nguyen Trong Nghia and Nguyen Manh Hung, who oversee propaganda and the media, have not authored any theoretical works. The same applies to General Luong Cuong, the recently promoted Permanent Member of the Secretariat.

Second, young Vietnamese increasingly reject the orthodox version of Soviet socialism taught in schools despite rigorous state-sponsored indoctrination aided by public media. Only 0.5 per cent of CPV members are students, compared to 3.2 per cent in the Communist Party of China. Trong once lamented that the youth were “bored of the party, indifferent with the [communist] youth league, and disinterested of politics” (Nhạt đảng, khô đoàn, xa rời chính trị). He urged greater efforts to educate the next generation in Leninism despite its waning appeal. If he could not arrest the trend, it is highly unlikely his successors can.

Third, in a regime often marred by corruption, Trong’s image of an unblemished career and a selfless life granted him the moral authority to stand above factional interests. Given that he was primus inter pares, Trong formulated a policy and enforced it. With his passing, the anti-corruption campaign may descend into rounds of factional infighting — a departure from his ideal of fighting graft to ensure the survival of the CPV.

Trong’s passing leaves his successors with a big challenge in terms of using Marxist-Leninist ideology to undergird many state policies. His vision for Vietnam to develop along the path to socialism with an outlook to 2050 may come under threat sooner than he had hoped for.

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