Nguyen Phu Trong’s Foreign Policy Legacy: Shaping Vietnam’s Great Power Balance
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Nguyen Phu Trong’s strategic nous in shaping Hanoi’s relations with the great powers is his foremost foreign policy legacy.
The recent passing of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)’s General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has left a leadership void that would be challenging to fill, not only because of his political legacy, but also his diplomatic acumen. Leading Vietnam in an era of increasing geopolitical tensions and conflict, Trong skillfully executed what he called “proper, effective management of relations with great powers”.
Trong assumed the role of party chief in 2011, at a time of China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. During his inaugural visit to China that year, the two countries signed an Agreement on Guiding Principles for Solving Maritime Issues, including disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys. This move signalled Trong’s and Vietnam’s intention to compartmentalise the South China Sea issue from other areas of cooperation with China, aiming to prevent maritime clashes while forging stable bilateral ties.
This approach faced a severe test in May 2014 when China placed the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, leading to a two-month standoff. The incident sparked violent anti-China protests in Vietnam and threatened to upend bilateral ties. Several members of the CPV Central Committee even called for abandoning the “Three Nos” (now “Four Nos”) policy to strengthen defence cooperation with Western countries so as to better deter China at sea. However, Trong prioritised restoring stable ties with China and adhering to the 2011 agreement. For this purpose, in the aftermath of the crisis, he sent his special envoy Le Hong Anh, a Politburo member, to China in August 2014.
Since then, Trong’s personal rapport with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his efforts to promote close party-to-party ties helped to maintain and advance stable bilateral relations even as maritime tensions persisted. Xi’s personal visit to the Vietnamese embassy in Beijing to mourn Trong’s passing speaks volumes of this.
Trong’s hallmark foreign policy legacy is the concept of ‘bamboo diplomacy’, which he strived to promote as Vietnam’s unique practice of diplomacy. Drawing upon the characteristics of bamboo — ‘strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches’ — Trong depicted ‘Vietnamese bamboo diplomacy’ as ‘soft and wise but still persistent and resolute; flexible and creative but consistent, valiant and resilient against all challenges and difficulties […] resolute, persistent and patient in safeguarding the national interest’.
Due to Trong’s position as party chief and his seemingly accommodating approach towards China, some have viewed him as belonging to the “pro-China” camp among Vietnamese political elites. However, this narrative becomes untenable when examining his contributions to Vietnam-US ties. Under his leadership, Vietnam established a comprehensive partnership with the US in 2013. Notably, in 2015, Trong made a historic trip to Washington, becoming the first CPV chief to visit the White House. On that occasion, Trong and US President Barack Obama issued a joint vision statement, which expressed concerns about “recent developments in the South China Sea that have increased tensions, eroded trust, and threatened to undermine peace, security, and stability”. As Alexander Vuving argues, the 2014 oil rig crisis served as a catalyst for Trong to reach out to the US.
In 2023, in a move that surprised many observers, Trong invited US President Joe Biden to Vietnam, during which the two countries elevated their relationship to the highest level of a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP). In his condolence statement to Vietnam, Biden hailed Trong as “a champion of the deep ties between the American and Vietnamese people whose leadership helped nurture the friendship and partnership” of the two countries.
Trong’s hallmark foreign policy legacy is the concept of “bamboo diplomacy”, which he strived to promote as Vietnam’s unique practice of diplomacy. Drawing upon the characteristics of bamboo — “strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches” — Trong depicted “Vietnamese bamboo diplomacy” as “soft and wise but still persistent and resolute; flexible and creative but consistent, valiant and resilient against all challenges and difficulties […] resolute, persistent and patient in safeguarding the national interest”. In 2023, he published a book on the concept, further solidifying and embedding it in Vietnam’s foreign policy discourse. Vietnamese policymakers, scholars, and observers inside and outside the country have increasingly adopted the term when discussing Vietnam’s foreign policy choices.
In recent years, bamboo diplomacy has guided Vietnam’s great power hedging. Under Trong’s third tenure, Vietnam forged CSPs with the US and three US allies — Australia, Japan and South Korea. Simultaneously, Vietnam has enhanced ties with its traditional partners, projecting an image of neutrality. Shortly after the CSP upgrade with the US, Trong invited Xi to visit Vietnam and the two leaders declared their agreement to build a “community of shared future” between the two countries. One month before his passing, Trong hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Hanoi, despite the risk of upsetting Western partners. Trong reaffirmed the “Four Nos” principle to both Xi and Putin to reassure them that Hanoi would not side with any major powers against others.
Despite his background as a Soviet-trained ideologue, Trong’s foreign policy approach, as epitomised by Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy, was driven more by pragmatism than ideological affinity. Thus, Trong not only embodied but also elevated Vietnam’s national interest-based foreign policy in the post-Doi Moi era. His personal influence on Vietnam’s relations with great powers clearly demonstrated this.
Inclusive diversification with multiple powers has enabled Vietnam to continue attracting external assistance in pursuing economic and security interests. However, some have questioned the long-term viability of this approach in today’s growing polarised and fraught strategic environment. Vietnam’s longstanding ties with Russia, traditionally crucial for arms supply and support in the South China Sea, has been complicated by Moscow’s strategic alignment with China and the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China has continued to challenge Vietnam’s sovereignty and maritime rights. Just one day before Trong’s passing, China rebuked Vietnam’s recent claim to an extended continental shelf in the South China Sea.
As such, the next CPV General Secretary will not only need to uphold Trong’s foreign policy legacy but also develop a long-term strategic vision for Vietnam in the context of evolving geopolitical dynamics.
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Phan Xuan Dung is a Research Officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a PhD student at the Australian National University.









