Pak Lah and Islam Hadhari’s Hits and Misses

On 13 April 2025, Malaysians bid farewell to their fifth prime minister, Tun Abdullah Badawi. Pak Lah, as he was affectionately called, was remembered as “Mr Clean” for his strong anti-corruption stance. His detractors would argue that his soft approach and manner, in contrast with his predecessor Mahathir Mohamad’s abrasive style, were Pak Lah’s weaknesses and that his views were easily coloured by the “fourth-floor boys”, alluding to his young aides who occupied the fourth floor of the prime minister’s office in Putrajaya. His son-in-law, former UMNO youth chief and minister Khairy Jamaluddin, was regarded as the leader of these “boys”.

One of Pak Lah’s legacies deserving scrutiny is his introduction in January 2004, three months after assuming office, of Islam Hadhari (Civilisational Islam), a set of 10 progressive and moderate Islamic values, which earned him a reputation as a moderate Muslim leader. Had Pak Lah and Islam Hadhari survived politically, would Malaysia be less religiously conservative today than observers tend to contend?

While Islam Hadhari earned compliments locally and internationally for its mission to battle conservative Islam, the concept, even in its heyday, remained at the discursive level. On the ground, it failed to improve relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, without buy-in from the Islamic bureaucracy, Islam Hadhari, which was ambiguous to begin with, was a non-starter.

The ten values Islam Hadhari championed are: (1) piety and faith in Allah; (2) a just and trustworthy government; (3) a free and independent people; (4) vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; (5) balanced and comprehensive economic development; (6) a good quality of life for the people; (7) protection of the rights of minority groups and women; (8) cultural and moral integrity; (9) safeguarding of natural resources and the environment; and (10) strong defence capabilities. These values may be read as akin to corporate vision and mission statements; critics ridiculed the selection of only ten values out of possibly hundreds of universal values that Islam champions, such as democracy, freedom of belief (which includes religious conversion), and the right to privacy.

Introduced three years after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Islam Hadhari was intended to counter, among other things, the ensuing Islamophobia and terrorist incidents in Southeast Asia. At the domestic level, it was clearly intended to “out-Islamise” the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), which was at the time calling for the formation of an Islamic state and implementation of hudud laws (a punitive and legalistic approach to Islamic shariah). Islam Hadhari shored up Pak Lah’s Islamic credentials to challenge his PAS ulama opponents Nik Aziz, Haron Din, and Abdul Hadi Awang. In the March 2004 election, Pak Lah led his Barisan Nasional coalition to a landslide victory, capturing 90 per cent of the 219 parliament seats. It is uncertain whether Islam Hadhari directly contributed to this victory. It may not have swayed conservative Muslims who would have voted PAS anyway, but its deployment during the election campaign might have projected Pak Lah as a moderate Muslim in the eyes of non-Malays and centrist Muslims.

Islam Hadhari’s promise of a moderate and progressive Islam could not tackle numerous interfaith and intra-faith issues.

Despite its good intentions and potential, the promotion of Islam Hadhari ended with Pak Lah’s resignation as prime minister in 2009. The project was closely associated with him and was not furthered by Malaysia’s federal and state religious bureaucracy beyond slogans, campaigns, and songs. Several institutions were created in the name of Islam Hadhari, such as Institute Islam Hadhari at Universiti Kebangasaan Malaysia (UKM), and the concept was promoted through publications and conferences, but there were no serious critical debates among ulama and Muslim intellectuals.

Islam Hadhari’s promise of a moderate and progressive Islam could not tackle numerous interfaith and intra-faith issues. It failed to avert the decline in non-Malay support for his government. For example, the Malaysian government’s relations with Hindus was at an all-time low, contributing to the emergence of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf). In 2007, 30 NGOs rallied under the Hindraf banner and staged a mass rally calling for their rights and heritage to be preserved.

The national controversy revolving around M. Moorthy’s burial under Islamic rites following a Shariah Court ruling also came under his watch. When Moorthy’s wife challenged the decision in the High Court, contesting her husband’s alleged conversion to Islam, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to override the Shariah Court’s decision.

Pak Lah also could not control the religious zeal of departments such as JAWI, the Federal Territories Religious Department. Raids by religious officials on nightclubs constantly placed him on the spot as they ran counter to his promotion of a progressive form of Islam. Moreover, the prime minister could not prevent the conservative edicts issued by some Malaysian muftis, including the late Tan Sri Harussani Zakaria, Perak’s mufti at the time.

While the opposition of the conservatives and the actions of some conservative mufti and the religious establishment would have blocked Pak Lah, his own team, including senior members of his party, UMNO, failed to implement his ambiguous vision too.

In sum, the Hadhari concept faced too many domestic obstacles for true success. Successive prime ministers after Pak Lah did not believe Islam Hadhari had political capital. Najib Razak championed Islam Wasatiyyah alongside his One Malaysia campaign. These too fell by the wayside after Najib’s electoral defeat in 2018. The current prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, revived Islam Hadhari’s predecessor concept, Islam Madani. Lessons from Pak Lah’s failed Hadhari project are a stern reminder that Madani too may suffer the same fate if it lacks support from the religious establishment, is unable to moderate religious conservatism in society, and does not improve interfaith relations in the country.

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