Pheu Thai: Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Published
The Pheu Thai party has to tread a delicate balance between its coalition with conservatives and fulfilling reformist expectations.
A Pheu Thai (PT) party candidate beat an opposition candidate in the Phitsanulok by-election on 15 September. The by-election saw PT’s conservatives backing it in confronting the popularity of the People’s Party (PP, the latest iteration of the now-defunct Move Forward Party). But the by-election also illustrated that PT’s political standing relies more on cooperation with coalition partners than organic voter appeal.
PT’s Jadet Jantar defeated PP’s Nathachanon Chanaburanasak by 6,569 votes (37,209 to 30,640). PT was aided by coalition parties withholding their candidates to avoid splitting the vote. PT’s prospects were also buoyed by PT leader and Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra topping a recent poll. Conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), the poll showed 31.35 per cent of respondents favouring her as the PM. NIDA conducted the poll between 16 and 23 September 2024 through phone interviews with 2,000 respondents across Thailand. Respondents who previously supported Srettha Thavisin have likely shifted to Paetongtarn because she is now the new PM. However, such strength in positive opinion polls contrasts with how PT continues to rely on support from its conservative allies.
Although opinion polls can be accurate given sufficient sample size and random sampling method, the results cannot be generalised over time, and they have a short lifespan, especially when conducted during high-profile policy implementation. Paetongtarn’s support increased after recent cash handouts and the handling of recent floods that hit Thailand.
In September 2024, she distributed 10,000 baht (US$295) to 15 million citizens, including welfare cardholders, the elderly, and people with disabilities. In the same month, she also authorised a flood relief package of around 3 billion baht and visited impacted areas such as Chiang Rai. Respondents praised Paetongtarn’s flood management. However, PT’s boost in support appears linked to immediate circumstances (the cash handouts). It does not appear to signify a durable political shift.
On paper, the conservatives’ strategy of uniting behind a Shinawatra member seems to be an effective counterweight to the PP. While the strategy is still working, the result should be put in proper context. Although Paetongtarn’s rating rose from 4.85 per cent in June 2024 to 31.35 per cent, her rating compared less favourably to Pita Limjaroenrat’s 45.5 per cent in June. PT’s popularity rating was 27.15 per cent, an increase from 16.85 per cent in a similar NIDA poll conducted in June 2024. But the PP remains the most popular political party, with 34.25 per cent of respondents indicating that they would still support it if an election is held.
Given that PT’s reformist agenda is at odds with its conservative allies, it raises questions about whether the party can maintain relevance while appeasing conservative allies and its traditional support base.
In a sense, PT’s alignment with conservative and military-backed parties has limited its positive momentum. It faces challenges regaining support from the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). The prime minister appointed a former red-shirt co-leader, Nattawut Saikua, as her advisor despite his promise not to engage with PT after it had assembled a coalition with the conservatives. Nattawut’s u-turn and acceptance of the role sparked an outcry among the public. PT’s partnership with conservative parties has also distanced younger voters and past supporters looking for more progressive reforms, leading them to support the PP.
PT has attempted to advance reform proposals involving reducing military prerogatives and increasing wages. In September 2024, PT also aimed to introduce several constitutional amendments. One of these amendments aimed to establish clear criteria and conditions for charging and dismissing political officeholders for breaches of ethical standards. However, PT halted its proposal after coalition partners such as Bhumjaithai (BJT) and United Thai Nation (UTN) opposed it. Given that PT’s reformist agenda is at odds with its conservative allies, it raises questions about whether the party can maintain relevance while appeasing conservative allies and its traditional support base.
The double majority rule for rewriting the Constitution is also under debate, as the PT must first reconcile differences with its coalition partners. The rule requires that at least 50 per cent of eligible voters participate in the referendum and that more than half of those who vote must support the proposal. Such a rule helps conservatives by making it difficult for progressives to secure voter turnout and amend the Constitution. A recent Lower House vote in October 2024 saw the BJT abstain from rejecting the Senate’s decision to retain the rule.
BJT’s support is crucial because the party holds significant influence over the Senate, with 123 senators aligned closely with it. As an advocate for conservative interests, BJT is expected to oppose proposals that could weaken the political establishment. Thus, PT’s relevance is limited by its ability to work with conservative factions that wield critical influence.
In short, the political landscape remains conservative, with conservative elites still retaining control and veto power. PT could make inroads into the conservative voter base. However, whether conservative voters see PT as a viable party to represent their interests remains uncertain. Historical opposition to PT from conservative groups, mainly due to their association with Thaksin, is likely to persist. Conservatives use Thaksin’s lese-majeste charge as a deterrent, and despite the court hearing being adjourned until July 2025, the charge remains intact.
PT’s alignment with the conservative status quo has affected its national appeal, especially among ideologically committed voters. Such a situation may benefit the BJT, which is building its political influence with quiet manoeuvring and astuteness in building local networks. Nevertheless, the close ties between BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul and Thaksin may make conservatives cautious of him. The Election Commission’s recent decision to investigate Thaksin’s unlawful influence casts a shadow on PT, BJT, and other conservative allies. PT’s relevance hinges on how well it appeases and manages conservative allies and the stability of the coalition government. The coalition may collapse if the conservatives regain ground, leaving PT struggling for support.
2024/335
Eugene Mark is a Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.









