Prabowo and Indonesia’s Ulema Council: Is MUI Losing Traction Again?

President Prabowo Subianto was absent from a key event organised by the Ulema Council of Indonesia (MUI) in late July. This is his second absence from the organisation’s activities. He was also absent from MUI’s congress last year, an event which appoints its top leaders. Prabowo’s absence at the 8th Indonesian Muslim Community Congress (KUII) is not an indication it is breaking ties with the organisation, because it still holds significant electoral weight at a time when the president’s popularity is falling. But the president’s approach signals to MUI that it is now just another player in a crowded field.

KUII, first held in the 1920s under the Dutch colonial government, was attended by representatives of 87 Islamic organisations, senior government officials, politicians and academics. MUI is an organisation set up by Suharto in 1975 as a supra-Islamic institution made up of prominent ulama who represent Islamic organisations. MUI members include NU and Muhammadiyah members, and other smaller Islamic organisations.

President Prabowo Subianto was invited to open the congress but did not attend. The president’s absence sparked speculation that he is sidelining MUI, especially since he had attended the National Awakening Party’s (PKB) 28^th anniversary event the day before. PKB is the largest Islamic political party affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Former Indonesian presidents or vice-presidents had officiated the KUII: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) opened KUII IV (2005) and KUII V (2010); Joko Widodo (Jokowi) closed KUII VI (2015); and VP Maruf Amin (from MUI) opened KUII VII (2020).

Prabowo’s absence from the MUI’s largest event was conspicuous, even though several Cabinet members were among the attendees. Fahmi Salim, the head of the MUI’s foreign relations and international cooperation, lamented Prabowo’s absence, suggesting that the president might have been bothered by MUI’s recent criticisms of him, including his proposal to move wounded Gazans to Indonesia. The KUII Congress had invited government critics such as former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, Constitutional Court chief and vice-presidential candidate Mahfud MD and legal scholar Zainal Arifin Mochtar. This fuelled speculation that the president was deliberately avoiding MUI. However, MUI deputy chairman Cholil Nafis suggested that the president “might have more important things to do”. 

Arguably, the relationship between MUI and the president has not been at its best in recent times. MUI was one of the harshest critics of Prabowo’s move to join US President Donald Trump’s Board of Gaza, which it said would only serve the US and Israeli interests, and not those of the Palestinians.

Another indication that Prabowo is sidelining MUI is that its leaders have not been appointed to the Cabinet, unlike those affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah. In addition to handing out Cabinet positions, Prabowo also retained the mining concessions granted to them. This contrasts with the period between 2014 and 2019, when Prabowo was pandering to hardline Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Salafi groups to undermine Joko Widodo (Jokowi). He also supported MUI’s opposition to then Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, a former Gerindra politician who was accused of defaming the Quran.

Prabowo’s absence from the KUII signals to MUI that it is not a priority, contrary to what the organisation aspires to be.

The latest developments are a setback to MUI’s attempt to regain its footing in Indonesia’s pluralistic and fragmented civil society landscape. Despite making some inroads under the SBY and Jokowi governments, MUI has generally been at the margins of the country’s Islamic landscape. When it was formed in 1975, it was widely perceived by the public as a tool of Suharto’s New Order regime. Under SBY and Jokowi, MUI arguably had some influence over the government. While its edicts are not legally binding, its controversial anti-secularism, anti-pluralism and anti-liberal Islam (SIPILIS) fatwa in 2005 and the reinstatement of rulings against the minority Shia and Ahmadiyah groups led to a public uproar and forced the governments to react. In 2019, Jokowi tapped then-MUI chairman Ma’ruf Amin, a key religious authority who supported the social and legal mobilisation against Ahok for his “blasphemous” remark, as his vice-presidential candidate. The MUI’s support for Jokowi helped the former president secure a second term by insulating him from attacks from his Islamist detractors, who were then politically aligned with Prabowo.

At the KUII Congress, MUI issued 12 recommendations for the government to follow up on. This included proposals to enact special legislation to create Danantara Syariah (Syariah-compliant Danantara sovereign wealth fund) to make the Islamic community more economically competitive, a ban on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual and queer (LGBTQ) persons or activities relating to the group, and measures to mitigate the harms of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. Some of these recommendations — such as the Danantara Syariah and AI — might be taken up by the government if they have significant public support, and strengthen the government’s economic, financial and political positions. However, the government’s position on these proposals is unlikely to be swayed solely by MUI’s rulings.

Prabowo’s absence from the KUII signals to MUI that it is not a priority, contrary to what the organisation aspires to be. The president’s stance is consistent with his absence from the 2025 MUI Congress (MUNAS XI), which is a more significant meeting for the organisation than the KUII, as it elects the organisation’s governing board and chairman. Ma’ruf Amin’s elevation to vice president under Jokowi in 2019 represented MUI at its peak.

Arguably, it is now moving towards eventual decline or a return to its “secondary” status under the New Order era. MUI now has a smaller role in the halal certification process, after the government affirmed its role in the lucrative licensing and regulation parts of the process. This compounds its marginal role in the Muslim public domain, especially as its leaders have not been offered significant government roles.

Still, it is unlikely that Prabowo will totally alienate MUI, especially with his approval ratings nosediving from 81 per cent in November last year to 51 per cent in July this year. In February, Prabowo attended the inauguration of MUI’s executive council. The president approved the construction of a 40-storey complex on prime land along the famous Hotel Indonesia Roundabout in Jakarta to house the MUI headquarters, with the caveat that the space will be shared with other religious institutions and community organisations. The government will continue to engage the institution by sending government representatives and ministers to attend its functions, but its status will be below NU and Muhammadiyah, given their large mass bases that could be turned into formidable electoral power.

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