Prabowo Subianto’s Problematic Start: A Missed Opportunity?

It appears that Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s hard-fought presidential victory has not translated into a convincing governance strategy to achieve his political promises, despite his administration’s Asta Cita (Eight Ideals). The Asta Cita comprises eight visions, 17 priorities, and eight “quick wins” reflecting a desire for national sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency. Compared to his predecessor Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) Nawa Cita (Nine Ideals), which focused on availing the state (menghadirkan negara) to the people through social protection schemes, and increased connectivity and infrastructural development, Asta Cita reflects a strong state that protects national dignity and sovereignty in different policy sectors. With his team barely a month into office, some have criticised Prabowo as failing to ensure he has a uniformly professional cabinet to realise these ambitions.

This contrasts with Jokowi’s first term, which began in 2014 with a clear focus and rapid policy implementation. Jokowi’s presidential win was at the time seen as a fresh chapter in Indonesian politics. Coming from outside the political elite, he built his campaign on promises of menghadirkan negara in all aspects. His electoral victory was followed by the formation of a transition team led by Tim 11 (Team of Eleven), who helped him secure the presidency and had three months to prepare for the formal handover of power in October 2014. Members of this team were later appointed as ministers, cabinet secretaries, or presidential advisers. This arguably made Jokowi’s transition from candidate to president fairly smooth and his cabinet hit the ground running quickly.

A key strength of Jokowi’s early presidency was the clear articulation of his policy priorities. His flagship programmes were designed to improve Indonesia’s infrastructure, streamline the bureaucracy, and enhance social welfare. His cabinet appointments were seen as decisive, blending technocratic expertise with political pragmatism. In short, Jokowi managed to strike a balance although there were some bureaucratic challenges.

Despite having an eight-month transition from post-election to inauguration, Prabowo does not seem to project decisiveness and clarity, except on his signature “free nutritious meals” programme. Immediately after inauguration, his militaristic “bootcamp” for his new cabinet members received mixed reviews. He has not convinced the public how he and his team will promptly implement key campaign promises, such as economic revitalisation, legal reform, and improving national security. While Asta Cita is Prabowo’s vision, his ministers need to convert it into concrete policies. Growing the economy without a clear roadmap, questionable progress on legal reform when law enforcement is weak, and fears that the Suharto-era “dual function” (dwifungsi) of the military and police will return are challenges awaiting the new administration. Improving national security, which includes cyber security, is a delicate matter when the Indonesian bureaucracy is not digitally savvy.

Furthermore, Prabowo’s appointment of loyalists to cabinet positions compromises overall professionalism. For example, the coordinating minister for law, human rights, immigration and correctional services downplayed the significance of human rights violations to journalists when asked about the May 1998 tragedy, attracting criticism from a rights group leader, who challenged the minister’s statement.

Moreover, Prabowo’s leadership style, which is centralised and militaristic, may be less effective in the collaborative environment required for policy formulation and execution.

Two key factors have contributed to this lack of clarity in direction: the absence of a formal transition team and the over-accommodation of political allies’ interests. First, Prabowo chose not to establish a transition team but instead set up a “synchronisation and assistance” team, reasoning that his administration would be a continuation of Jokowi’s. However, this team was manned by only his party Gerindra’s activists. A transition team plays a critical role in ensuring the incoming president is fully briefed on the government’s ongoing policies and priorities, and allows the president-elect to engage in detailed planning for his or her first 100 days in office.

In Prabowo’s case, his synchronisation team apparently neither maintained institutional continuity nor received critical knowledge transfers from Jokowi’s administration. Consequently, when Prabowo took office, there was little clarity regarding which of the government’s policies would take priority. Asta Cita was integrated with the national development plan but was not adequately calibrated to align with the new administration’s needs. For example, the state budget may be barely enough to cover Prabowo’s proposed “quick wins”.

The lack of a formal transition team might have compounded Prabowo’s need to cater to vested interests in a broad political coalition including members of the preceding government. Without effectively managing competing interests, Prabowo has ended up with a large cabinet, comprising 48 ministers, five ministerial-level agency heads and 56 vice ministers, many of whom were loyalists, which risks inefficiency and fragmentation. Already, some ministers are blatantly prioritising their own agendas.   

Moreover, Prabowo’s leadership style, which is centralised and militaristic, may be less effective in the collaborative environment required for policy formulation and execution. His reluctance to delegate authority and focus on consolidating power within his political alliance have contributed to an uneven start for his ministers. While some have hit the ground running like the ministers for foreign affairs and higher education, science, and technology, some have made questionable moves like misusing official letterheads for private purposes, as the minister for villages and the development of disadvantaged regions did. The new vice tourism minister got into trouble and had to back down from a plan for halal tourism in Bali, the only Indonesian province with a Hindu-majority populace. Those who can move fast are either professionals or technocrats supported by professional career staff or spent time coordinating with their predecessors during the transition. These early snafus could have been avoided had the transition period been more effectively used.  

Prabowo’s presidency is in its infancy. He will likely streamline and reshuffle his cabinet after an initial period and can still assert a clear policy vision and engage more actively with the bureaucratic apparatus. However, the honeymoon may be short. Now that he has finally climbed the pinnacle of Indonesian politics, the president must focus on governance if he is to fulfil the promises that brought him to power.

2024/342