Proximity Without Leverage? Indonesia’s Risky Bet on Trump’s Board of Peace

Indonesia is set to become one of the first countries to deploy a “peacekeeping force” to Gaza under US President Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) initiative. The government is reportedly preparing 8,000 troops for the proposed Gaza International Stabilization Force, part of Phase II of the Israel–Hamas ceasefire under the Gaza Peace Plan signed in October 2025. Initially, Jakarta plans to send 1,000 troops as early as April 2026, operating under the institution Trump launched at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. Although 60 countries were invited to join the BoP, only around 27 have formally signed on. Permanent, as opposed to a three-year, membership requires a USD1 billion contribution, though Indonesia does not appear to be committed to paying such a sum.

From the outset, the BoP has been controversial. Originally conceived as a mechanism to end the Gaza conflict and oversee reconstruction, it has evolved into a broader peacekeeping platform with ambitions to address global conflicts. Several traditional US allies – including France, the United Kingdom, and Germany – have declined to participate, while others, such as Japan and South Korea, remain undecided. Many governments question whether the BoP could undermine the United Nations, whose legal mandate and institutional legitimacy in conflict resolution are more firmly established. Concerns also focus on the BoP’s governance structure: Trump serves as chairman and retains the authority to appoint his successor. The Financial Times has described it as “a fledgling club of autocrats”.

Nevertheless, President Prabowo attended the BoP’s inauguration ceremony in Davos and signed its charter, signalling the trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy under his administration. The move has triggered domestic debate, with critics warning of potential consequences for Indonesia’s political positioning. Yet Prabowo has largely contained opposition, including from Islamic groups, reportedly by offering concessions such as a promise to build a headquarters for them in an elite Jakarta neighbourhood.

Why did Prabowo choose to join Trump’s BoP, and does this signal a pivot towards Washington? How does it square with Indonesia’s long-standing non-aligned tradition, its deep economic ties with China, and its membership of the BRICS grouping, which is seen as an alternative to Western-led economic systems?

The answer lies in the broader logic of Prabowo’s foreign policy, less ideological than pragmatic, and shaped by a calibrated proximity to power. As he stated in Davos, “We want to be a friend to all. An enemy to none.”

Taken together, Indonesia risks losing more than it gains from joining the Board of Peace and concluding the trade deal.

Indonesia operates in a fragmented global order in which China dominates trade and industrial investment, the US anchors regional security and wields significant economic leverage, and Europe shapes market access through stringent regulatory standards. Jakarta’s strategy has been to avoid confrontation with any major power while extracting selective advantages from each. Unlike his predecessors, however, Prabowo advances a more pragmatic interpretation of Indonesia’s bebas aktif (non-alignment) policy – shifting it from a principled commitment to Global South leadership and anti-colonial solidarity towards a strategy of strength-building and geopolitical hedging. Rather than emphasising normative leadership, he prioritises maximising leverage in a competitive order, as reflected in his remark to Indonesian bureaucrats: “If we are truly non-aligned, nobody will help us.”

This is precisely where the concern arises. Prabowo’s decision to join the BoP risks signalling alignment with Trump’s “America First” approach that privileges power politics and transactional dominance over multilateral norms. By associating Indonesia with a platform shaped by this doctrine, Jakarta may appear to be endorsing a worldview in which “might is right”, potentially diluting Indonesia’s long-standing identity as a champion of non-alignment and rules-based cooperation.

At the same time, joining the BoP appears aimed at increasing Indonesia’s bargaining leverage, particularly in negotiating tariff reductions with the US. Prabowo combined diplomatic alignment with trade negotiations during his visit to Washington, DC, for the BoP’s first meeting on 20 October. Yet the outcome suggests an asymmetrical settlement: Indonesia will continue to face tariffs of 19 per cent on its exports to the US, while more than 99 per cent of US exports across nearly all sectors, including agriculture, healthcare products, seafood, ICT, automotive goods, and chemicals, will enter Indonesia tariff-free. Jakarta also announced USD38.4 billion in trade and investment deals with US companies, including the extension of a controversial mining contract with Freeport McMoRan in West Papua province until 2041.

The 45-page trade agreement has sparked immediate domestic controversy, with many observers arguing that Indonesia has conceded extensively to US demands. Particularly contentious is a clause (Article 5.3 [3]) stating that the tariff on Indonesian goods will return to 32 per cent, as originally implemented by Trump in April 2025, if Indonesia enters trade arrangements with third parties deemed to undermine fundamental US interests. Similar coercive frameworks have previously been applied to Malaysia and Cambodia, widely interpreted as efforts not only to secure market access but also to deter closer economic alignment with China.

One day after the Indonesia–US trade agreement was signed, the US Supreme Court ruled that President Trump’s tariffs, imposed under emergency powers, were unlawful, affirming that such tariff authority rests with Congress. While the decision cast uncertainty over agreements negotiated under those powers, including that with Indonesia, Trump invoked another legal mechanism to impose a 10 per cent global tariff.

Taken together, Indonesia risks losing more than it gains from joining the BoP and concluding the trade deal. While it may have gained proximity to US power, it has sacrificed economic autonomy and risks diminishing its standing in the Global South and complicating its ties with China. Domestically, joining the BoP may be perceived as appeasing Washington and implicitly legitimising Israeli military actions, particularly in the absence of legal accountability for alleged human rights violations, thereby risking increased public discontent towards the Prabowo administration.

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