Questioning the Neutrality of Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia’s 2024 Election

The votes of nahdliyyin – followers of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – in next week’s election are apparently split based on the political preferences of NU’s current elite. Their main options are to either support the Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD pair or the frontrunners, Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

In this analysis, Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (Team AMIN) are omitted because the current NU leadership is uneasy with Anies and dislikes Muhaimin, still depicting Muhaimin as a political traitor to the late Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid (d. 2009), Indonesia’s fourth president (1999-2001) and past general chairman of Pengurus Besar NU (PBNU).

Currently, the NU elite seem to be closer to Erick Thohir (Minister for State Owned Enterprises) than to Muhaimin. Last year, Thohir was seen as a potential running-mate for any of the three presidential candidates. Now, Thohir is clearly on the side of Prabowo-Gibran and was appointed as the head of NU’s Institute for Human Resources Development (LAKPESDAM PBNU), an important autonomous body.

For the election, NU’s officially declared stance of neutrality might be questionable. The nahdliyyin have seen indications that some NU leaders are siding with a particular presidential candidate. With its membership and affiliations in the tens of millions, NU members’ and nahdlyiin votes have always been highly contested and valued in presidential elections in the post-Suharto era. For instance, in 2019, NU helped to deliver candidate Joko Widodo’s second victory against Prabowo.

The rhetoric of NU neutrality has been repeated from one election to the next since direct presidential elections have begun in Indonesia.

Based on Khittah 1926 (NU’s policy for political neutrality), the result of NU’s National Congress (Muktamar) in 1984 (when Wahid first became chairperson), NU is bound to impartiality over to any political practice. This includes being impartial to even political parties NU itself initiates, like the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). (Muhaimin wrested leadership of the PKB from the Wahid camp years ago, causing the aforementioned rift).  

NU Chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf has declared that NU is neutral in its candidate preference for 2024’s presidential race. He has tried to enforce this stance by allowing his board members to go on leave or even resign if they wish to join the ‘success teams’ (tim sukses) of any candidate. If the individuals do not wish to go on leave or resign, NU headquarters will send them letters of termination. This has already happened to some leaders such as Nusron Wahid (Golkar), Marzuki Mustamar (Chairman, East Java NU), Khofifah Indar Parawansa (Governor, East Java), and many others.  

However, the public and NU members now doubt NU’s neutrality. Abdussalam Shohib (a member of the so-called “blue-blood generation” of NU founders and former functionary, East Java NU) has criticised NU’s leaders for being inconsistent. While NU demands impartiality, Saifullah Yusuf, its Secretary General, has directed members not to choose Team AMIN because Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah) recently declared his support for them. Saifullah also noted that Amien Rais (affiliated with the National Mandate Party, PAN, and former speaker of Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR) supports Team AMIN.

What is more, Saifullah Yusuf has declared that Prabowo will win in East Java and stated that PBNU had its own criteria for a presidential candidate. To this author, this means that NU is not neutral. East Java is a key field of contestation for NU; any candidate who wins here is likely to win in the overall election.

This support of some NU elites for Prabowo will not be officially voiced. Yet some provincial NU leaders have indicated the preference of NU’s Jakarta headquarters for a “one round election” (Pemilu Satu Putaran), implicitly supporting Prabowo. Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, Staquf’s younger brother, minister of religious affairs and former general chairman of ANSOR, NU’s youth wing, has been criticised for his clear preference for Prabowo-Gibran. For instance, Qoumas has publicly displayed the “two finger” (victory) sign, referencing the pair’s electoral code for the election, 02.

NU’s conflicted position can be traced to President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) supporting the current leadership. In 2021, President Jokowi leaned toward Yahya Staquf’s leadership in NU, to replace Said Aqil Siradj. Jokowi announced at the opening ceremony for the NU muktamar in Lampung that NU will be given a concession for mining. After that point, Yahya Staquf seemed to follow Jokowi’s policies. (In Jokowi’s first term, he was asked to be a member of the Presidential Advisory Council.)

Yahya has indicated more than once that NU will not stay away from Jokowi. Many NU programmes receive tremendous support from President Jokowi, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs or other channels. For instance, NU successfully organised the “Religion-20” (R20) summit in 2022 during Indonesia’s G-20 presidency. The most recent significant event showing this closeness between NU and Jokowi was NU’s centennial celebration in Sidoarjo, East Java, in 2023.  

NU’s rhetoric of neutrality has been repeated from one election to the next since direct presidential elections began in Indonesia. To avoid any doubt of NU’s declared neutrality, its elites need to take a more consistent position balancing their official and practical stances.

However, this would be difficult if NU’s elites are trapped in their own political interests.  

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